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JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41. On 
May, 19, 2005, this Court granted the Order of Certification issued by the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, the Honorable Judge Tena Campbell presiding. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Pursuant to the Court's May 19, 2005 Order, the two issues presented are: 
1. Whether the exercise of rights under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101, et. seq.. ("UWCA") implicates a "clear and 
-VI-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
substantial policy" of the State of Utah that would provide a basis for a claim 
of wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and if so, 
2. Whether this cause of action applies in the following circumstances: (a) where 
the employee has not filed for benefits under the UWCA but is retaliated 
against for opposing an employer's treatment of other injured employees who 
are entitled to file for benefits under the UWCA; (b) the employee is not fired, 
but resigns under circumstances that constitute a "constructive discharge;" and 
( c) the employee who has filed for benefits under the UWCA is neither fired 
nor constructively discharged, but experiences other discriminatory treatment 
or harassment from an employer because the employee has exercised rights 
under the UWCA. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are no Determinative Constitutional Provisions presented in this appeal. 
STATUTES 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Annotated, § 34A-2-101 et seq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Court has recognized that there are exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine 
allowing an employee to bring a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy. This Court has stated that one example of such a public policy is that an employer 
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cannot interfere with employees' statutorily created right to the benefits granted by Utah's 
Workers' Compensation statute, Utah Code Ann.§ 34A-2-401 et seq. (the "UWCA"). 
Further, virtually all of the states which have decided workers' compensation retaliation 
cases recognize the claim of wrongful termination based upon the exercise of an employee's 
right to workers' compensation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' allegations that they were: 1) 
terminated for exercising their statutory right to benefits under the UWCA; 2) terminated for 
assisting individuals who sought such benefits; or 3) were otherwise harassed for filing for 
benefits, present cognizable claims. 
INTRODUCTION 
The two certified questions and their subsets have never been the subject of an opinion 
from the Court. While this Court has previously described the filing for benefits under the 
UWCA as a "clear and substantial" public policy, it has never decided a case in which the 
employee sought to recover damages based upon a violation of that public policy. Further, 
the Court has never addressed whether the public policy exception extends to protect 
employees who are not terminated, but who suffer other adverse employment actions or who 
assist fellow employees to exercise rights under the UWCA. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
Plaintiffs Marilyn Touchard ("Ms. Touchard"), Thomas Ammons ("Mr. Amnions"), 
Felix Barela ("Mr. Barela"), Oscar Garcia ("Mr. Garcia"), Dennis Nelson ("Mr. Nelson"), 
Wade Peterson ("Mr. Peterson"), Frank Ross ("Mr. Ross") and Heidi Scott ("Ms. Scott") are 
all former employees of Defendant La-Z-Boy, Inc. ("La-Z-Boy"). P.10, para. 45; P.14, 
para.67;P.17,para.81;P.22,para. 119;P.28,para. 147;P.32,para.l72;P.36,para.l97;P.43, 
para. 242. Plaintiffs filed suit against La-Z-Boy seeking to recover damages based upon La-
Z-Boy5 s: 1) actual or constructive termination of their employment due to their seeking 
benefits under the UWCA; or 2) harassment sufficient to change the terms and conditions of 
their employment due to seeking benefits under the UWCA; or, 3) in Ms. Touchard's case, 
termination for assisting individuals who sought UWCA benefits and for protesting La-Z-
Boy's policies and actions toward those employees. P.46-50. The parties and the Honorable 
District Court Judge Tena Campbell agreed to seek this Court5 s guidance concerning whether 
Utah's public policy exception to the at-will doctrine of employment provides the Plaintiffs 
with causes of action. Tab 11. 
2The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs' Complaint. The Complaint is found 
behind Tab 1 of the Record. All references to the Compliant will be by page and 
paragraph number and will be cited "P. , para. ." While La-Z-Boy disputes many of 
the facts in Plaintiffs' Complaint, the disputed facts related to Plaintiffs' termination and 
claims are largely irrelevant due to the purely legal nature of the questions certified to this 
Court. However, Plaintiffs provide these facts in order to properly frame the legal issues 
before the Court. 
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La-Z-Boy owns and operates a manufacturing plant in Tremonton, Utah, where its 
employees assemble recliners and sofas. P.3, paras. 13-14. This assembly often involves 
repetitive motions and the lifting of heavy furniture, which historically has resulted in 
numerous injuries and re-injuries. P.3-4, para. 15. La-Z-Boy has repeatedly refused to 
change its manufacturing procedures to reduce injuries to its employees, although such 
changes, in some cases, are easy to accomplish and cost little, if anything. P.4, para. 16. For 
example, employees were required to double-stack chairs at the end of the production line 
causing the employees to suffer significant shoulder and back injuries. P.4, para. 17. For a 
time after it became aware of this problem, La-Z-Boy extended the production line, providing 
enough room so that the chairs did not have to be double-stacked, which substantially 
reduced the number of injuries to employees. P.4, para. 17-18. Notwithstanding this simple 
solution, La-Z-Boy then shortened its production line again, requiring employees to stack 
chairs. P.4, para. 18. When it made this change, employees again started to suffer back and 
shoulder injuries. P.4, para. 18. 
Most employers carry Workers' Compensation insurance, which is funded by an 
insurance company or by Utah's Workers' Compensation Fund. P.5, para.23. Regardless 
of who provides the insurance, the employer is not directly responsible for the amounts paid 
to an injured employee, but instead pays a premium based on the number of workers and the 
type of occupation in which they are engaged. P.5, para.23. Although an employer's 
premium can increase if its employees are repeatedly injured at work, the additional cost is 
-x-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
significantly less than the cost of the medical expenses and the temporary disability payments 
made to its employees. P.5, para.24. 
Unlike most companies, La-Z-Boy's Workers' Compensation program is self-funded. 
P. 5, para.25. This means that after receiving approval from the State of Utah, La-Z-Boy does 
not have to obtain Workers' Compensation insurance, but instead, directly covers the medical 
costs incurred by its employees and makes the temporary disability payments directly to its 
employees. P.5-6, para. 25. The UWCA allows such an arrangement. U.C.A. §§ 34A-2-
201,201.5. Id. Although La-Z-Boy's Workers' Compensation plan is self-insured, it hired 
the Crawford Company ("Crawford") to administer the plan. During Plaintiffs' employment, 
Crawford oversaw the payment of medical benefits and other compensation. P. 6, para.26. 
Crawford employed a claims adjuster, Kathleen Hobbs ("Ms. Hobbs"), who was primarily 
responsible for reviewing and approving or disproving claims. Id. 
Because La-Z-Boy is self-insured, it could become very expensive if an employee is 
injured, requires expensive medical care and/or cannot work and receives temporary 
disability payments in lieu of wages. P.6, para.27. Instead of trying to reduce these costs by 
improving working conditions, La-Z-Boy engaged in a campaign to delay and deny 
employees medical benefits and to fire those employees who had severe injuries requiring 
expensive medical treatment and/or who were likely to be re-injured in the future. P.6, 
para.28. La-Z-Boy directed Ms. Hobbs to routinely deny or delay the administration of 
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legitimate claims by injured La-Z-Boy employees. P.6, para.29. This included refusing to 
authorize necessary medical treatment in a timely manner. Id. 
La-Z-Boy also employed its own nurse, Lynda Saterfield ("Ms. Saterfield"), to review 
Workers' Compensation claims, and to examine the employees who made such claims. P.7, 
para.30. La-Z-Boy directed Ms. Saterfield to take a hostile attitude towards the employees, 
and she routinely delayed and/or refused treatment of injured workers. Id. Ms. Saterfield also 
asked La-Z-Boy employees to "spy" on injured employees to see if the injured employee was 
faking his or her injuries. P.7, para.31. 
La-Z-Boy also utilized a company doctor, Dr. Douglas Walker ("Dr. Walker"). P.7, 
para.33. Ms. Saterfield often called Dr. Walker and asked him to change the work 
restrictions he had prescribed for specific injured employees, so that those employees would 
have to go back to work before they were fully recovered. Id. This often meant that those 
employees would be re-injured. Id. 
Delaying or refusing medical treatment to injured employees allowed La-Z-Boy to 
terminate employees when they did not recover quickly enough. La-Z-Boy had a policy of 
terminating employees who could not return to their normal job after 120 days. P.8; para.37. 
Delaying medical treatment meant that many injured employees could not possibly recover 
within the 120-day deadline for return to work. Id. They were then terminated for not being 
able to work. Id. 
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La-Z-Boy generally put its injured employees who received Workers' Compensation 
benefits on alternate duty, or "light-duty" assignment, which was ostensibly a way for the 
employee to continue working while recovering from his or her work-related injuries. P.8, 
para.36. In reality, "light-duty" served as a way of punishing employees who were injured 
by harassing and demeaning them. Id. For example, La-Z-Boy' s Human Resources Director, 
Thorn Smith ("Mr. Smith"), told La-Z-Boy supervisors that light-duty should be made as 
unpleasant as possible and to "weed out" employees who were faking their injuries. Id. 
Accordingly, "light-duty" assignments usually included picking up garbage around the plant 
for several hours per day. Id. Not only were such assignments demeaning to employees, they 
often violated the injured employees' doctors' restrictions. P.8, para.37. For instance, 
employee with back injuries had to bend over to perform the "light-duty" assignments. This 
contributed to lengthy recover periods for employees, who were often fired because they 
could not meet the 120-day deadline. 
La-Z-Boy also required employees who had surgery to come back to work for at least 
an hour on the day of their surgery, and each day thereafter. P.9, para.39. This policy meant 
that La-Z-Boy would not have to report lost-time due to work-related injuries to the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"). Id. The practice, however, was 
abusive to injured employees by requiring them to come into work under the influence of 
narcotic pain medications and delayed their recoveries so that they could not meet the 120-
day deadline. Id. 
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Finally, La-Z-Boy routinely denied employees' requests for transfers after they 
returned to work after their injuries. P.9, para. 40. Instead, employees were put back to work 
doing the same job, at the same work station, without modification. Id. Because La-Z-Boy 
refused to make modifications to the work stations, these employees often were unable to 
continue working for more than a few days after their return from an injury and were then 
fired. Id. 
Facts regarding Mr. Ammons 
Mr. Ammons worked at La-Z-Boy in a manufacturing position for 21 years - from 
February 1980 until his termination on or about October 25, 2001. P. 14, para. 67. As an 
upholsterer, Mr. Ammons was required to repeatedly lift and flip recliners. P. 14, para. 68. 
Beginning around August 2000, Mr. Ammon began to experience pain in his shoulders. Id. 
He promptly notified his manager, Todd Burton, about the pain. P. 15, para. 69. 
Shortly after Mr. Amnion's complaint, La-Z-Boy extended the production line of the 
upholsterers, so that they would not have to double-stack chairs. P. 15, para. 70. Because Mr. 
Ammons did not have to lift chairs above his head with this modification, his shoulders 
stopped bothering him. P. 15, para. 71. However, in April 2001, a new manager, Scott 
Wakely ("Mr. Wakely"), took over the upholstery department. P. 15, para. 72. Mr. Wakely 
changed the procedures back to the double-stacking procedure that had previously been used. 
Id. 
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Within a few weeks of resuming double-stacking, Mr. Ammons' shoulder pain 
returned. P. 15, para. 73. He immediately informed Mr. Wakely and La-Z-Boy about his 
injuries. Id. Instead of modifying the work station or sending him for medical treatment, Mr. 
Wakely told Mr. Ammons he could not even see a doctor about his shoulder until after 
another injured employee returned to work and was working at full capacity. P. 15-16, para. 
74. 
Mr. Ammons obtained the paperwork to fill out a Workers' Compensation claim from 
Ms. Saterfield, but, as directed by Mr. Wakely, waited to fill it out until the other injured 
employee returned. P. 16, para. 76. La-Z-Boy then terminated Mr. Ammons before he could 
see a doctor or apply for Workers' Compensation benefits. P. 16, para. 77. 
After Mr. Ammons was terminated, in December 2001, he was diagnosed with bone 
spurs in both shoulders and other health problems, all attributable to the working conditions 
at La-Z-Boy. P. 16, para. 78. His application for Workers' Compensation benefits was 
denied by La-Z-Boy. P. 16, para. 79. It was not until over a year later, in December 2002 that 
La-Z-Boy recognized his Workers' Compensation claim. P. 16, para. 80. 
Facts regarding Felix Barela 
Mr. Barela also worked at La-Z-Boy in a manufacturing position for 21 years - from 
November 1979 until his termination on or about August 22, 2000. P. 17, para. 81. For 
approximately 16 years, Mr. Barela operated a swing saw, cutting wood for the frames of the 
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chairs and sofas. P. 17, para. 82. For his last five years at La-Z-Boy, he worked as an 
assembler. Id. 
Mr. Barela injured his back while at work on April 17,2000. P. 17, para. 83. On April 
19, 2000, Mr. Barela went to La-Z-Boy's doctors, who sent him to Bear River Hospital for 
an x-ray. P. 17, para. 84. The x-ray showed that Mr. Barela had a slipped disc in his back. 
Id. The doctors gave Mr. Barela certain work restrictions, including no bending and no 
stooping. P. 17, para. 85. Mr. Barela applied for Workers' Compensation benefits and La-Z-
Boy assigned him to walk around the plant and pick up cigarette butts. P. 17, paras. 86-87. 
These activities violated his restrictions because they involved both bending and stooping. 
Id. 
Mr. Smith refused to change the assignment and told Mr. Barela that he would have 
to continue picking up cigarette butts. P. 18, para. 88. Jose Martinez, the light-duty 
supervisor, told Mr. Barela that Mr. Smith had instructed him to make the light-duty work 
as uncomfortable and unpleasant as possible, so that injured employees would either not want 
to apply for Workers' Compensation benefits or "decide" to recover more quickly. P. 18, 
para. 89. Because Mr. Barela's first doctor had placed restrictions on what Mr. Barela could 
do, La-Z-Boy sent him to one of its own doctors, Dr. Walker. P. 18, para. 92. Dr. Walker 
released Mr. Barela to go back to work with no restrictions, even though Mr. Barela was not 
fully recovered. P. 19, para.93-94. After Mr. Barela returned to his job, which involved 
lifting, turning, and twisting, his injuries immediately flared up again, and he was able to 
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work for only about three weeks before his back became too painful to continue. P. 19, para. 
94. 
The next month, Mr. Barela again went to see Dr. Walker who put Mr. Barela back 
on work restrictions, which included no twisting, bending, stooping, or kneeling. P. 19, para. 
95. Mr. Barela again applied for Workers5 Compensation benefits and was immediately 
assigned to pick up cigarette butts and other garbage. P. 19, paras. 96-97. La-Z-Boy refused 
to change the assignment even though it violated his restrictions.. P. 19, paras. 97-98. 
On or about July 25, 2000, Mr. Barela had an MRI, which showed that he had 
herniated discs, as well as two bulging discs that had not yet ruptured. P.20, para. 103. Dr. 
Walker requested that Mr. Barela be allowed to change jobs, to Quality Control, because it 
would not exacerbate Mr. Barela's back pain. P.20, para. 105. Mr. Barela bid on an 
available Quality Control job at La-Z-Boy, but La-Z-Boy gave the job to an employee who 
was supposed to be ineligible to bid for the job. P.20, paras. 106-07. In August 2000, La-Z-
Boy assigned Mr. Barela to another job which violated his restrictions. P.21, paras. 108-09. 
Shortly thereafter, La-Z-Boy discharged Mr. Barela before he could have surgery on 
his back. P.21, para. 110. La-Z-Boy claimed that Mr. Barela used the wrong rate per piece 
on his time cards to account for his production. P.21, para. 111. La-Z-Boy's reason was 
pretextual because Mr. Barela was not being paid on a piece rate basis. Id. 
After his termination, Mr. Barela finally had surgery on his back in November 2000. 
P.21, para. 113. However, it was not until 2002 that Mr. Barela was able to obtain a 
-xvn-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Workers' Compensation judgment, which included an agreement from La-Z-Boy to cover 
his future medical bills. P.22, para. 115. Mr. Barela's injuries are still very painful and in 
February 2003, he went to see Dr. Bryson Smith, a neurologist, who recommended another 
surgery to relieve Mr. Barela's continuing back pain. P.22, para. 116. Currently, La-Z-Boy 
is refusing to pay for Mr. Barela's visits to Dr. Smith or for the needed surgery. P.22, para. 
117. 
Facts regarding Oscar Garcia 
Oscar Garcia ("Mr. Garcia") worked for La-Z-Boy, mainly in the paint booth in the 
metal room, foi 17 1/2 years - from March 1985, until La-Z-Boy terminated him on or about 
September 20,2002. P.22, para. 119. Mr Garcia'sjob required him to repeatedly lift at least 
60 pounds over his head. P.23, para. 120 Over the course of his employment with La-Z-
Boy, Mr. Garcia suffered multiple injuries due to accidents and repetitive motions. P.23, 
para. 121. He eventually had seven surgeries to try to correct his injuries. Id. 
I\It Garcia received Workers' Compensation for several, but not all, of his injuries 
over the years of his employment. P.23, para. 122. Mr. Garcia was first injured at La-Z-Boy 
in 1989, when he was struck in the face by a metal hook hanging from the ceiling at the plant, 
breaking four of his teeth. P.23, para. 123. He was never offered Workers' Compensation 
benefits to cover his medical expenses for this accident, and used his own private insurance 
to pay for his false teeth. Id. In 1994, Mr. Garcia was sprayed in both eyes with paint while 
he was cleaning the paint machine at the plant. P.23, para. 125. Although he had to be taken 
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to the hospital by ambulance and missed two weeks of work, he was not offered Workers' 
Compensation benefits by La-Z-Boy. P.23,para. 125. 
After years of repeatedly lifting 60 pounds over his head on a daily basis, Mr. Garcia5 s 
elbows began hurting him and he had several surgeries to correct the problems. P.24, para. 
126. On each occasion Mr. Garcia was injured, La-Z-Boy and Crawford delayed processing 
his applications for Workers' Compensation benefits for many months, often claiming that 
his paperwork was missing. P.24, para. 127. 
By 1998, Mr. Garcia had developed tendinitis in both his wrists. P.24, para. 128. He 
received an impairment rating of 4% whole body due to the damage to his right wrist, but 
he did not receive any compensation for the damage to his left wrist. Id. When he tried to 
obtain treatment for his left wrist, the administrator spread rumors that Mr. Garcia "just 
wants money to buy his drugs." P.24, para. 124. 
Shortly after his tendinitis developed, Mr. Garcia fell from a machine while he was 
cleaning, resulting in further injury to both hands. P.24-25, para. 130. Although Mr. Garcia 
needed surgery on both hands, La-Z-Boy refused to pay for the necessary surgery on his left 
hand. P.25, para. 132. After surgery on his right hand, La-Z-Boy put Mr. Garcia on light 
duty. P.25, para. 131. Although he was under doctor's orders not to use his right hand, his 
light-duty assignment required him to pick up items such as tools and small screws, which 
he could not do without using both hands. Id. La-Z-Boy later moved him to another 
assignment which also violated his work restrictions. Id. 
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Mr. Garcia called his surgeon to get a prescription for pain medication. P.26, para. 
136. His doctor denied the request because his records said Mr. Garcia abused pain killers. 
Id. It appears that Ms. Hobbs had put notes in Mr. Garcia's file stating that he abused 
painkillers, although this was untrue and there was not evidence to suggest it was true. P.26, 
para. 137. 
In late summer of 2002, when the metal room where Mr. Garcia worked was closed, 
he was moved to a different department, which required him to fill out his i:nic 
differently than he had been doing. P.27, para. 141. Although he followed his supervisor's 
instructions on filling out the cards, he was fired for "cheating" on the time cards. P.27, 
paras - 144 \ Iter Mr. Garcia was terminated, Mr. Garcia could not find employment for 
over a year because La-Z-Boy repeatedly told potential employers that he had cheated on his 
time cards. P.28, para. 146. 
Facts regarding Dennis Nelson 
Dennis Nelson ("Mr. Nelson") worked for La-Z-Boy as an upholsterer for almost 16 
years - from April 1987 until his termination on or about January 7, 2003. P.28, para. 147. 
Mr. Nelson injured his hand on March 28, 2001, while he was upholstering chairs. P. 28, 
para. , 18. He received Workers' Compensation benefits for two months following his 
injury. ' ' \ i KNUII of this injury, Mr. Nelson was required to undergo ligament 
reconstruction surgery in October 2001. P.28, para. 149. On the day of his surgery, and for 
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two weeks after, La-Z-Boy required him to come to work, clock in for an hour, and sit in the 
nurse's station. P.29, para. 150. 
Mr. Nelson then began gradually increasing his work hours and started working a 
light-duty assignment. P.29, para. 151. However, his assignment required him to used his 
injured hand, in violation of his work restrictions. P.29, para. 152. La-Z-Boy refused to 
change his assignment. P.29, para. 152-53. 
In the meantime, the Safety Manager had evaluated Mr. Nelson's work station and 
recommended certain ergonomic changes. P.29, para. 156. La-Z-Boy refused to implement 
the recommended changes and after a brief period, the pain in Mr. Nelson's hand returned. 
P.29, para. 157. In November 2002, Mr. Nelson had to go back on light duty. P.30, para. 
159. Mr. Nelson had a second surgery on his hand in December 2002. P.30, para. 161. La-
Z-Boy again required him to go back to work at the plant on the day he was let out of 
hospital, while he was still on Percocet and Morphine. Id. Just as he had after his prior 
surgery, Mr. Nelson began working for an hour a day on light-duty assignment. P.30, para. 
163. This time, Mr. Nelson's light-duty assignment was to rip sheets of time cards at their 
perforations. Id. This assignment also violated his work restrictions because he had to use 
his injured hand. P.31, para. 164. La-Z-Boy refused to modify the work or give him 
something else to do, and told him that if he did not do his assigned duties he would not 
receive Workers' Compensation benefits. P.31, para. 165. 
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On or about December 20,2002, Mr. Nelson went back to his doctor, who again told 
him not to use his injured hand. P.31, para. 166. La-Z-Boy still refused to modify his 
assignment. Id. Mr. Nelson saw Dr. Okawa again on January 3,2003. P.31, para. 166 Dr 
Okawa again told him not to use his hand and that he should only work one hour a day if the 
onlyjobLa-Z-Boy would give him required the use of both hands. P.31, para. 167. La-Z-
Boy again refused to give him a different assignment. P.31, para. 168. 
In January, 2003, Mr. Smith fired Mr. Nelson for allegedly falsifying a doctor's note, 
without even checking with the doctor, which would have shown that the allegations were 
untrue. P.32, para. 169. 
Facts regarding Wade Peterson 
Wade Peterson ("Mr. Peterson") worked for La-Z-Boy primarily doing the final 
assembly on sleeper sofas, for 17 years - from November 1985 until his termination on or 
about July 8, 2002. P.32, para. 172. Mr. Peterson had to lift entire sofas by himself as part 
of his job. P.32, para. 173. In doing so, Mr. Peterson injured his right shoulder and ripped 
his bicep tendon on or about February 4, 2002. Id. Other employees had been similarly 
injured doing the same jobs. P.32, para. 
Immediately after his injury, Mr. Peterson went to Dr. Walker, who referred him to 
another doctor for an MRI. P.33, para. 175. La-Z-Boy refused to allow Mr. Peterson to have 
the MRI for almost a month. P.33, para. 178. Shortly after his injuries occurred, Mr. 
Peterson applied for Workers' Compensation and began working an alternate duty position. 
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P.33, para. 176. His duties included screwing nuts into bolts and picking up garbage in the 
parking lot. Id. Mr. Peterson's light-duty supervisor told him that La-Z-Boy wanted to make 
light-duty as uncomfortable as possible so that employees would go back to their jobs. P.33, 
para. 177. 
The MRI showed that Mr. Peterson suffered from a severe loss of cartilage in his right 
shoulder. P.33, para. 179. He had surgery on his shoulder in March, 2002. Id. La-Z-Boy 
told Mr. Peterson that he had to report to work immediately after the surgery. P.33, para. 
180. Mr. Peterson, however, got a doctor's note to excuse him from having to come in on 
the day of his surgery. Id. 
Mr. Peterson knew that La-Z-Boy terminated employees who stayed on light-duty for 
more than 120 days. P.34, para. 186. Therefore, in May, he told his surgeon, Dr. Larson, 
that he was going to lose his job if he did not go back to work and had the doctor release him 
to go back to work. Id. Mr. Peterson went back to lifting sofas. P.34, para. 187. Within 
days of returning to his job, on June 1,2002, he injured his other shoulder. Id. Mr. Peterson 
applied for Workers' Compensation benefits and was immediately put on light-duty again. 
P.35,para. 188. 
Once again, Mr. Peterson went to see Dr. Larson who recommended another surgery. 
P.35, para. 189. La-Z-Boy, however, demanded that Mr. Peterson get a second medical 
opinion. Id. Before he could obtain this second opinion, La-Z-Boy fired Mr. Peterson telling 
him that it had no use for him anymore. P.35, para. 192. 
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Facts regarding Frank Ross 
Frank Ross ("Mr. Ross") worked at La-Z-Boy as an upholsterer and upholstery trainer, 
J
 01 18 years - from February 1983 until La-Z-Boy forced him to resign, on or about October 
23, 2001. P.36, para. 197. Mr. Ross5 jobs at La-Z-Boy required him to perform repetitive 
tasks such as stapling foam and cardboard and lifting upholstered chairs on and off of 
conveyer belts. P.36, para. 199. When the conveyer belts, which were about waist-high, 
became backed up, he had to throw the chairs on top of each other. Id. Because of the types 
of movements required by this job, at least five of Mr. Ross' coworkers in the upholstery 
department had shoulder injuries, and another five had back injuries. P.36, para. 200. 
On or about August 8,1999, Mr. Ross injured his right shoulder and back. P.37, para. 
201. Mr. Ross filed an accident report and went to see La-Z-Boy's doctor, Dr. Walker. P.37, 
para. 203. Dr. Walker referred him to Dr. Brad Larson, who recommended that he have 
surgery. P.3 , para. 204. La-Z-Boy demanded that Mr. Ross get a second opinion, and sent 
him to Dr. Brian Morgan, who said Mr. Ross did not need surgery. P.37, para. 2 J5. 
Meanwhile, Mr. Ross continued working his regular job, although he was in great 
pain, but filed a Workers' Compensation claim. P. 37, paras. 207-08. It was denied by 
Crawford. Id. Either La-Z-Boy, or Crawford at La-Z-Boy's direction, orally informed Mr. 
Ross' surgeon that it would not pay for the surgery. P.38, para. 210. Crawford finally 
approved the surgery several months later and only after Ms. Touchard spoke to Ms. Hobbs 
on Mr. Ross' behalf. P.38, para. 211. Mr. Ross then scheduled the surgery with Dr. Larson, 
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but La-Z-Boy refused to allow it, and he had to cancel the procedure. P.38, para. 212. Seven 
months passed before Mr. Ross' surgery was approved and he began receiving Workers' 
Compensation benefits. P.38, para. 215. 
After Mr. Ross came back to work, he was not able to regain full use of his right arm. 
P.39, para. 216. His doctors later told him that the long delay in getting surgery had caused 
permanent damage to his nerves. Id. In July 2000, because he could not use his right arm, 
La-Z-Boy pulled him from his job and put him on light-duty, where Mr. Ross was required 
to pick up trash. P.39, para. 217-18. The bending and stooping severely exacerbated Mr. 
Ross' back condition, but Mr. Smith told him that he had to do it or he would be fired. P.39, 
para. 219. 
In October 2000, while still working light-duty, Mr. Ross had a second surgery on his 
right shoulder. P.39, para. 221. This surgery was unsuccessful at restoring his full mobility. 
Id. Nonetheless, La-Z-Boy suddenly stopped sending him Workers' Compensation checks 
claiming that he had reached "maximum medical improvement." P.39-40, paras. 222-23. 
The injury left Mr. Ross with an impairment rating of 16% whole body. P.40, para. 
224. His doctor recommended permanent work restrictions preventing him from using his 
back to lift. Id. Mr. Ross was later assigned to push approximately 150-200 steel holding 
carts with canvas, weighing about 200 pounds, around the plant. P.40, para. 226. Due to his 
ongoing limitations, he could not effectively do this job. Id. Mr. Ross then asked Mr. Garren 
for a reasonable accommodation to allow him to do the job. P.41, para. 227. Mr. Garren got 
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so angry that he turned red in the face, and told Mr. Ross that if he had to accommodate Mr. 
Ross, he would have to accommodate everyone. Id. Mr. Ross was moved into a training 
position and then asked to temporarily work on the night-shift. P.41, para. 228. La-Z-Bo) 
denied Mr. Ross5 subsequent requests to get moved back to the day-shift. P.41, para. 231. 
On October 20,2001, Mr. Gambell told Mr. Ross that as long as he worked for La-Z-
Boy, he would have to work the night shift, with no opportunity to bid on other jobs. P.42, 
para. 235. Yet, during Mr. Ross5 last two weeks at La-Z-Boy, two other night shift 
employees, both of whom had worked at the company less than two months and had no 
bidding rights, were moved to the day shift. P.42, para. 236. 
On October 24, 2001, Mr. Ross was constructively discharged because he could no 
longer work on the night shift. P.42, para. 238. Within two weeks of Mr. Ross' constructive 
discharge, the trainer who replaced him was put on the day shift permanently. P.43. Para. 
239. 
After Mr. R t ^ w a- icrminated, his injuries continued to bother him. P.43, para. 240. 
He called Crawford to get La-Z-Boy to pay for his medical bills for ongoing treatment. Id. 
Mr. Ross was forced to file a Workers' Compensation complaint to get La-Z-Boy to pay for 
his ongoing physical therapy and pain medication. I '.43, para. 241. 
Facts regarding Heidi Scott 
Heidi Scott ("Ms. Scott") worked for La-Z-Boy as a line-loader, from September 1999 
until her termination oii or about January 4, 2001. P.43, para. 242. Ms. Scott injured her 
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lower back while working at La-Z-Boy on or about August 31,2000, when she lifted a chair. 
P.43, para. 243. The day after her injury, she collapsed in pain. P.43, para. 245. She went 
to see La-Z-Boy's doctor who sent her to get x-rays. Id. The x-rays showed that she had a 
new fracture in her back, but also showed an old healed fracture. P.44, para. 246. La-Z-Boy 
claimed that Ms. Scott's pain was because of her old injury. Id. 
Dr. Walker referred Ms. Scott to a back specialist who confirmed that the pain was 
due to the new injury. P.44, paras. 247-48. He recommended that Ms. Scott begin physical 
therapy, in an attempt to avoid surgery. P.44, para. 248. While Ms. Scott was going to 
physical therapy, Ms. Saterfield repeatedly told her (and other employees) that Ms. Scott was 
faking her injury. P. 44, para. 250. 
Although Ms. Touchard made suggestions to La-Z-Boy's management about 
accommodating Ms. Scott's injuries, such as raising the sewing machine, La-Z-Boy ignored 
these suggestions. P.44, para. 251. On January 4,2001, La-Z-Boy told Ms. Scott that there 
was no longer a position for her at the company and terminated her. P.44, para. 252. 
After Ms. Scott was terminated, her doctor determined that she had dessication of her 
L5-SI disc and spondylolisthesis, and recommended surgery. P.45, para. 255. When she 
asked for Workers' Compensation to cover surgery, Ms. Hobbs told her that her case had 
been closed. P.45, para. 256. 
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Facts regarding Ms. Touchard 
Ms Touchard worked as the environmental/assistant safety manager at La-Z-Boy from 
September 1999 to June 16, 2002, P If) pani 45. One of Ms. Touchard's responsibilities 
was to find out why La-Z-Boy's Workers' Compensation costs were so high and increasing. 
P. 10, para. 46. AI tei i investigating the situation, Ms. Touchard determined that La-Z-Boy had 
a high injury rate, and that the company's Workers' Compensation claims were Demi: 
mismanaged P. 10 par:) 47 M Touchard w rote a memorandum to Mr. Smith about these 
problems. She said that employees were waiting for extensive periods of time to receive 
treatment, diagnostic testing, and/or resolution to their claims, due to the intentional 
mismanagement of their claims. P.l 1, para. 48; see also Exhibit "A' to Complaint. 
1 ouchard also reported that the claims adjuster from Crawfon: \ K . Hobbs, was 
hostile towards employees who had filed Workers' Compensation claims. P.l 1, para. 49. 
No one m La-Z-Boy's management took any action in response to Ms. Touchard's 
memorandum. P. 11, para. 51 
As part of her job duties, Ms. Touchard also led the ergonomics team. P. 11, para. 52. 
In the summer of 2000, Ms. Touchard did a study of the upholsterers' work stations, because 
of the high injury rate among those workers. Id. She drafted a memorandum regarding her 
findings, which stated that: 1) 7 out of 8 upholsterers at La-Z-Boy were complaining about 
shoulder problems caused by double-stacking; and 2) employees would eventually need 
difficult and expensive rotator-cuff treatment. P.l 1-12, para. 53-54. In response, La-Z-Boy 
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changed the production line so that employees did not have to double-stack chairs. P. 12, 
para. 56. This change was temporary, however, and once it was undone, employees began 
getting injured again. Id. 
On July 28, 2000, Ms Touchard met with Mr. Smith and told him that alternate duty 
assignments were demeaning, and were creating huge problems with the employees. P. 12, 
para. 57. She told Mr. Smith that employees decided not to report injuries, just to avoid 
being made fun of by management and harassed with demeaning tasks. Id. Mr. Smith 
became very angry with, and hostile to, Ms. Touchard because of her comments. Id. Mr. 
Smith began criticizing her, recommending that she be written up, and delaying changes or 
programs she was trying to implement. P. 13, para. 58. 
In February 2001, Mr. Garren falsely accused Ms. Touchard of coaching employees 
on how they could sue La-Z-Boy and told her that she could not tell employees they had a 
legal right to contact Utah's Labor Commission. P. 13, para. 60. 
In October 2001, Ms. Touchard voiced her objections to the 120-day return to work 
rule, when La-Z-Boy management was considering adopting the policy. P. 13, para. 61. Mr. 
Garren got angry with Ms. Touchard and told her she was never to discuss employees' rights 
with the employees. Id. 
On December 3, 2001, Ms. Touchard told Mr. Garren that an employee had been 
injured and was entitled to Workers' Compensation benefits, but those benefits were being 
improperly denied by La-Z-Boy. P. 13, para. 62. Ms. Touchard was disciplined for these 
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statements and told that she would be fired if she ever talked to any employees about their 
Workers' Compensation issues or their injuries. P. 14, para. 63. Ms. Touchard went on 
maternity leave on December 22, 2001. P. 14, para. 65. While she was out on maternity 
leave, La-Z-Boy filled Ms. Touchard's position and terminated her because she opposed its 
practices of abusing employees who applied for Worker's Compensation benefits Jd 
SUMMARY Oh I HE ARGUMENT 
This Court should hold that terminating an employee for seeking benefits pursuant to 
the UWC A implicates a clear and substantial public policy allowing the terminated employee 
to recover tort damages whether the employee is actualK < n constructively discharged, for 
the employer's violation of that public policy. The Court should also hold that employees 
who are terminated for aiding or assisting other employees in obtaining benefits, or for 
opposing an employer's practice of violating public policy arc also entitled to recover 
damages. Finally, the Court should allow an employee who is harassed by an employer for 
seeking benefits to recover damages. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. AN EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO OBTAIN BENEFITS UNDER THE 
UWCA IS A "CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL POLICY" OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH AND PROVIDES A BASIS FOR A CLAIM OF WRONGFUL 
TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF THAT PUBLIC POLICY. 
This Court has recognized that certain terminations violate Utah's public policy and 
are exceptions to the principle of at-will employment allowing an employee to recover 
damages for the termination. In Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1042 (Utah 
1989), the Court first recognized, u[w]here an employee is discharged for a reason or in a 
manner that contravenes sound principles of established and substantial public policy, the 
employee may typically bring a tort cause of action against his employer." Since Berube, the 
Court has refined the exception and made clear that it only applies if the public policy 
allegedly violated is "established and substantial." Hansen v. American Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 
950 (Utah 2004). While the Court has listed the UWCA as the statutory expression of a 
substantial public policy in several decisions, the violation of which can lead to a tort claim 
of wrongful discharge, it has never specifically held that such a claim exists in Utah. The 
Court should now hold that an employer who terminates an employee for exercising a 
statutory right under the UWCA violates Utah's public policy of ensuring injured workers 
are entitled to benefits, thereby providing the employee with a claim for wrongful discharge. 
A. This Court's Prior Decisions Demonstrate the Applicability of the 
Exception to At-Will Employment to this Case. 
In Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395,408 (Utah 1998), the Court stated: 
1 
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In our previous cases we have already outlined certain conduct that typically 
brings into play a clear and substantial public policy: (i) refusing to commit an 
illegal or wrongful act, such as refusing to violate the antitrust laws; (ii) 
performing a public obligation, such as accepting jury duty; (iii) exercising a 
legal right or privilege, such as filing a workers' compensation claim; or (iv) 
reporting to a public authority criminal activity of the employer. 
Citations omitted, emphasis added. This Court recently reiterated that filing a workers' 
compensation claim implicates a clear and substantial public policy. Hansen, 96 P.3d at 952. 
Here, Plaintiffs' allege that La-Z-Boy harassed and then discharged them for exercising their 
rights under the UWC A. This is the exact same conduct recognized by the Court in Ryan and 
Hansen as conduct which "brings into play a clear and substantial public policy." Id.3 
Presumably, this Court would not have repeated the use of "filing a workers' 
compensation claim" as an example of a clear and substantial Utah public policy in Hansen 
3In the District Court, La-Z-Boy claimed that this Court has taken an "unusually 
conservative approach" to recognizing new claims under the public policy exception to 
the at-will doctrine. However, Hansen noted: 
The analysis of whether the public policy exception applies to a particular 
legal right or privilege will frequently require a balancing of competing 
legitimate interests: the interests of the employer to regulate the workplace 
environment to promote productivity, security, and similar lawful business 
objectives, and the interests of the employees to maximize access to their 
statutory and constitutional rights within the workplace. 
96 P.3d at 953. Similarly, La-Z-Boy's reliance in the District Court on Buckner v. 
Kennard, 99 P.3d 842 (Utah 2004) for the proposition that the Court would not recognize 
Plaintiffs' claim is misplaced. In Buckner, the Court specifically noted that there was no 
"'clear and substantial' public policy" to be vindicated by addressing pay inequality for 
deputies. Id. at 856. However, as outlined above, the Court has used the UWCA as an 
example of a public policy that is "clear and substantial." 
2 
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unless it were just that. "Filing a worker's compensation claim" in Utah implicates a "clear 
and substantial public policy" which should be protected by a cause of action for wrongful 
termination. Accordingly, an employer's interference with an employee's exercise of rights 
under the UWCA is sufficient factual basis to support a claim for wrongful termination. 
The Court's guidance in Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 
1992) demonstrates why the Court has used "filing a worker's compensation claim" as an 
example of a "clear and substantial" public policy. In Retherford, the Court stated: 
The following questions are relevant to determining whether a statute embodies a 
clear and substantial public policy. First, one must ask whether the policy in question 
is one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed to the parties only. 
Second, one must inquire whether the public interest is so strong and the policy so 
clear and weighty that we should place the policy beyond the reach of contract, 
thereby constituting a bar to discharge that parties cannot modify, even when freely 
willing and of equal bargaining power. Since these are the consequences of 
qualifying a policy as a basis for the tort action, these considerations should inform 
the evaluation of the policy itself. 
Id at 966, n.9. 
The UWCA is the statutory expression of the clear and substantial public policy 
protecting an injured employee's right to receive benefits. The UWCA is such an expression 
because of its comprehensive nature and because it supplants all other causes as a result of 
a workplace injury: 
The Worker's Compensation Act is a comprehensive scheme enacted to 
provide speedy compensation to workers who are injured as a result of an 
accident occurring in the course and scope of their employment, irrespective 
of negligence on the part of employers or employees. The Act basically 
creates a no-fault type insurance protection scheme for work-related injuries 
in lieu of traditional common law tort remedies. Although in some cases, the 
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amount of compensation a worker can receive under the Act is more limited 
than the worker might receive in common law damages, compensation is 
available without regard to fault, is more flexible in providing for physical 
disabilities and loss of wages, medical benefits, and benefits for dependents 
and survivors, and is provided more speedily and generally with less expense. 
Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 1996) {emphasis added); see also 
Workers' Compensation Fund v. State of Utah, 533 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 2005) (outlining 
almost ninety year history of the fund and its role in Utah). Indeed, the UWCA provides the 
exclusive remedy to workers injured on the job: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries 
sustained by an employee . . . shall be the exclusive remedy against the 
employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or 
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this 
chapter shall be in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at 
common law or otherwise, to the employee . . . on account of any accident, or 
injury or death . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) (emphasis added). This exclusive remedy provision bars 
employees from pursuing all negligence based actions against their employers and/or an 
officer, agent or employee of an employer. See Gunderson v. May Dep't Stores Co., 955 
P.2d 346,352 (Utah App. 1998); Mitchell v. Estate of Jerry L. Rice, 885 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 
1994); Lantz v. National Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937,938 (Utah App. 1989); Cerka 
v. Salt Lake Co., 988 F. Supp. 1420, 1422 (D. Utah 1997), affd, 172 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1999). Irrefutably, the UWCA is "one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed 
to the parties only." Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966, n.9.4 
Because the legislature has provided an exclusive and comprehensive statute 
governing workplace injuries, which has been uniformly upheld and enforced, "the policy 
[is] so clear and weighty that [the Court] should place the policy beyond the reach of 
contract." Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966, n.9. The whole regulatory scheme is why the Court 
has recognized the damage that could be done to the public policy contained in the UWCA 
if employers are allowed to terminate employees based upon their mandatory utilization of 
the UWCA. If employers are allowed to terminate employees because the employee has 
sought benefits, the entire purpose of providing injured employees benefits would fail. 
Indeed, allowing employers the unfettered right to terminate such employees would leave 
employees injured on the job in a worse position than they were prior to the enactment of the 
UWCA, since prior to the UWCA an injured employee at least had the ability to seek 
damages based upon the negligent or intentional acts of an employer. 
4Further, La-Z-Boy has a statutory obligation to provide workers' compensation. Indeed, 
La-Z-Boy would be subjected to criminal penalties if it: 1) attempted to have its workers 
waive their rights to workers' compensation, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-108; 2) attempted 
to obtain coverage by means of "false or fraudulent representations" Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-110(3); 3) failed to obtain workers' compensation coverage, Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-209; and 4) violated any section of the UWCA, § 34A-2-803. Providing such 
benefits allows La-Z-Boy to avoid the cost of paying common law tort damages for 
injuries caused by its negligence or even intentional misconduct. Theoretically, 
employees are to receive "economic protection for . . . injuries arising out of their 
employment." Drake v. Industrial Comm 'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). 
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Moreover, the legal reasoning used by the states that have judicially recognized that 
terminating an injured worker for seeking benefits under that state's workers' compensation 
statute parallels the reasoning used by this Court in discussing Utah's public policy. The 
Indiana Supreme Court was the first court to recognize a claim for retaliatory discharge based 
upon an employee's exercise of rights pursuant to a workers' compensation statute. In 
Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Company, 297 N.E.2d425,251-52 (Ind. 1973), the court 
held: 
The Act creates a duty in the employer to compensate employees for work-
related injuries (through insurance) and a right in the employee to receive such 
compensation. But in order for the goals of the Act to be realized and for the 
public policy to be effectuated, the employee must be able to exercise his right 
in an unfettered fashion without being subject to reprisal. If employers are 
permitted to penalize employees for filing workmen's compensation claims, 
a most important public policy will be undermined. The fear of being 
discharged would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory right. 
Employees will not file claims for justly deserved compensation opting, 
instead, to continue their employment without incident. The end result, of 
course, is that the employer is effectively relieved of his obligation. Since the 
Act embraces such a fundamental, well-defined and well-established policy, 
strict employer adherence is required . . . . Once an employee knows he is 
remediless if retaliatory discharged, he is unlikely to file a claim. What then 
is to prevent an employer from coercing an employee? Upholding retaliatory 
discharge opens the door to coercion and other duress-provoking acts. 
{emphasis in original). 
The Indiana Supreme Court based its holding in part by analogizing to claims of 
"retaliatory evictions" in the landlord/tenant context which violate public policy. Id. at 252-
53. This Court has already held that retaliatory evictions can support a claim for damages. 
Building Monitoring Systems, Inc. v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Utah 1995). 
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Interestingly, in reaching its conclusion, this Court used virtually identical language to that 
used by the Indiana Supreme Court quoted above. The Court noted, "If we were to permit 
retaliatory evictions, this intent [to improve housing conditions] might well be frustrated 
because tenants would be reluctant to report violations of health department regulations or 
to assert their rights under the Act." Id. 
The sound legal reasoning of the Indiana Supreme Court combined with this Court's 
prior opinions in the eviction context make clear that the Court should hold that the UWCA 
represents a "clear and substantial" public policy of the State of Utah prohibiting an employer 
from terminating employees who seek benefits. 
B. Virtually Every Other State Recognizes the Importance of Protecting 
Workers From Retaliation For Seeking Benefits From Workers' 
Compensation. 
This Court's statements referring to the exercise of rights under the UWCA as an 
"established and substantial" public policy are consistent with the decisions of the vast 
majority of the states which have squarely addressed this issue. Since the Indiana Supreme 
Court decided Frampton, twenty-five (25) other state courts have recognized a wrongful 
discharge cause of action based upon a violation of public policy when an employer 
terminates an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim, even without a specific 
statutory prohibition: Arizona, Douglas v. Wilson,774P.2dl356,1358-59 (Az.App. 1989); 
Arkansas, Wal-Mart Stores v. Bay singer, 812 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1991) superseded by 
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statute',5 California, Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 586 P. 2d 
564 (Cal. 1978); Colorado, Lathrop v. Entenmann 's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367,1373 (Colo. App. 
1989) cert. deniedllS P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1989); Idaho, Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc. 799P.2d 
70 (Id. 1990); Illinois, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (111. 1978); Iowa, Smith v. 
Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc. 464 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1990); Kansas, Murphy v. Topeka-
Shawnee County Dep 't of Labor Services, 630 P.2d 186 (Kan. 1981); Kentucky, Firestone 
Textile Company v. Meadows, 666 S.W. 2d 730, 733 (Ky. 1983); Louisiana, Wiley v. 
Missouri P. R. Co., 430 So. 2d 1016 (La. App. 1982); Maryland, Ayers v. ARA Health Servs., 
918F.Supp. 143 (Dist.Md. 1995); Michigan, Sventkov. The Kroger Company, 245N.W.2d 
151, 153-4 (Mich. App. 1976); Nebraska, Jackson v. Morris Communications Corp., 657 
N.W.2d 634 (Neb. 2003); Nevada, Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984); New 
Jersey, Lally v. Copy graphics, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); New Mexico, Michaels v. Anglo 
American Auto Auctions, 869 P.2d 279 (N.M. 1994); North Dakota, Krein v. Marian Manor 
Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.Dak. 1987); Oregon, Brown v. Transcom Lines, 588 P.2d 
1087, 1090 (Ore. 1978); Pennsylvania, Rettinger v. American Can Co., 51A F.Supp. 306 
(M.Dist. Pa. 1983); South Dakota, Niesent v. Homestake Mining Company, 505 N.W.2d 781 
(S.Dak. 1993); Tennessee, Clanton v. Cain-Sloan, Co., 677 S.W.2d441,445 (Tenn. 1984); 
Vermont, Murray v. St Michael's College, 667 A.2d 294 (Vt. 1995); Washington, Wilmot 
5
 Arkansas' state legislature passed a statute specifically overturning Bay singer. See Tackett v. 
Crain Automotive, 899 S.W.2d 839 (Ark. 1995). Arkansas' legislators may have been influenced 
by the fact that Wal-Mart's corporate headquarters are located in Bentonville, Arkansas and it is 
doubtful that an Arkansas legislator's career is helped by taking a position against the retail giant. 
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v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, 821 P.2d 18 (Wash. 1991); West Virginia, 
Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Company, 270 S.E.2d 178 (W.Va. 1980); Wyoming, 
Griess v. Consolidated Freightways, Corp., 776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 1989). 
Additionally, seventeen (17) other states and the District of Columbia have recognized 
a claim based upon statutory language prohibiting retaliation: Alabama, Twilley v. Daubert 
Coated Products, Inc., 536 So.2d 1364 (Ala. 1988); Alaska, Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, 
Inc., 93 P.3d 427 (Ak. 2004); Connecticut, Genovese v. Gallo Wine Merchants, Inc., 628 
A.2d 946 (Conn. 1993); Delaware, Mondzelewski v. PathmarkStores, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6956 (D.Del. 2000); District of Columbia, Abramson Assoc, Inc. v. District of 
Columbia Dept. of Employment Services, 596 A.2d 549 (D.C. App. 1991); Florida, Smith 
v. Piezo Technology & Professional Admrs., All So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983); Hawaii, Puchert 
v. Agsalud, 677 P.2d 449 (Hawaii 1984) appeal dismissed All U.S. 1001 (1985); Maine, 
Delano v. South Portland, 405 A.2d 222 (Me. 1979); Massachusetts, Ourfalian v. Aro 
Manufacturing Co., 511 N.E.2d 6 (Mass. App. 1991); Minnesota, Snesrud v. Instant Web, 
Inc., 484 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. App. 1992); Missouri, Mitchell v. St. Louis County, 575 
S.W.2d813 (Mo. App. 1978); Montana, Lueck v. United Parcel Serv., 851 P.2d 1041 (Mont. 
1993); North Carolina, Buie v. Daniel International Corp., 289 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. 1982); 
Ohio, Genheimer v. Clark Grave Vault Co., 434 N.E.2d 744 (Ohio App. 1980); Oklahoma, 
Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); South Carolina, Wallace v. 
Milliken & Co., 389 S.E.2d 448 (S.C. App 1990); Texas, Lester v. County of Terry, 353 
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F.Supp. 170 (N.Dist. Tex. 1973); Virginia, Mullins v. Virginia Lutheran Homes, Inc., 479 
S.E.2d 530 (Va. 1997).6 
Accordingly, forty-two (42) states and the District of Columbia have recognized, by 
case law or by statute, that an employee should be allowed to recover damages if the 
employee is retaliated against for filing a worker's compensation claim. It also appears that 
New Hampshire would join the majority if presented with the issue. Georgia and Mississippi 
are the only states which have specifically held that there is no such claim and as outlined 
above Arkansas has adopted a statute reversing its Supreme Court's recognition of the claim. 
The UWCA provides important rights and responsibilities for both employer and 
employees in Utah. Given its importance in the employer/employee relationship in protecting 
injured employees who seek benefits, the "clear and substantial" public policy given statutory 
expression in the UWCA, this Court should follow its reasoning in Ryan and Hansen and the 
vast majority of other states and hold that Plaintiffs have stated a valid claim under Utah law. 
6There are several states which have either not been presented with this issue or their 
position is unclear. For example, New Hampshire's broad rulings on the public policy 
exception to at-will employment make it likely that it would recognize the claim 
presented in this case. See, e.g., Cloutier v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 
Inc., 436 A.2d 1140, 1142-43 (N.H. 1981). However, it appears that New York would 
join the minority position if presented directly with the issue. See, e.g., Murphy v. 
American Home Products Corp. 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983). It is unclear what 
stance Rhode Island or Wisconsin would take on this issue. While Wisconsin has an anti-
retaliation statutory provision and recognizes there is a public policy exception to at will 
employment, Plaintiffs were unable to find a case involving the discharge of an employee 
due to the employee's seeking benefits under Wisconsin's Workers' Compensation 
statute. See Wis. Stat. § 102.35 and Brockmeyer v. Dun &Bradsheet, 335 N.W.2d 834 
(Wis. 1983). 
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II. UTAH'S PUBLIC POLICY PREVENTS EMPLOYERS FROM TAKING 
OTHER ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS AGAINST 
EMPLOYEES WHO OPPOSE THE TREATMENT OF OTHERS WHO 
FILE FOR BENEFITS UNDER THE UWCA, OR WHO ARE 
CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED, OR WHO EXERCISE RIGHTS 
UNDER THE UWCA. 
The Court should also hold that Utah's public policy prohibits an employer from: 1) 
taking adverse employment actions short of termination against employees who oppose the 
treatment of other employees who have filed for benefits; 2) constructively discharging an 
employee who files for benefits; or 3) from harassing an employee who files for benefits. 
The only way to vindicate the public policy of allowing injured employees to seek benefits 
under the UWCA is to ensure that employees are able to seek benefits without the fear of 
retaliation. Similarly, those who assist injured employees should not be retaliated against due 
to that assistance. Finally, if an employer makes the terms and conditions of employment so 
unbearable that any reasonable person must quit, the Court should allow a constructively 
discharged employee the same cause of action as a discharged employee. In the absence of 
these protections, an employer could avoid its responsibilities under the UWCA and chill an 
employee's exercise of those rights while avoiding any legal liability for its wrongful actions. 
A. Employees Who Oppose the Treatment of Others Who File for Benefits 
Under the UWCA are Also Entitled to Protection. 
The Court has agreed to answer the question of whether an employee has a claim 
where "[an] employee has not filed for benefits under the UWCA but is retaliated against for 
opposing an employer's treatment of other injured employees who are entitled to file for 
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benefits under the UWCA." In the District Court, La-Z-Boy claimed that Ms. Touchard does 
not have a cause of action because she did not actually file for benefits under the UWCA, but 
instead assisted its employees to understand and exercise their rights. However, La-Z-Boy's 
narrow reading would effectively negate the public policy exception outlined above. 
Ms. Touchard repeatedly pushed La-Z-Boy to comply with the UWCA. She 
determined that La-Z-Boy had a high injury rate and that La-Z-Boy's workers' compensation 
claims were being mishandled. Tab 1, P. 10-11, paras. 47-48. She drafted a memorandum 
to La-Z-Boy's management outlining the problems with the handling of workers' 
compensation claims and another outlining a way to prevent injuries to workers. Tab 1, P. 11 -
12, paras. 53-55. Ms. Touchard also informed injured workers of their rights to workers' 
compensation. Due to her repeated efforts to compel La-Z-Boy to meet the UWCA's 
requirements, she was terminated. Tab 1, P. 14, para. 66. 
Ms. Touchard was in a unique position which allowed her to see and understand the 
totality of the problem at La-Z-Boy. She was the individual who recognized La-Z-Boy's 
mistreatment of its injured workers. She was the individual who attempted to protect all of 
La-Z-Boy's injured workers' rights. She was willing to take the actions she did after 
recognizing the pattern of mistreatment. A single injured worker was not in the position to 
recognize the pattern or to push La-Z-Boy to take appropriate action. Finally, Ms. Touchard 
was attempting to correct the problem internally. If Utah's public policy is to ensure that 
workers have access to the benefits provided by the UWCA, it stands to reason that Utah's 
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public policy protect individuals such as Ms. Touchard who assist workers to obtain those 
benefits and who attempt to have employers comply with the UWCA. Any other conclusion 
will have a chilling effect on employees' exercise of their rights and their attempts to have 
employers comply with the UWCA . 
Courts have repeatedly recognized the need to protect employees who assist others in 
exercising their statutory rights, even in the absence of explicit statutory protection. 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court, in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 
125 S.Ct. 1497 (2005), held that a girls5 basketball coach stated a valid cause of action under 
Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), requiring gender equity in scholastic sports programs, when 
he was removed as coach after complaining about funding inequalities between the boys' and 
girls' basketball team, even though Title IX does not contain a provision prohibiting 
retaliation. The Supreme Court noted that Title IX's objective: 
"would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve if persons who complain about sex 
discrimination did not have effective protection against retaliation." If recipients were 
permitted to retaliate freely, individuals who witness discrimination would be loath 
to report it, and all manner of Title IX violation might go unremedied as a result. 
Id. at 1508 citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae. 
This position is line with the Supreme Court's prior opinion of Sullivan v. Little 
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). In Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a white 
man who was evicted from a community for leasing a home to an African American was 
entitled to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. While the plaintiff was not 
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discriminated against on the basis of his own race, he was discriminated against because of 
his relationship to an African American. The Supreme Court held: 
We turn to Sullivan's expulsion for the advocacy of Freeman's cause. If that 
sanction, backed by a state court judgment, can be imposed then Sullivan is punished 
for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities protected by § 1982. Such a sanction 
would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on property. 
Id 237. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals used similar reasoning to find that 42 U.S.C. § 
1981 protects employees who assist others in vindicating their rights: 
A number of courts have recognized that an employee who has been the subject of 
employer retaliation because of his efforts to vindicate the rights of racial minorities 
may bring an action under § 1981 We conclude . . . that "although [plaintiff] was 
not fired because of his race, it was a racial situation in which he became involved 
that resulted in his discharge from his employment." 558 F.2d at 1268, and that his 
claim is therefore cognizable under § 1981. 
Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc. 859 F.2d 1439, 1447 (10th Cir. 1988) {citations omitted). 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee found that a nurse who claimed she was 
fired for refusing to assist her employer "avoid and minimize workers' compensation claims" 
had stated a valid claim. Wilkerson v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
666 *3 (Tenn. App. 1989). The court held, "[i]f she can show that SKM fired her for failure 
to keep the gate closed, in an effort to avoid its responsibilities under the workers' 
compensation statutes, she should be permitted to recover damages for wrongful discharge." 
Id. at *9. 
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The rationale behind the holdings of Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
and the Tennessee Court of Appeals clearly applies to the facts presented in this case. Ms. 
Touchard, and others who assist employees in exercising their rights under the UWCA, must 
be protected in order to vindicate Utah's public policy of providing a remedy to injured 
workers. If employers are allowed to terminate such employees with impunity, those who 
have the ability to ensure that employees receive their statutorily guaranteed rights will be 
without a remedy if they are terminated for using that knowledge. It would be incongruous 
to allow employees who apply for benefits under the UWCA to have a cause of action while 
denying that same cause of action to those who are responsible for allowing those same 
employees to enjoy the benefits of the UWCA. 
B. Employees Who are Constructively Discharged are Entitled to the Same 
Protection as Employees Who are Terminated. 
The Court also certified the question of whether Utah's public policy is violated where 
"the employee [who sought benefits under the UWCA] is not fired, but resigns under 
circumstances that constitute a 'constructive discharge."' The Court of Appeals, in Sheikh 
v. Department of Public Safety, 904 P.2d 1103, 1107 (Utah App. 1995) held that in order for 
an an employee to establish a constructive discharge, the employee must show, "(1) that her 
employer engaged in discriminatory conduct, and (2) that conduct created intolerable 
working conditions." Id. This is essentially the same standard for proving a claim of 
constructive discharge adopted by the Unite States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania State 
Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 139 (2004). 
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This Court should hold that Utah's public policy is violated when an employer 
constructively discharges an employee for exercising rights under the UWCA. There is no 
logical reason to make a legal distinction between an actual and a constructive discharge, 
because once an employee can demonstrate a constructive discharge, the available remedies 
are the same. Accordingly, the Court should hold that an employee who is constructively 
discharged due to exercising rights under the UWCA is entitled to the same protection as an 
employee who is actually terminated for the same reason. 
While this Court has never explicitly held that a constructive discharge is the legal 
equivalent of a termination, it has implicitly recognized that there is no legal difference 
between the two types of termination. See Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790,792 n.5 (Utah 
1979); Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1992). The Utah Court of Appeals 
reinforced this legal equivalency in Sheikh where it held that "an employee who believes that 
he or she has been constructively discharged may bring an action for discrimination because 
'an involuntary or coerced resignation is equivalent to a discharge.'" 904 P.2d at 1107. 
Further, the United States Supreme Court in Suders, like the Court of Appeals in 
Sheikh, noted that there is no legal difference between an actual and a constructive discharge. 
The United States Supreme Court held, "[u]nder the constructive discharge doctrine, an 
employee's reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is 
assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes." 542 U.S. at 141. Because of this, 
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the United States Supreme Court agreed "with the lower courts and the EEOC that Title VII 
encompasses employer liability for a constructive discharge." 
The legal equivalence of an actual termination to a constructive discharge has 
particular importance when the discharge involves the violation of a public policy. If the 
Court holds that the UWCA represents an important public policy protecting injured 
employees which limits at will employment, it is of enough importance to protect by 
precluding an employer from constructively discharging an employee. To hold otherwise 
would eviscerate an employee's right to file for benefits under the UWCA. An employee 
could simply make an employee's working conditions so unbearable that the employee has 
no choice but the quit thereby allowing the employer to avoid both its obligations under the 
UWCA and liability for its constructive discharge. Simply put, a constructively discharged 
employee should have the exact same rights as an employee who is fired. 
This Court would not be alone in recognizing the importance of protecting employees 
from constructive discharges. The Court of Appeals of Washington specifically recognized 
that a constructive discharge in violation of Washington's public policy states a claim. In 
Korslundv. Dyncorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc., 88 P.3d 966 (Wash. App. 2005), the court held 
that, "[t]he discharge maybe either actual or constructive." Id. at 975. Similarly, the Nevada 
Supreme Court, in Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 989 P.2d 882 (Nev. 1999) 
cert, denied 530 U.S. 1276 (2000), specifically held that an employee who proves a 
constructive discharge in violation of public policy states a claim. Id. at 886. 
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There is no logical or legal reason to treat a constructive discharge differently from 
an actual discharge. If an actual discharge violates public policy and provides an employee 
with a claim for wrongful discharge, then a constructive discharge should provide the basis 
for the same claim. 
C. Utah's Public Policy Protects Employees Who are Harassed Based Upon 
an Exercise of Rights Under the UWCA. 
Because a constructive discharge should be treated the same as an actual termination, 
the Court should also hold that an employee who is harassed for exercising rights under the 
UWCA can state a claim for a violation of Utah's public policy. As outlined above, in order 
to establish a claim for constructive discharge, an employee must demonstrate that the terms 
and conditions of employment are so intolerable that any reasonable person would resign. 
That is, in order to prevail on a claim of constructive discharge, an employee has to prove a 
series of acts which created an intolerable working condition. See Suder, 542 U.S. at 149 
("Creation of a hostile work environment is a necessary predicate to a hostile-environment 
constructive discharge case.") Allowing an employer to engage in the underlying 
discriminatory acts with impunity would undermine any holding that the result of those acts 
violates public policy. 
Further, any such holding would allow inequitable treatment of similarly situated 
employees. For example, if Employee A applies for benefits and is then subjected to 
harassment sufficient to result in a constructive discharge, she should be entitled to pursue 
a cause of action. However, if Employee B applies for benefits, is subjected to the same 
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harassment as Employee A, but continues to work, she would not be allowed a cause of 
action. Such an inequitable result defies logic. Further, if an employer is allowed to harass 
an employee for seeking benefits with impunity, few employees will seek to recover the 
benefits guaranteed by the UWCA. Utah5 s public policy of allowing injured workers benefits 
under the UWCA is best served by not allowing an employer to escape liability for harassing 
employees who seek those benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should hold that Utah's public policy prohibits an employer from 
interfering with an employee's exercise of rights guaranteed by the UWCA by either 
constructively or actually terminating that employee, that the same public policy prohibits an 
employer from harassing an employee who assists employees to exercise rights under the 
UWCA and also prohibits the harassment of an employee for seeking benefits under the 
UWCA. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JA_ day of December, 2005. 
STRINDBERG SCHOLNICK & CHAMNESS, LLC 
Ralph E. Chamness 
Erik Strindberg 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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JOSEPH A. MONDZELEWSKI, and REBECCA MONDZELEWSKI, Plaintiffs, v. PATHMARK STORES, 
INC. and SUPERMARKETS GENERAL CORP., Defendants. 
Civil Action No. 96-359 MMS 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6956; 11 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1627 
March 20, 2000, Decided 
March 20, 2000, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] FOR ELECTRONIC PUBLICATION ONLY 
DISPOSITION: Judgment as to the jury's verdict of liability and damages on the workers' 
compensation retaliation claim vacated. In all other respects, Pathmark's motion for a new trial 
denied. Judgment entered for $ 300,000 compensatory damages on the ADA discrimination and 
retaliation claims. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant corporation moved to set aside jury verdict awarding 
plaintiff employee recovery in action alleging violation of Americans with Disabilities Act and 
state statute prohibiting retaliation for filing workers' compensation claim, and to enter 
judgment for defendant as matter of law; defendant alternatively requested grant of new trial 
or remittitur. 
OVERVIEW: A jury returned a liability and damages verdict for the plaintiff, finding that the 
defendant had violated the plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq., by discriminating against him and by retaliating against him for 
seeking accommodation for his disability, and that the defendant had violated a state statute 
by retaliating against the plaintiff for seeking workers' compensation benefits. The court 
denied the defendant's motion with respect to the ADA claims, ruling that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict. However, the court vacated the verdict with respect to 
the workers' compensation claim because the statute prohibiting retaliation for seeking such 
benefits had not been enacted until after the claimed retaliatory acts occurred, and did not 
have retroactive effect. The court denied the defendant's alternative requests for a new trial 
or remittitur of the ADA damage award. 
OUTCOME: Court vacated liability and damages verdict concerning workers' compensation 
claim because statute prohibiting retaliation for seeking such benefits had not been enacted 
until after claimed retaliatory acts occurred, and did not have retroactive effect. Court 
otherwise denied defendant's motions and entered judgment on plaintiff's Americans with 
Disabilities Act claims. 
CORE TERMS: meat, retaliation, workers' compensation, disability, write-up, lifting, new trial, 
return to work, manager, compensatory damages, chuck, assigned, cutter, retaliatory, store 
manager, lift, matter of law, accommodation, proffered, pound, protected activity, skills, 
suspension, sufficient evidence, prima facie case, returned to work, undesirable, excessive, 
disabled, punitive damages 
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Civil Procedure > Trials > Judgment as Matter of Law *AM 
HNiin a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court must review the evidence, 
* together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the 
verdict winner. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Trials > Judgment as Matter of Law *2 
HN2\f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally 
— sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the 
court may determine that issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment 
as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under 
the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue. 
F e d . R. C iv . P. 50(a) . More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Trials > Judgment as Matter of Law *2 
HN3 The standard a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 is an 
— exacting one, contemplating the court's duty to assure enforcement of the controlling law 
and to not intrude on any responsibility for factual determinations conferred on the jury. 
The court reviews the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the verdict winner. The court may not weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of 
witnesses, or replace its version of the facts for that of the jury. Judgment as a matter of 
law should be granted sparingly, and only when, after reviewing the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, no jury 
could decide in that party's favor. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Retaliation * 3 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions $2 
HN4jhe Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq., retaliation 
**- provision states that no person shall discriminate against any individual because such 
individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by the ADA or because such 
individual made a charge under the ADA. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12203(a). This provision is 
similar to the prohibition of retaliation, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-3(a), in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.S. 5 2000e et seq. Courts analyze ADA retaliation 
claims using the same framework employed for retaliation claims arising under Title 
VII. More Like This Headnote 
\ 
jet, 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Retaliation ^ 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions *m 
HNSJO establish a prima facie case for retaliation for protected conduct under the Americans 
* with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq., a plaintiff must show that (1) he 
engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action following 
the protected activity; and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and 
the adverse employment action. If the plaintiff establishes these elements, the burden of 
production shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for its actions. At this point, a presumption of discrimination drops from the case, 
and, to prevail, the plaintiff must carry the burden of convincing the factfinder both that 
the defendant's proffered reasons for the actions were false, and that discrimination was 
the real reason for the actions. Subsumed within this burden, the plaintiff has to prove 
that the defendant's proffered non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual. More Like This Headnot 
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Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Retaliation *m 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions *yJ 
HN6 Minor or trivial actions that merely make an employee unhappy are not sufficient to 
* qualify as retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et 
seq., for otherwise every action that an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not 
like would form the basis of a discrimination suit. However, assigning an employee to an 
undesirable schedule can be more than a trivial or minor change in the employee's 
working conditions. More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Trials > Judgment as Matter of Law Sm 
tfw^In assessing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, it is not the role of a court to 
* second guess a jury's inferences from the evidence. More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Retaliation %n 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions %l 
HNSEven if timing alone is not unusually suggestive, temporal proximity, in addition to 
* evidence of a pattern of antagonism toward the plaintiff, may be sufficient to establish a 
causal link between protected activity and the adverse employment action in an action 
for retaliation for protected conduct under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U . S . C . S . § 12101 et s e q . More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions *m 
HN9A factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by a defendant (particularly if disbelief 
•* is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the 
prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination in an Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq., action. Thus, rejection of the defendant's 
proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination, 
and upon such rejection, no additional proof of discrimination is required. More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Jury Trials > Province of Court & Jury 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions *H 
H/viojhe role of determining whether the inference of discrimination is warranted in an 
•*• action under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq., must 
remain within the province of the jury, because a finding of discrimination is at bottom 
a determination of intent. In making that finding, the jury must perform its traditional 
function of assessing the weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses through 
observation of both direct testimony and cross-examination at trial, and the strength of 
inferences that can be drawn from the elements of the prima facie case and the 
evidence that undermines the employer's proffered reasons for its actions. This is 
uniquely the role of the factfinder, not the court. More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Jury Trials > Province of Court & Jury *3 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions $3 
HNII in an Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. 5 12101 et seq., action alleging 
— discrimination, a district court must determine whether the plaintiff has cast sufficient 
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doubt upon the employer's proffered reasons to permit a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that the reasons are incredible. But once the court is satisfied that the 
evidence meets this threshold requirement, it may not pretermit the jury's ability to 
draw inferences from the testimony, including the inference of intentional discrimination 
drawn from an unbelievable reason proffered by the employer. More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Trials > Judgment as Matter of Law %tl 
HN12 For purposes of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court must view the 
•* evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. The court will not second 
guess the weight assigned to this evidence by the jury, nor will the court interpose its 
own belief as to what the evidence showed if it were different from that of the 
jury's. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions %u 
HNl3See 42 U.S.C.S. § 12112. 
± 
Eh 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions ^ 
HNi4j\t\e VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e et seq., and Age 
— Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 621 et seq., caselaw inform standards 
of causation for proving disparate treatment under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq. More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions €:^  
HNisin order to make out a prima facie case under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
— U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq., a plaintiff must be able to establish that he or she (1) has a 
disability, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) has suffered an adverse employment 
action because of that disability. More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions *m 
HNi6Jhe Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. 5 12101 et seq., defines disability to 
~~ mean, among other things, a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more 
of the major life activities. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102(2)(A). More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions %d 
HNi7\n the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, working is considered to be 
* one of the "major life activities" under 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102(2)(A). More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions %H 
HNisin the context of 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102(2)(AVsubstantially limits" as applied to working 
** means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad 
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable 
training, skills and abilities. Determining whether an individual is substantially limited in 
working thus requires consideration of the individual's training, skills, and abilities in 
order to evaluate whether the particular impairment constitutes for the particular 
person a significant barrier to employment. More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions *Q 
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HN19in the context of 42 U.S.C.S. 5 12102(2)(A), to be substantially limited in the major life 
•* activity of working, one must be precluded from more than one type of job, a 
specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but 
perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a 
substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are available, one 
is not precluded from a broad range of jobs. More Like This Headnote | 
Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Retaliation «yi 
HN20 For harassment to rise to the level of discrimination, it must be sufficiently severe or 
•* pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive 
working environment. This standard is intended to take a middle path between making 
actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a 
tangible psychological injury. More Like This Headnote 
Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions 
HN21 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has adopted a totality of the 
** circumstances approach to hostile work environment claims. Relevant circumstances 
may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. In order to find liability 
for a hostile work environment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct was 
severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that a reasonable person of the 
same protected class would find to be hostile or abusive. The victim must also 
subjectively perceive the work environment to be hostile or abusive. More Like This Headnote 
Workers' Compensation & SSDI > Coverage 
HN22 Del. Code Ann. tit. 19 § 2365 was not effective until July 12, 1994, and there was no 
•* predecessor statutory provision providing comparable rights. More Like This Headnote 
Governments > Legislation > Effect & Operation > Prospective & Retrospective Operation 
HN23 Delaware courts have recognized the general principle that statutes will not be 
•* retroactively applied unless there is a clear legislative intent to do so. More Like This Headnote 
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation *m 
Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Legislatures ^m 
HN24j}ne Delaware judiciary has a long-standing practice of deferring to the Delaware 
— General Assembly when it comes to declaring the public policy of the state. More Like This Headn 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Jurisdiction > Certified Questions %d 
HN25A United States district court may certify a question to the Delaware Supreme Court 
~ prior to the entry of final judgment if there is an important and urgent reason for an 
immediate determination of such question. Del. Sup. Ct. R. 41(a)(ii). More Like This Headnote 
Torts > Damages > Pain & Suffering S i 
HN26There is no legal yardstick by which to measure accurately reasonable compensation for 
— pain and suffering. A jury may not, however, base damages on sheer speculation. More Like Thi 
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Torts > Damages > Pain & Suffering %£ 
HN27if the only evidence of emotional distress is plaintiffs own testimony of depression and 
**• humiliation, and there is no evidence of physical suffering, the need for medical care, or 
the like, then there is no reasonable probability, rather than a mere possibility, that 
damages due to emotional distress were in fact incurred as a result of the wrongful act. 
By contrast, where a plaintiff has corroborated his or her own testimony with testimony 
of friends, family, and expert witnesses and has proffered evidence that he or she has 
needed or will need professional care, such evidence can support a compensatory 
damages award. More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Abuse of Discretion ^Q 
Civil Procedure > Relief From Judgment > Motions for New Trial %il 
HN28jhe authority to grant a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will 
•* not be disturbed absent an abuse of such discretion. More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Relief From Judgment > Motions for New Trial *2 
HN29/\ district court ought to grant a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the 
•* weight of the evidence only where a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict 
were to stand. When the district court grants a motion for a new trial based on the 
weight of the evidence, the court has to some extent at least, substituted its judgment 
of the facts and the credibility of witnesses for that of the jury. Such an action effects a 
denigration of the jury system and to the extent that new trials are granted the judge 
takes over, if he does not usurp, the prime function of the jury as the trier of facts. 
Therefore, a trial judge should exercise caution and grant a new trial because the 
verdict is against the weight of the evidence only where a jury's verdict results in a 
miscarriage of justice, cries out to be overturned, or shocks the conscience. More Like This Headn 
I Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Jury Trials > Jury Instructions ™J 
Civil Procedure > Relief From Judgment > Motions for New Trial %l 
HN30 Erroneous jury instructions may serve as the basis for a new trial. More Like This Headnote 
Jt 
Civil Procedure > Relief From Judgment > Motions for New Trial *yJ 
HN31 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) is the procedural authority under which a trial court may consider a 
* motion for a new trial. More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Relief From Judgment > Motions for New Trial *3 
HN32\n evaluating a motion for a new trial on the basis of trial error, the court's inquiry is 
— twofold: (1) whether an error was in fact committed, and (2) whether that error was so 
prejudicial that denial of a new trial would be inconsistent with substantial justice. More Like Th 
Civil Procedure > Relief From Judgment > Motions for New Trial %m 
HN33A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in 
~ an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new 
trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States. 
F e d . R. C iv . P. 59(a) (1) . More Like This Headnote 
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Labor & Employment Law > Discrimination > Disability Discrimination > Coverage & Definitions l*yJ 
HN34Controlling caselaw on the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq., 
* from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit incorporates the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission's Regulations and Interpretive Guidelines. More Like This 
Civil Procedure > Relief From Judgment > Motions for New Trial *»J 
HN35/\ new trial is the proper remedy if it is shown that a jury verdict was the result of 
•* passion or prejudice. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
has rejected the argument that the size of the award alone is enough to prove prejudice 
and passion. More Like This Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Relief From Judgment > Motions for New Trial %l 
Civil Procedure > Relief From Judgment > Additurs & Remittiturs *m 
HN36\f a court concludes a jury verdict is clearly unsupported by the evidence and/or 
— excessive, it may deny a motion for a new trial on the condition that the plaintiff accept 
a remittitur of the jury's verdict. Alternatively, the court may grant a new trial on 
damages because the jury's award is so entirely disproportionate to the injury to the 
plaintiff that it cries out to be overturned or shocks the conscience of the court. More Like This H 
| Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Abuse of Discretion 'Sal 
Civil Procedure > Relief From Judgment > Motions for New Trial *m 
Civil Procedure > Relief From Judgment > Additurs & Remittiturs Q 
HN37/\ trial court's decision to grant or withhold remittitur or order a new trial on damages 
— lies within the discretion of that court and cannot be disturbed absent a manifest abuse 
Of SUCh discretion. More Like This Headnote 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Joseph Mondzelewski ("Mondzelewski") filed a complaint against Pathmark Stores, Inc. 
("Pathmark") alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 5 12101 etseq., and unlawful retaliation for filing a workers' 
compensation [*2] claim, in violation of the Delaware Workers' Compensation laws, 19 Del. C. 
§ 2365. n l Following an eight-day trial in this matter, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Mondzelewski, finding that Pathmark violated his rights under the ADA by both discriminating 
against him and retaliating against him for seeking accommodation for his disability. Docket 
Item ("D.I.") 116. The jury further found that Pathmark retaliated against Mondzelewski for 
seeking benefits under Delaware's Workers' Compensation Statute. n2 Id. The jury awarded 
Mondzelewski compensatory damages of $ 250,000 on the ADA discrimination count, $ 400,000 
on the ADA retaliation count, and $ 200,000 on the workers' compensation retaliation count, for 
total compensatory damages of $ 850,000. The jury also awarded Mondzelewski total punitive 
damages of $ 3,000,000, attributing $ 500,000 to the ADA discrimination count, $ 2,000,000 to 
the ADA retaliation count, and $ 500,000 to the workers' compensation retaliation count. Id. The 
Court remitted $ 350,000 of the compensatory damages attributable to the ADA claims to 
comply with the $ 300,000 statutory damages cap for the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a [*3] 
(b)(3)(D), and entered judgment for compensatory damages in the amount of $ 500,000 ($ 
300,000 on the ADA claims and $ 200,000 on the workers' compensation claim). D.I. 120. The 
Court remitted all punitive damages under the ADA due to the statutory damages cap and 
entered a judgment for the $ 500,000 punitive damages award apportioned by the jury to the 
state worker's compensation claim. Id. 
- - - Footnotes 
n l In addition, his wife, Rebecca Mondzelewski, sought damages for loss of consortium arising 
out of the Delaware workers' compensation retaliation claim. 
n2 The jury also returned a verdict in favor of Pathmark and against Mondzelewski's wife, 
Rebecca, on her tort claim for loss of consortium. This claim is not the subject of any post-trial 
motions. 
End Footnotes- -
Pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Pathmark moves to set aside the 
jury verdict and asks the Court to enter Judgment as a Matter of Law for Pathmark on all counts. 
D.I. 152. In the alternative, pursuant to Rule 59, Pathmark asks this Court [*4] to grant a new 
trial. As a fallback position, Pathmark requests the Court to grant remittitur and reduce 
Mondzelewski's award substantially in all categories of damages. Id. For the reasons set forth 
below, the Court will vacate the judgment as a matter of law as to liability and damages on the 
workers' compensation retaliation claim, but will deny Pathmark's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law, for a new trial, and for remittitur. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
At trial, the following evidence was adduced, as viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict 
winner, Mondzelewski. n3 At the time of the events in question, Mondzelewski, who had 
approximately a sixth-grade education, had been employed by Pathmark for approximately 
thirty-five years, for most of that time as a meat cutter. Pathmark and its predecessor company 
had been Mondzelewski's only employer with the consequence that Mondzelewski viewed the 
company as family and his job as his life. Mondzelewski hurt his back twice on the job, first in 
March of 1992 and again in December of 1993. A-70, 99 (D.I. 141). After the first injury, when 
Mondzelewski was released to return to work by his doctor, he was placed on [*5] a lifting 
restriction of twenty pounds by his doctor. The initial restriction was increased to forty pounds Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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several weeks later and, thereafter, made permanent at fifty pounds. The parties agree that 
Pathmark accommodated Mondzelewski's physical restrictions, in conformance with company 
policy that workers injured on the job could return to work on light duty. The 1992 injury was 
not treated by Pathmark as a workers' compensation injury until Mondzelewski filed for workers' 
compensation in 1994, after his second injury. 
Footnotes 
n3 HN1fln a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court must review "the evidence, 
together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict 
winner." Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992). 
End Footnotes 
In December 1993, Mondzelewski again injured his back at work while trying to move some 
boxes of meat. In mid-February 1994, Mondzelewski's primary care physician, Dr. Wesley 
Young, as well as a specialist to whom Mondzelewski had been [*6] referred, Dr. Otto 
Medinilla, released him to return to work on February 21, 1994, with a temporary twenty-five 
pound lifting restriction, to be increased to a fifty pound restriction after six weeks. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit ("PX-") 10, 11. 
Despite receiving the physicians' authorizations to return to work, setting forth Mondzelewski's 
medical condition, limitations, and return to work date, Pathmark did not immediately return 
Mondzelewski to work, contending that it needed more information to determine his medical 
status and ability to return to work. However, the correspondence from Pathmark's workers' 
compensation office to Mondzelewski's treating physicians focused on obtaining additional 
information regarding his history of previous back injuries and their "causal relationship" to the 
current injury, Defendant's Exhibit ("DX-") 5, 11, information more relevant to the 
compensability of the injury rather than his ability to return to work. Mondzelewski repeatedly 
called Pathmark headquarters and the Dupont Highway store at which he worked, seeking to 
return to work. The delay caused him anxiety about his job and whether he would be permitted 
to return. Mondzelewski filed a workers' [*7] compensation petition on March 3, 1994. PX-33. 
Pathmark authorized him to return to work on March 16, 1994. Although Pathmark offered the 
testimony of Mondzelewski's assistant store manager, Leo Johnson, that he played no role in the 
delay in Mondzelewski's return to work, because such decision was in the hands of personnel at 
the company's corporate offices, E-157, 169 (D.I. 145), this testimony was contradicted by a log 
of Pathmark's disability department, which recorded Johnson as having said the Mondzelewski's 
restrictions were "too tight to return him" to work. E-169-172 (D.I. 145). 
Assignment to "Punishment shifts" 
Evidence was introduced at trial that meat cutters typically work early morning shifts, e.g., 5:00 
a.m. or 6:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. or 2:00 p.m., and were randomly rotated to evening shifts, e.g., 
12:00 p.m. or 1:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. or 10:00 p.m. Meat cutters prefer these types of early 
morning or evening shifts because they give the worker either mornings or afternoons free to do 
other things. When Mondzelewski returned to work on March 17, 1994, he was consistently 
assigned to shifts starting at 9:30 a.m. and ending at 6:00 p.m. Mondzelewski and several 
co-workers [*8] testified that such shifts were undesirable and generally recognized as 
"punishment shifts." A-113 (D.I. 141); B-244-245 (D.I. 149); D-25-27, 56-57 (D.I. 130). These 
undesirable shifts were assigned on occasion to meat cutters for a day or two, but were only 
assigned on a continual basis only when a worker had offended management. D-25-26, 50, 59 
(D.I. 130); G-124 (D.I. 142). Mondzelewski was assigned to such shifts consistently for several 
months. n4 
Footnotes 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
n4 Although the shifts were later changed to 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., there was testimony that 
such shifts were still considered "punishment shifts" because Mondzelewski would have neither 
his mornings nor his afternoons free. B-245 (D.I. 149); D-50 (D.I. 130). 
End Footnotes 
Additionally, Mondzelewski was assigned to work every Saturday night after his return to work 
until he suffered a mental breakdown in August 1994. A-113-114; 121-22 (D.I. 141). Such 
shifts were considered highly undesirable and Friday and Saturday night shifts were typically 
rotated so that a meat cutter would [*9] usually be assigned to such shifts once every four or 
five weeks. A-76-77 (D.I. 141); D-23-24; D-57 (D.I. 130). 
Pathmark contended that Mondzelewski's assignment to the undesirable shifts were necessary to 
accommodate his lifting restrictions. However, such shifts were not deemed necessary to 
accommodate his similar lifting restrictions after his injury in 1992. A-76-77 (D.I. 141); D-23 
(D.I. 130). Moreover, such shifts were not considered necessary to accommodate his lifting 
restrictions when he returned to work after he had suffered a mental breakdown. B-36 (D.I. 
149); G-113-114 (D.I. 142). Mondzelewski testified that when he confronted Wayne Ostafy, the 
store manager, about why he was being consistently assigned to work 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., 
Ostafy told him that was the way he wanted it. A-116-117 (D.I. 141). 
Pathmark, through the testimony of meat department manager and union member Bobby 
Hinkle, tried to show that Hinkle, rather than store management, was responsible for 
Mondzelewski's assignment to the "punishment shifts." F-38 (D.I. 146). However, Hinkle's 
testimony was contradicted by his previous sworn testimony where Hinkle denied knowledge of 
how Mondzelewski was assigned [*10] to the "punishment shifts," stating that he had no 
recollection of it, it was not his doing, and that the schedules he drew up were sent up front 
where they were gone over by store management. F-46-47 (D.I. 146). Former Pathmark meat 
wrapper Gail Barker also testified that when she asked Hinkle why Mlondzelewski was being 
given the "punishment shifts," Hinkle responded that he drew up the initial schedules but that 
they were then left up front with store management, who changed the schedules as they saw fit. 
D-30 (D.I. 130). Additionally, the jury was informed that, in answers to interrogatories as to 
who was responsible for Mondzelewski's work schedule, Pathmark identified the store manager, 
Wayne Ostafy, and assistant manager, Leo Johnson, making no mention of Hinkle. F-46 (D.I. 
146). 
First Disciplinary Write-up 
Shortly after Mondzelewski returned to work after his second injury, he was disciplined for the 
first time in his thirty-five year career at Pathmark. A-122 (D.I. 141). He was working alone on 
a Friday night shift on April 23, 1994. Prior to leaving that evening, the assistant meat manager, 
Joe Kubec, instructed Mondzelewski to grind additional meat for late night shoppers [*11] 
because the previous night had been unusually busy. n5 A-124 (D.I. 141). Mondzelewski 
followed these instructions and the next day received a write-up for leaving excessive ground 
meat in the case overnight. A-127-128 (D.I. 141); PX-16. The write-up, which noted that 
Mondzelewski had no record of prior counseling, also contained the following handwritten 
statement under the category of "continuing action": "Future violations will result in additional 
disciplinary action up to and including separation." PX-16. There was testimony that it was 
common for meat cutters to leave ground meat in the case overnight and to grind meat late at 
night in quantities similar to that ground by Mondzelewski, and that this practice did not result 
in disciplinary write-ups. D-36; D-42; D-61 (D.I. 130). Although Pathmark's position was that 
the disciplinary action was only counseling, Pathmark managers conceded that it was a write-up 
and thus violated the company's progressive discipline policy which required an oral warning 
before any formal write-up. E-85; E-174-76 (D.I. 145). The union shop steward, Bobby Taylor, 
also testified that it was not the norm to threaten an employee with termination in an [*12] Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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oral warning on a first disciplinary offense. G-58 (D.I. 142). No explanation was provided as to 
why management violated Pathmark's progressive discipline policy in Mondzelewski's case. 
Mondzelewski, who had never been disciplined in his working career found this language stating 
that future violations could result in termination to be traumatizing, particularly because he 
already feared for his job because of Pathmark's delay in re-accommodating him and returning 
him to work. A-128 (D.I. 141). 
Footnotes 
n5 Although Pathmark introduced evidence that the store had initiated a new policy that meat 
cutters working late night shifts should consult with store management prior to grinding extra 
meat, there was conflicting testimony as to whether a meat cutter was expected to go over the 
head of a meat department manager, who instructed the cutter to grind more meat, to the store 
manager or the assistant store manager. 
. End Footnotes - -
Second Write-up and Suspension: Lifting Incident 
Within a week of Mondzelewski's first disciplinary action, [*13] and shortly after his lifting 
restriction had been increased to fifty pounds, he received a second write-up and was 
suspended for half a day. PX-17. On April 30, 1994, the day of the incident, Mondzelewski's 
meat manager, Bobby Hinkle was not working. n6 The assistant meat manager that day, Jimmy 
Porter, brought to Mondzelewski a cart holding five chucks of meat with no weights indicated. 
The type of meat at issue came in boxes that could weigh a total of 70 pounds or more. These 
boxes contained a large chuck and a smaller, separately packaged piece of meat called a 
"bolar." Mondzelewski, out of concern that he not re-injure his back, testified that it was his 
custom and practice since he first had restrictions to lift large pieces of meat only after 
determining they were within his lifting restrictions. B-8-11 (D.I. 149). He would do this by 
observing the weight on the box in which the pieces meat came and subtracting from that 
weight the known weights of the bolar and any pieces of meat that had been removed from the 
larger piece. B-6-10 (D.I. 149). On the day of the incident, when presented with the chucks with 
no associated boxes giving their weights, Mondzelewski asked Jimmy Porter [*14] to help him 
lift the chucks onto the table for him because he could not determine their weight. Porter 
responded, "Hell, no." E-131 (D.I. 145). Mondzelewski refused to lift the chucks not knowing 
their weight. Porter consulted with Bobby Taylor, the shop steward, about what to do and Taylor 
said to call the assistant store manager, Leo Johnson. Johnson ordered Mondzelewski to lift the 
meat, despite Mondzelewski's protestations that he did not know the actual weights and that 
they could be above his restrictions. B-16-18 (D.I. 149); E-185-188 (D.I. 145); F-73-74 (D.I. 
146). When Mondzelewski refused, Johnson said, "I am not playing these f g games with you. 
Either do your job or go home." E-163 (D.I. 145). When Mondzelewski refused to lift the chucks, 
he was suspended for the remainder of the day and given a second write-up which stated that 
future violations could result in his termination. (B-17, 20 (D.I. 149), PX-17). 
Footnotes 
n6 Hinkle testified that the incident would not have occurred if he had been working. 
End Footnotes [*15] 
In defense of the write-up and suspension of Mondzelewski for the lifting incident, Pathmark 
presented the testimony of the union's shop steward, Bobby Taylor, and the assistant store 
manager, Leo Johnson, who testified that Mondzelewski was shown the weights of the chucks 
that he refused to lift. G-40 (D.I. 142); E-163 (D.I. 145). Taylor testified that he had weighed Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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out everything and showed the "ticket" to Mondzelewski with the weights of the bolars and other 
pieces that had been removed from the chucks. G-66 (D.I. 142). However, the jury was also 
presented with evidence that shed doubt on Taylor's testimony. The write-ups on Mondzelewski 
never showed exacts weights of the meats, nor was mention made of any weight tickets; rather, 
the write-up referred to "average weight." n7 PX-17. Further, the store manager, Wayne Ostafy, 
testified that no one knew the exact weight of the meat in question, F-73-74 (D.I. 146), and 
conceded that there was a possibility that it could have exceeded Mondzelewski's fifty pound 
lifting restriction. F-57 (D.I. 146). Moreover, Taylor's credibility generally was called into 
question. Taylor testified to the effect that he and Mondzelewski had worked together [*16] for 
a long time and had been there for one another and that the meat cutters all had back problems 
and helped each other out with lifting, although Taylor conceded that Mondzelewski was the 
only one in the department with restrictions. G-51 (D.I. 142). His testimony on this allegedly 
caring environment was contradicted by his explanation as to why he did not lift the chucks onto 
the cutting table for Mondzelewski, namely he wasn't explicitly asked. G-61-62; 72 (D.I. 142). 
Despite the fact Taylor was aware that Mondzelewski feared the chucks exceeded his lifting 
restrictions and that Jimmy Porter adamantly refused to help when asked, Taylor did not offer to 
help, but instead told Porter to call store management. B-15 (D.I. 149); E-132 (D.I. 145). There 
was also testimony by a former Pathmark meat wrapper who had been present at the time of 
the incident that the boxes the large pieces of meat came in, that would have had the weights 
of the meat, were sought from the trash area only after Mondzelewski was suspended and sent 
home for the day. D-32 (D.I. 130). 
Footnotes 
n7 The write-up explanation stated: "Joe was instructed to cut bone[-]in chucks. The largest one 
weighed 67.7 lb. Removed bolar and three ribs from each chuck. Average weight below 50 lb." 
PX-17. 
Enc] Footnotes [*17] 
Several Pathmark witnesses testified that Mondzelewski bore responsibility for his own safety 
and ensuring that his restrictions were properly observed. E-80 (D.I. 145); F-27 (D.I. 146); 
G-71 (D.I. 142). The evidence adduced indicated that Mondzelewski had not previously refused 
a supervisor's orders, nor had there been disputes on any prior occasions about whether 
Mondzelewski was reasonably justified in not lifting certain items. Pathmark's Director of Human 
Resource Services, Edward McFeeley testified that, under such circumstance, if an employee had 
an honest doubt about the weight, he should either determine the weight, or if that could not be 
done, someone else should pick up the object. E-84-85 (D.I. 145). Nevertheless, as previously 
rehearsed, Mondzelewski was given a write-up that warned of possible termination the next 
time such an incident occurred and was suspended. 
Moreover, there was testimony of several of Pathmark's witnesses conceding that 
Mondzelewski's write-up and suspension for the lifting incident violated a Pathmark ADA policy 
guidance. E-79, 82-85 (D.I. 145). The policy guidance states that, if a disabled employee is not 
meeting performance standards, such [*18] employee should be informed and asked if 
reasonable accommodation is required, and accommodation should be provided if it is 
reasonable. PX-34. If the employee continued to perform below standard, the ADA policy 
required that Pathmark's Human Resources division should be consulted prior to proceeding with 
documentation and progressive discipline. PX-34. Assistant store manager Leo Johnson also 
acknowledged that his actions violated the company's ADA policy, although he was not aware of 
such policy at the time he took them. E-183-184 (D.I. 145). Mondzelewski brought the violation 
of company ADA policy to the attention of Pathmark's corporate management in a letter to 
Steve Radcliffe, the Associate Relations Manager at Pathmark's corporate headquarters. PX-19. 
n8 Mondzelewski's letter mentioned his physician-imposed restrictions, described the lifting 
incident and the store manager's obscene language and Johnson's failure to follow Pathmark's 
ADA policy in writing him up and suspending him. PX-19 Mondzelewski never received a Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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response to the letter from Pathmark management. C-38-39 (D.I. 129). 
Footnotes 
n8 The letter also described the delay in returning him to work after his physicians had released 
him with restrictions and comments by Jimmy Porter, Bobby Taylor, and store management that 
Mondzelewski was a "hardship." PX-19. 
End Footnotes [*19] 
Mondzelewski filed a grievance over his punishment for the lifting incident. DX-23. At the 
grievance proceeding, Mondzelewski's union shop steward, Bobby Taylor, took a position 
adverse to Mondzelewski expressing his view that Mondzelewski should have picked up the 
meat. G-43-44 (D.I. 142). Pathmark denied the grievance and upheld the write-up and 
suspension for the lifting incident. F-98 (D.I. 146). 
Additional Aggravating Incidents 
Mondzelewski testified to other harassing incidents after he returned to work following his 
second injury. Co-worker Jimmy Porter flashed obscene gestures at Mondzelewski and his wife 
while they were shopping. B-24-25 (D.I. 149). Mondzelewski was criticized for taking his break 
at the end of his shift even though other employees did this and no one had previously been 
criticized. B-22-24 (D.I. 149); D-37 (D.I. 130). Fellow meat cutters Jimmy Porter and Bobby 
Taylor complained that Mondzelewski was a hardship. B-27 (D.I. 149); D-38; D-59-60 (D.I. 
130). Although store management was aware that other employees referred to Mondzelewski as 
a hardship, management did not explain the ADA's requirements for accommodation to the 
employees, nor were any other [*20] actions taken. B-27 (D.I. 149). Due to physical 
symptoms of stress from the job related actions, Mondzelewski requested to be excused from 
work for medical tests, B-101 (D.I. 149), but contrary to common practice, his request was 
initially denied. B-29-30 (D.I. 149). After Mondzelewski suffered a mental breakdown and had 
returned to work at a new store, the management there told him that he would not be there 
long, he was no longer needed, and that he would be better off pumping gas, B-40, and asked 
him to "shake" for him. B-41 (D.I. 149). 
Harm Suffered by Mondzelewski 
It was uncontradicted that Mondzelewski suffered a major depressive episode in August 1994. 
B-99-100 (D.I. 149); C-48 (D.I. 129); G-170-71; G-183 (D.I. 142). Dr. Neil Kaye, " 
Mondzelewski's treating psychiatrist, described the depression as "acute," C-50 (D.I. 129), and 
testified that it led to a chronic medical condition, C-77-78 (D.I. 129), requiring psychiatric 
medical supervision and counseling, C-54-56 (D.I. 129), for the remainder of Mondzelewski's 
life. C-78 (D.I. 129). The combination of anti-depressant and anti-anxiety medication prescribed 
for Mondzelewski required close psychiatric supervision since they [*21] had potentially fatal 
cardiac side-effects. C-51; 110-112 (D.I. 129). Although Mondzelewski's acute depression had 
shown improvement with intensive psychiatric treatment, medication, and counseling, this 
medication and therapy would be required for the rest of his life in order to maintain him in a 
relative status quo. C-52-54 (D.I. 129). 
Mondzelewski's chronic depressive condition was attributed to the harassing incidents at work 
that Mondzelewski perceived to be threatening to his job, B-96 (D.I. 149); C-78 (D.I. 129), in 
light of Mondzelewski's lifelong employment at Pathmark which defined him as a person. C-46; 
C-110 (D.I. 129). There was testimony that Mondzelewski's reaction and suffering was 
reasonable under the circumstances. C-78-79 (D.I. 129). Mondzelewski testified that he could 
never understand "why me" with respect to the punishments he was receiving, A-120, 128 (D.I. 
141), B-128 (D.I. 149), and that he felt devastated and emotionally sick, and that he felt that 
he was going to be fired and that Pathmark was trying to get rid of him. A-121 (D.I. 141); B-21, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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44 (D.I. 149). Mondzelewski was described by his psychiatrist as a "broken" man who would 
never return to his old [*22] self. C-54; C-78 (D.I. 149). Mondzelewski's co-workers also 
described the change in him after the assignment to the "punishment shifts" and the disciplinary 
actions, that he was not "the old Joe," that he no longer talked to anybody. D-63-64 (D.I. 130); 
G-45 (D.I. 142). One co-worker described Mondzelewski looking "like he was scared to death all 
the time . . . so afraid to do anything that . . . they could say was wrong" for fear of being 
written up and possibly fired. D-39 (D.I. 130). 
Mondzelewski also experienced physical manifestations of his psychiatric injury including a loss 
of more than fifty pounds over a few months, B-102 (D.I. 149), inability to sleep, B-31 (D.I. 
149), and a stress ulcer that required medical treatment. B-97 (D.I. 149); PX-7. He also was 
unable to work for several months due to the severity of his psychiatric condition. PX-33. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 
Pathmark first moves for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
50(b). n9 Pathmark argues it is entitled to JMOL because Mondzelewski failed to produce 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could reach to following conclusions: [*23] 
(1) That Pathmark retaliated against Mondzelewski for requesting accommodation for his 
disability; (2) that Pathmark discriminated against Mondzelewski because of his disability; (3) 
that Pathmark retaliated against him for filing a workers' compensation claim; (4) that 
Mondzelewski was entitled to and/or suffered any actual damages; or (5) that Mondzelewski was 
entitled to punitive damages in any amount. 
Footnotes -
n9 As the rule requires, Pathmark moved for judgment as a matter of law on all counts before 
the submission of the case to the jury pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), and now renews its 
motion post-trial. 
Encj Footnotes 
1. Legal Standard 
The standard for granting JMOL is set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), which provides: 
HN2-~ 
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no 
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that 
issue, the court may determine that issue against that party and may grant a motion 
for judgment as a matter of law against [*24] that party with respect to a claim or 
defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a 
favorable finding on that issue. 
MNJTYhe standard is an exacting one, "contemplating 'the court's duty to assure enforcement of 
the controlling law and [to not intrude] on any responsibility for factual determinations 
conferred on the jury.'" Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1395, 1408 (D. Del. 1996) (quoting 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, Advisory Committee Notes, 1991 amendment), aff'd without opinion, 124 
F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court reviews the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the 
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light most favorable to the verdict winner. See Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 100 
F.3d 1061, 1072 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert, denied, 521 U.S. 1129, 138 L Ed. 2d 1031, 117 
S. Ct. 2532 (1997); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1095 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Rotondo, 956 F.2d at 438. "The Court may not weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of 
witnesses, or replace its version of the facts for that of the jury." Finch, 941 F. Supp. at 
1408 [*25] (citing Blair v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
Judgment as Matter of Law should be granted "sparingly," Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 
1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993), and only when, after reviewing the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, "no jury could decide in that 
party's favor." Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 919 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 914, 139 L. Ed. 2d 230, 118 S. Ct. 
299 (1997); see also, e.g., Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1996) (JMOL 
not appropriate if any rational basis for the verdict); Danny Kresky Enterprises Corp. v. Magid, 
716 F.2d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 1983) (The Court may overturn a jury verdict in favor of a prevailing 
party only if the record "is critically deficient of that minimum quantum of evidence from which 
a jury might reasonably afford relief." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
2. Analysis of Pathmark's Arguments and the Evidence 
a. Sufficiency of Evidence [*26] Supporting the ADA Retaliation Claim 
HN4lFThe ADA retaliation provision states that "no person shall discriminate against any 
individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] 
or because such individual made a charge . . . under [the ADA]." 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). This 
provision is similar to the prohibition of retaliation in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Not surprisingly, courts analyze ADA retaliation claims using the 
same framework employed for retaliation claims arising under Title VII. See Krouse v. American 
Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997). 
" "
5 T T o establish a prima facie case for retaliation for protected conduct under the ADA, 
Mondzelewski had to show that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse 
employment action following the protected activity; and (3) a causal link existed between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action. See id.; Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 
F.3d at 920. If Mondzelewski establishes these elements, the burden of production shifts [*27] 
to Pathmark to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its actions. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 36 L Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973); Texas 
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 101 S. Ct. 1089 
(1981); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). At this point, a presumption of 
discrimination "drops from the case," Woodson, 109 F.3d at 920 n.2 (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 
763), and to prevail, Mondzelewski must carry the burden of convincing the factfinder both that 
Pathmark's proffered reasons for the actions were false, and that discrimination was the real 
reason for the actions. Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 
2748, 2754, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993). Subsumed within this burden, Mondzelewski has to 
prove that Pathmark's proffered non-discriminatory reasons were pretextual. 
Pathmark first contends that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to have found that 
Mondzelewski established the second and third elements of his prima facie case. [*28] 
Second, Pathmark argues that even if he established a prima facie case, Mondzelewski failed to 
present competent evidence to show that Pathmark's asserted non-discriminatory reasons for its 
adverse actions against Mondzelewski were pretextual. 
i. Adverse actions 
Pathmark argues that most of the "adverse actions" alleged by Mondzelewski fail to fall within 
the Supreme Court's definition of adverse employment action. See Burlington Industries v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268, 141 L Ed. 2d 633 (1998) (defining adverse 
employment actions as conduct which "constitutes a significant change in employment status, 
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such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.") ^ ^ P ' M i n o r or trivial 
actions that merely make an employee 'unhappy' are not sufficient to qualify as retaliation 
under the ADA, for otherwise every action that an 'irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did 
not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.'" Mondzelewski v. Path mark Stores, Inc., 
162 F.3d 778, 787 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 
(3d Cir. 1997) [*29] (citation omitted)). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in this case 
that a jury could conclude that Mondzelewski's assignment to punishment shifts constitutes an 
adverse employment action, because "assigning an employee to an undesirable schedule can be 
more than a 'trivial' or minor change in the employee's working conditions." 162 F.3d at 788 
(citing voluminous caselaw). Sufficient evidence was in fact presented at trial for the jury to 
conclude that the schedule to which Mondzelewski was assigned was undesirable, was 
considered "punishment," and amounted to taking away the benefits of the standard meat 
cutters' schedule. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have 
concluded that at the very least Mondzelewski's schedule change constituted a change in his 
terms and conditions of employment and thus was an adverse employment action. Additionally, 
if the jury concluded that Mondzelewski was unfairly disciplined, it could reasonably have 
concluded that such unfair discipline had the effect of changing his terms and conditions of 
employment or limited or classified him so that his opportunities or status were adversely 
affected. nlO 
Footnotes 
nlO Pathmark even appears to concede in its brief that the schedule change and suspension 
could "arguably qualify as 'adverse acts.'" D.I. 153, at 10. 
End Footnotes [*30] 
ii. Causation 
Evidence adduced at trial indicated the protected activity asserted by Mondzelewski was his 
request for accommodation, that is, to return to work with lifting restrictions. Mondzelewski's 
theory of the retaliation claim was that his return from the second injury with a lifting restriction 
triggered Pathmark's adverse actions against him. An exhibit introduced at trial stressed the 
close proximity between Mondzelewski's return to work and the asserted adverse actions. PX-33. 
Pathmark argues that Mondzelewski offered no evidence linking his request for accommodation 
with any of the alleged adverse actions taken against him. Pathmark contends that, aside from 
the fact that the schedule changes and write-ups temporally followed his return to work with 
restrictions, there was no other evidence connecting the two events. Moreover, Pathmark 
maintains, there is no difference between Mondzelewski's request to return to work with 
restrictions after his injury in 1992 and his request to return to work with restrictions after his 
December 1993 injury. It was uncontested that Mondzelewski was not mistreated by Pathmark 
after returning to work with restrictions following his [*31] 1992 injury. Therefore, Pathmark 
asserts, the alleged retaliatory acts in March and April 1994 were temporally remote from 
Mondzelewski's return to work with accommodation in 1992 and, without more, cannot support 
a finding of retaliation. Pathmark argued to the jury that the fact that Pathmark did not 
discriminate against Mondzelewski in 1992 after he returned to work with restrictions rebutted 
an inference that discrimination motivated the adverse actions after Mondzelewski's return to 
work with restrictions following the second injury. The jury apparently did not accept this 
argument, and instead viewed Mondzelewski's request to return to work with accommodation 
after his second injury as a separate protected act under the ADA. HN7+it is not the role of this 
Court to second guess the jury's inferences from the evidence, see, e.g., Finch, 941 F. Supp. at 
1411, and the following analysis therefore proceeds accepting what must have been the jury's 
view. 
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Case law in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals is "'seemingly split' on the question of whether the 
timing of the allegedly retaliatory action can, by itself, ever support a finding of causation." 
Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503 [*32] (citing Robinson, 120 F.3d 1286 at 1302)(emphasis in original). 
In Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1989) the court held the plaintiff established a 
prima facie case of retaliation where he was fired two days after filing an EEOC complaint. In 
Woodson, the court, relying on Jalil, stated in dicta that the "temporal proximity between the 
protected activity and the termination is sufficient to establish a causal link." 109 F.3d at 920. 
In EEOC v. LB. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 1997), the court found that the 
employee's protected activity and the adverse employment action, which followed two months 
later, were "sufficiently close together to allow a reasonable fact finder to find the required 
element of causation." And, in Kachmar v. Sunguard Data Sys., Inc., the court stated that 
"temporal proximity between the employee's protected activity and the adverse employment 
action . . . is an obvious method by which a plaintiff can proffer circumstantial evidence 
sufficient to raise the inference that [the plaintiffs] protected activity was the likely cause of the 
adverse employment action." 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997) [*33] (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, the Third Circuit appellate court has stated that 
"timing alone will not suffice to prove retaliatory motive." Delli Santi, 88 F.3d at 199 n.10. See 
also Quiroqa v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that the court in Jalil 
"stopped short of creating an inference based upon timing alone"). In Krouse, the court stated 
that "even if timing alone could ever be sufficient to establish a causal link, . . . the timing of 
the alleged retaliatory action must be 'unusually suggestive' of retaliatory motive before a 
causal link will be inferred." 126 F.3d at 503 (citing Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1302). 
tf/V8-pEven ,f timing alone is not "unusually suggestive," temporal proximity, in addition to 
evidence of a "pattern of antagonism" toward the plaintiff, may be sufficient to establish a 
causal link between protected activity and the adverse employment action. Woodson, 109 F.3d 
at 920 ("[A] plaintiff can establish a link between his or her protected behavior and subsequent 
discharge if the employer engaged in a pattern of antagonism [*34] in the intervening 
period."); Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 177 ("Circumstantial evidence of a 'pattern of antagonism' 
following the protected conduct can also give rise to the inference" that the adverse employment 
action was in retaliation for the employee's protected activity, (citing Robinson, 982 F.2d 892 at 
895)). In this case, Mondzelewski adduced sufficient evidence for the jury to have found the 
close temporal proximity between his request to return to work with accommodation and the 
punishment shifts and other discipline was "unusually suggestive." Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503. 
Moreover, even if not sufficient on its own, the timing of the adverse employment actions, when 
combined with what the jury could reasonably view as a pattern of antagonism after the 
protected conduct, was sufficient for the jury to infer a causal relation between the protected 
conduct and the employer's adverse action. See Price v. Delaware Dep't of Correction, 40 F. 
Supp. 2d 544, 554 (D. Del. 1999). 
Mondzelewski requested to return to work with accommodation in mid-February 1994 and 
returned to work on March 17, 1994. On March 21, 1994, he began [*35] to be assigned to the 
"punishment shifts", and on March 26, 1994 began being assigned to the Saturday night shifts. 
On April 23, 1994, he received the first disciplinary action in his thirty-five year career, the 
write-up for grinding too much meat after being told by the meat department assistance 
manager to grind a lot of meat. This was followed shortly thereafter, on April 30, 1994, by the 
write-up and suspension for refusing to lift meat that he feared exceeded his lifting restriction. 
Mondzelewski also was singled out for reprimand for taking his break at the end of his shift. 
These actions against an employee with a spotless disciplinary record were both temporally 
close to Mondzelewski's protected activity and could be viewed by a reasonable jury as 
establishing a pattern of "retaliatory animus" sufficient for the jury to find that Mondzelewski 
established the required causal connection. Id. 
hi. Pretext Showing 
Pathmark next argues that Mondzelewski failed to present the jury with any evidence to rebut 
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Pathmark's non-discriminatory explanations of its actions, to show that these explanations were 
pretextual. At trial, Pathmark offered explanations for each adverse [*36] action. Therefore, at 
trial, the burden shifted to Mondzelewski to present sufficient evidence to persuade the jury that 
Pathmark's explanations were false and that the real reason for the actions was retaliation for 
protected activity. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 512. H/V9"?"'The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put 
forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) 
may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional 
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to 
infer the ultimate fact of discrimination, and . . . upon such rejection, no additional proof of 
discrimination is required." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (footnote and citation omitted); see also 
Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1066-67. Mondzelewski was not required to present direct evidence of 
discrimination of retaliation (i.e., "a smoking gun") in order for the jury to reasonably find in his 
favor. Price, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 554; see also Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (plaintiff need not "adduce 
evidence directly contradicting the defendant's [*37] proffered legitimate explanations"). To 
discredit Pathmark's proffered reasons, Mondzelewski could demonstrate that "such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in the employer's proffered 
legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them 
unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted 
non-discriminatory reasons." Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (internal quotations and citations omitted) 
(footnote omitted). See also Josey v. John R. Hollinqsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 
1993) (holding the correct inquiry is "whether evidence of inconsistencies and implausibilities in 
the employer's proffered reasons for [the adverse employment action] could support an 
inference that the employer did not act for non-discriminatory reasons" (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has described the role of the jury in this process as follows: 
HN10w+The role of determining whether the inference of discrimination is warranted 
must remain within the province of the jury, because a finding of 
discrimination [*38] is at bottom a determination of intent. In making that finding, 
the jury must perform its traditional function of assessing the weight of the evidence, 
the credibility of witnesses through observation of both direct testimony and 
cross-examination at trial, and the strength of inferences that can be drawn from the 
elements of the prima facie case and the evidence that undermines the employer's 
proffered reasons for its actions. This is uniquely the role of the factfinder, not the 
court. . . . 
HN11TYhe district court must determine whether the plaintiff has cast sufficient 
doubt upon the employer's proffered reasons to permit a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that the reasons are incredible . . . . But once the court is satisfied that the 
evidence meets this threshold requirement, it may not pretermit the jury's ability to 
draw inferences from the testimony, including the inference of intentional 
discrimination drawn from an unbelievable reason proffered by the employer. 
Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1071-72. (citations omitted) 
Mondzelewski presented sufficient evidence to meet this threshold requirement and to give the 
jury reason to disbelieve Pathmark's proffered [*39] non-discriminatory explanations for each 
of the adverse actions and to infer Pathmark's adverse employment actions were motivated by 
discriminatory intent. 
(1) Assignment to the "punishment shifts": Pathmark contended that Mondzelewski's 
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assignment to the undesirable shifts were necessary to accommodate his lifting restrictions; 
however, there was no written document, as would be expected under the circumstances, that 
Mondzelewski was being given shifts like no one else in order to accommodate his disability. 
Pathmark's position was undercut because it was brought out that such shifts were not deemed 
necessary to accommodate Mondzelewski's similar lifting restrictions after his injury in 1992, 
A-76-77 (D.I. 141); D-23 (D.I. 130), nor were such shifts considered necessary to accommodate 
his lifting restrictions when he returned to work at a different store with the same lifting 
restrictions after he had suffered a mental breakdown. B-36 (D.I. 149); G-113-114 (D.I. 142). 
Pathmark, through the testimony of meat department manager and union member Bobby 
Hinkle, tried to show that Hinkle, rather than store management, was responsible for 
Mondzelewski's assignment to the "punishment [*40] shifts." F-38 (D.I. 146). However, 
Hinkle's testimony suffered from memory lapses and conflicted with his previous sworn 
testimony where Hinkle denied knowledge of how Mondzelewski was assigned to the 
"punishment shifts," stating that he had no recollection of it, it was not his doing, and that the 
schedules he drew up were sent up front where they were gone over by store management. 
F-46-47 (D.I. 146). 
Other testimony supported Mondzelewski's argument that he was being given "punishment 
shifts" by store management. Mondzelewski testified that he asked Hinkle why he was being 
assigned to the punishment shifts and Hinkle responded that store managers, Ostafy and Leo 
Johnson changed the schedules that Hinkle wrote. A-114-115 (D.I. 141). Assistant meat 
manager Joe Kubec also told Mondzelewski that Ostafy was setting his schedule that way. 
A-115-116 (D.I. 141). Mondzelewski confronted store manager Ostafy about why he was being 
consistently assigned to work 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., Ostafy told him that was the way he 
wanted it. A-116-117 (D.I. 141). Former Pathmark meat wrapper Gail Barker also testified that 
when she asked Hinkle why Mondzelewski was being given the "punishment shifts, [*41] " 
Hinkle responded that he drew up the initial schedules but that they were then left up front with 
store management, who changed the schedules as they saw fit. D-30 (D.I. 130). Additionally, 
the jury was informed that, in answers to interrogatories as to who was responsible for 
Mondzelewski's work schedule, Pathmark identified the store manager, Wayne Ostafy, and 
assistant manager, Leo Johnson, and made no mention of Hinkle. F-46 (D.I. 146). Therefore, 
the evidence, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in Mondzelewski's favor, was sufficient 
for the jury to conclude that Pathmark's explanation for Mondzelewski's shift assignment was 
pretextual and that the true reason for his assignment was as punishment for Mondzelewski's 
request to return to work with restrictions. 
(2) Ground meat write-up: Pathmark's asserted that the write-up was justified because 
Mondzelewski's grinding up of too much meat resulted in excess "shrink," that the meat had to 
be thrown away and the store lost money. Pathmark's explanation was countered with 
testimony that it was common for meat cutters to leave ground meat in the case overnight, for 
meat cutters to grind meat late at night in quantities [*42] similar to that ground by 
Mondzelewski, and that this practice did not result in write-ups. A-126 (D.I. 141); D-36; D-42; 
D-61 (D.I. 130). There was no contradiction of Mondzelewski's testimony that he had been told 
by the assistant meat manager to grind a lot of meat before he left. Pathmark contended that 
store policy required employees to consult store management prior to grinding a lot of meat late 
at night, yet another of Pathmark's witnesses testified that under the circumstances, a meat 
cutter would not question the department managers' orders and go over his head to the store 
manager before complying with such order. E-149 (D.I. 145). 
Pathmark's contention that the write-up, which threatened possible termination for future 
occurrences, was an appropriate response was also undermined by a Pathmark manager's 
concession that a write-up for a first disciplinary offense violated the company's progressive 
discipline policy which required an oral warning before any formal write-up. E-85; E-174-76 
(D.I. 145). Pathmark's witness, Bobby Taylor, the union shop steward, also testified that it was 
not the norm to threaten an employee with termination in an oral warning on a first 
disciplinary [*43] offense. G-58 (D.I. 142). No explanation was given for this divergence from 
policy in Mondzelewski's case, n i l The evidence, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mondzelewski's favor, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Pathmark's explanation for the 
ground meat disciplinary write-up was pretextual and that the true reason for the write-up was 
as punishment for Mondzelewski's request to return to work with restrictions. 
Footnotes 
n i l Pathmark also suggested Mondzelewski was treated better than other workers under similar 
circumstances, pointing to the testimony of Jimmy Porter that he was demoted from meat 
department manager because of "shrink issues." Use of the plural issues implies ongoing 
wastage problems in Porter's case, and there was no evidence that his situation was 
comparable. Porter described "shrink" as referring to loss of money generally for overproduction, 
overtrimming, and mishandling product. E-151-52 (D.I. 145). 
- - End Footnotes 
(3) Write-up and suspension for lifting incident: In defense of the write-up [*44] and 
suspension of Mondzelewski for the lifting incident, Pathmark presented the testimony of Bobby 
Taylor, Leo Johnson, and Jimmy Porter to the effect that Mondzelewski could not have 
reasonably believed that the chucks he refused to lift weighed more than fifty pounds. G-40 
(D.I. 142); E-163 (D.I. 145). However, the jury was also presented with evidence contradicting 
Taylor's testimony that he weighed everything out and showed the tickets to Mondzelewski: the 
write-up never showed exacts weights of the meats, nor was mention made of any weight 
tickets and the store manager, Wayne Ostafy, admitted that no one knew the exact weight of 
the meat in question, and conceded that there was a possibility that it could have exceeded 
Mondzelewski's fifty pound lifting restriction. F-57 (D.I. 146). 
Taylor's credibility generally was called into question by his assertion that the meat cutters were 
a caring group who helped one another out, which did not square either with his failure to assist 
Mondzelewski in lifting the chucks because he "wasn't asked" or his instruction to Jimmy Porter 
to call store management. Testimony by a former Pathmark meat wrapper Gail Barker that the 
boxes listing the [*45] meat weights were retrieved from the trash area only after 
Mondzelewski was suspended contradicted Pathmark's assertion that the weight of meat was 
known to Mondzelewski. Testimony that Jimmy Porter called Mondzelewski a hardship and 
flashed obscene gestures at him and his wife would provide a reasonable basis for the jury to 
discredit his testimony as biased. Moreover, the obscene language employed by Leo Johnson 
during the incident further supports an inference of animus. 
The contradictions in the testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to Mondzelewski, support 
an inference that he had a good faith belief that he did not know whether the chuck he was 
being told to lift weighed more than his lifting restrictions. The jury was not compelled to accept 
the explanation of Pathmark, namely that Mondzelewski—who, it was uncontradicted, had never 
been insubordinate and was considered honest and a good worker—would for some reason 
suddenly choose to be insubordinate. Rather, the jury could have believed that Mondzelewski 
was set-up in a situation where he was ordered to lift meat for which in good faith he did not 
know nor could he determine the weight and forced into a the choice [*46] of potentially 
reinjuring his back or facing discipline. If follows there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 
conclude that Pathmark's proffered non-discriminatory explanation for the disciplinary 
suspension and write-up of Mondzelewski was pretextual. 
The Court reiterates that H/Vi2"?for purposes of the JMOL motion, the Court must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Mondzelewski. The Court will not second guess the 
weight assigned to this evidence by the jury, "nor will the Court interpose its own belief as to 
what the evidence showed if it were different from that of the jury's." Finch, 941 F. Supp. at 
1411. Accordingly, the Court finds the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow the jury 
to reasonably find that Mondzelewski established his prima facie case of retaliation, and to 
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conclude that enough inconsistencies, implausibilities, and incoherences in the evidence to 
support an inference that Pathmark's explanations for its actions were unworthy of credence. 
Together, this is sufficient to support the jury's finding that Mondzelewski proved his ADA 
retaliation claim. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1066-67. [*47] 
b. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting the ADA Discrimination Claim 
The core anti-discrimination section of the ADA provides that: 
HN13~ 
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability 
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, 
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 
42 U.S.C. 5 12112. HN14TTit\e VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") caselaw 
inform standards of causation for proving disparate treatment under the ADA. See Newman v. 
GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1995). H /V i5 ,?"In order to make out a prima 
facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must be able to establish that he or she (1) has a 'disability' 
(2) is a 'qualified individual' and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action because of that 
disability." Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Gaul v. Lucent 
Techs. Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
HN16TThe ADA defines "disability" to mean, among [*48] other things, "a physical . . . 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(2)(A). Pathmark does not dispute Mondzelewski's back injury is a "physical impairment." 
Mondzelewski contends that he is limited in the major life activity of H/VI7,?working, which, 
under controlling case law in the Third Circuit, is considered to be one of the "major life 
activities." See Mondzelewski, 162 F.3d at 782-83. ^ ^ "Subs tan t i a l l y limits" as applied to 
"working," means "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a 
broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable 
training, skills and abilities." Id. at 784 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Determining 
whether an individual is substantially limited in working thus requires "consideration of the 
individual's training, skills, and abilities in order to evaluate 'whether the particular impairment 
constitutes for the particular person a significant barrier to employment.'" Id. (citing Webb v. 
Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing [*49] Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 
931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986))). The Supreme Court has recently stated: 
HN19<% 
To be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, . . . one must be 
precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of 
choice. If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique 
talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, 
if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad 
range of jobs. 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2151, 144 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999). 
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In Mondzelewski, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the evidence proffered by 
Mondzelewski, if believed by a jury, would be sufficient to establish that he was disabled in the 
major life activity of working. Such sufficient evidence was presented at trial. The evidence 
showed that Mondzelewski had limited education, job training, and job skills and that he was an 
older employee. D-78-79; 86-87 (D.I. 130). Vocational expert Thomas Yohee testified that this 
combination of factors, coupled with his [*50] medically-imposed lifting restrictions, 
significantly restricted Mondzelewski's ability to find other employment. D-90 (D.I. 130). Based 
on an in-depth vocational analysis, Yohee concluded that Mondzelewski was restricted to 
medium-duty jobs, that he had virtually no transferable skills, and that there were relatively 
few jobs available to him if he was not accommodated in his meat cutter job. D-75-76, 86-87, 
90 (D.I. 130). He concluded that, of the jobs Mondzelewski could perform without 
accommodation, there were few openings, the jobs would be at substantially reduced wages, 
and that Mondzelewski had no substantial hope of finding jobs in Delaware or neighboring 
states. D-89-91 (D.I. 130). Yohee concluded that the combination of lack of education, training, 
skills, job history, age, and physical handicaps made Mondzelewski substantially unemployable 
without accommodation, that these factors disabled him from a broad range or class of jobs. 
D-91-92 (D.I. 130). Yohee testified that, in light of his impairments, there were no other jobs 
available to him that would use his skills or talents, nor were there a host of different jobs 
available to him. D-93 (D.I. 130). It follows that, [*51] if the jury accepted Yohee's 
testimony, there was sufficient evidence for it to conclude that Mondzelewski proved the first 
element of his prima facie case, that he was disabled in the major life activity of working. 
As to the second element of the prima facie case, the parties stipulated at trial that, with 
accommodation, Mondzelewski was a qualified individual. 
As to the third, and final, element of the prima facie case, Mondzelewski was required to show 
he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. At trial Mondzelewski 
appeared to argue several discrimination theories: that Pathmark assigned him to the 
"punishment shifts" and unfairly disciplined him because of his disability; that he was harassed 
because of his disability by his co-workers and Pathmark management, and, that such 
harassment rose to the level of a hostile working environment; and that Pathmark failed to 
accommodate Mondzelewski's lifting disability by taking the harassing and adverse actions 
against him. Pathmark contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a discrimination 
claim under any theory. The Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support a 
claim for discrimination, [*52] at least on the hostile work environment theory. 
HN20w
*For harassment to rise to the level of discrimination, "it must be sufficiently severe or 
pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.'" Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 411 U.S. 57, 67, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49, 106 S. Ct. 
2399 (1986) (citation omitted). This standard is intended to "take[] a middle path between 
making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a 
tangible psychological injury." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370, 126 
L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993). HN2I"¥The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a "totality of the 
circumstances" approach to hostile work environment claims. See West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 
45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 
(3d Cir. 1990). See also Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371 ("whether an environment is 'hostile' or 
'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances."). Relevant circumstances 
"may include the frequency of the [*53] discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. In order to find liability for a 
hostile work environment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct was severe or 
pervasive enough to create an environment that a reasonable person of the same protected 
class would find to be hostile or abusive. See West, 45 F.3d at 753-54. The victim must also 
subjectively perceive the work environment to be hostile or abusive. Id. at 754. 
Evidence was presented that some of Mondzelewski's co-workers referred to him as a hardship 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an objectively hostile work environment. However, more important to the creation of the hostile 
environment was Pathmark's month-long delay in returning Mondzelewski to work, which led 
him to wonder if he would lose his job; the assignment to punishment shifts when he returned 
to work; and the disciplinary write-ups. When combined with the co-worker comments and 
gestures and the actions [*54] by Pathmark that a jury could reasonably construe to be 
retaliatory, and the impact on Mondzelewski in terms of making him fear for his job, the lifting 
incident and its probable impact on a reasonable person in Mondzelewski's position could be 
found by the jury to be severe enough to create an objectively hostile environment. nl2 
- - Footnotes -
nl2 The parties do not dispute that Mondzelewski subjectively perceived the work environment 
at Pathmark to be hostile. 
Encj Footnotes 
Mondzelewski argued to the jury that he was set up by meat cutters Jimmy Porter and Bobby 
Taylor. Porter presented Mondzelewski with large chucks of meat, for which the boxes with the 
weights had been discarded, so Mondzelewski could not follow his customary practice of 
weighing the smaller pieces out and subtracting the weights of those pieces from the total 
weight on the box to determine whether the large chuck was within his lifting restriction. The 
jury could have reasonably found that Mondzelewski, back injury fresh in mind, only recently 
increased to the fifty [*55] pound restrictions, had a reasonable fear of reinjuring his back 
when confronted with a situation where he did not know the weight of the meat. Porter 
adamantly refused to help when Mondzelewski requested assistance in lifting and Taylor did not 
offer assistance but instead recommended calling the manager. The manager in obscene 
language ordered Mondzelewski to lift the meat or face suspension. The jury could reasonably 
view this incident as meat cutters and management combining forces to send a message to 
Mondzelewski to stop asserting his disability-imposed restrictions, even though there was ample 
evidence that it was Mondzelewski's responsibility to do so. In light of the response by both 
union workers and the manager Leo Johnson, a jury could reasonably have concluded that the 
lifting incident and the punishment — the suspension and write-up which threatened possible 
termination for the next occurrence — was designed to set a precedent and let Mondzelewski 
know that both union member meat cutters and management wanted to send him a signal. The 
message was that, should Mondzelewski assert such good faith objections to requests to lift 
above his restriction, he faced a stark choice: [*56] risk his health or termination. The jury 
could have concluded that this action, under the circumstances, including the other retaliatory 
acts and harassing comments and gestures, was sufficiently severe that a reasonable person in 
Mondzelewski's situation would view it as altering his terms and conditions of employment by 
creating a hostile or abusive working environment. Clearly store management had knowledge of, 
in fact ultimately imposed, the draconian choice on Mondzelewski. Moreover, Mondzelewski 
transmitted knowledge of this incident and the no-win situation in which he was placed to 
Pathmark corporate personnel in his letter to Steve Radcliffe asking how to resolve such 
situations in the future, but received no response. 
c. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting the Workers1 Compensation Retaliation Claim 
Pathmark next argues that the jury's verdict that Pathmark retaliated against Mondzelewski for 
exercising his rights under Delaware's workers' compensation statute, in violation of 19 Del. C. § 
2365, is not supported by sufficient evidence. The Court need not reach the merits of 
Pathmark's argument. Instead, the Court will vacate the jury's verdict for liability and 
damages [*57] against Pathmark on this claim, because 19 Del. C. § 2365 was not applicable 
during the time period when the alleged retaliatory actions relevant to this claim occurred. 
The trial in this case was conducted based on an assumption by both parties and this Court that 
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same assumption. However, M / v ^ 7 § 2365 was not effective until July 12, 1994 and there was 
no predecessor statutory provision providing comparable rights. See 69 Del. Laws, c. 370, § 1 
(1993 vol. II); 19 Del. Code Ann. § 2365, Revisor's note (1995 Repl.). 
Because the acts alleged as retaliation for Mondzelewski filing his workers' compensation 
retaliation claim occurred prior to the enactment of § 2365, he cannot claim relief under this 
section. nl3 Mondzelewski filed for workers' compensation on March 3, 1994. The alleged 
retaliatory acts occurred primarily in March and April 1994: Mondzelewski's assignment to 
"punishment shifts" started soon after his return to work on March 17, 1994; nl4 the 
disciplinary write-up for allegedly leaving too much ground meat in the case on April 23, 1994; 
and the write-up and suspension [*58] for Mondzelewski's refusal to lift a piece of chuck that 
he thought weighed more than his 50 pound restrictions on April 30, 1994. nl5 PX-33. The final 
denial of Mondzelewski's grievance by the store manager regarding the two write-ups was made 
in June 1994. PX-33. Because the statutory provision upon which Mondzelewski relies for his 
state workers' compensation retaliation claim was not enacted until July 12, 1994, after the 
claimed retaliatory acts occurred, it is inapplicable as a matter of law. nl6 
Footnotes -
nl3 ^"Delaware courts have recognized the general principle that statutes will not be 
retroactively applied unless there is a clear legislative intent to do so." Hubbard v. Hibbard 
Brown & Co., 633 A.2d 345, 354 (Del. 1993) (citing, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. State, 457 A.2d 345, 
351 (Del. 1983)). The Court has found nothing to indicate the Delaware General Assembly 
intended to retroactively apply the statute at issue here. 
nl4 The record is unclear as to precisely how long the "punishment shifts" were imposed. 
Mondzelewski testified variously that the Saturday night shifts were imposed for 25 or 30 weeks 
or 30 or 40 weeks in a row, A-122 (D.I. 141), B-244 (D.I. 149), which would more than cover 
the time period between Mondzelewski's return to work in March and his disability leave due to 
his mental breakdown, beginning August 8, 1994. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to Mondzelewski, Pathmark continued to assign him to undesirable shifts for approximately four 
weeks after 19 Del. C. § 2365 was enacted. However, the Court concludes as a matter of law 
that the assignment to four weeks of undesirable schedules in July and August 1994, standing 
alone, would not be sufficient evidence to establish that Pathmark retaliated against 
Mondzelewski by assigning him such undesirable shifts because he filed for workers' 
compensation on March 3, 1994. [*59] 
nl5 To the extent that any delay in returning Mondzelewski to work could also be considered a 
retaliatory act, the relevant actions took place in February and March 1994. 
nl6 At trial, evidence was presented that the bonus pay of managers at Pathmark stores could 
be adversely affected by the filing of workers' compensation claims by store employees. 
Mondzelewski's counsel argued that managers at the Pathmark Dupont Highway store, where 
Mondzelewski worked at the time he was injured in December 1993 and filed the workers' 
compensation, retaliated against him because filing the workers' compensation claim hurt their 
chances for bonuses. Although there was testimony of harassment of Mondzelewski after he 
returned to work following extended disability leave for his mental breakdown, these acts 
occurred at the new Pathmark store to which Mondzelewski was transferred and could not be 
considered retaliation for filing for workers' compensation under Mondzelewski's theory. 
End Footnotes Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The only possible argument for upholding the workers' compensation retaliation verdict in the 
absence of statutory authority [*60] would be if the Delaware Supreme Court had recognized a 
cause of action for workers' compensation retaliation under, for example, a public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. The Court has been unable to locate any 
Delaware Supreme Court case that addresses this issue. Moreover, it is highly improbable the 
Delaware Supreme Court would have recognized such a cause of action for workers' 
compensation retaliation at common law because H/V24"?'the Delaware judiciary has a 
long-standing practice of deferring to the Delaware General Assembly when it comes to 
declaring the public policy of the state. nl7 See, e.g., Moss Rehab v. White, 692 A.2d 902# 909 
(Del. 1997); Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554# 556 (Del. 1981); State ex rel. State Board of 
Pension Trustees v. Dineen, 409 A.2d 1256, 1260 (Del. Ch. 1979); Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 
97, 102-03 (Del. 1974). Not surprisingly, given the traditional deference given by the Delaware 
judiciary to the legislature, the only Delaware case this Court could find directly addressing the 
issue declined to recognize a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine [*61] 
on the ground of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim. See Emory v. 
Nanticoke Homes, Inc., 1985 Del. Super. LEXIS 1063, at *11, C.A. No. 82 C-MR-14 (Kent) (Del. 
Super. July 19, 1985). There being no viable basis to sustain the jury's liability verdict and 
corresponding damages awarded to Mondzelewski on the state workers' compensation 
retaliation claim, that portion of the jury verdict will be overturned. 
Footnotes 
nl7 The issue whether the Delaware Supreme Court would have recognized a common law 
cause of action for workers' compensation retaliation prior to July 12, 1994 is not an appropriate 
question for certification by this Court under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 41. Rule 41 states 
that HN25+a United States District Court may certify a question to the Delaware Supreme Court 
"prior to the entry of final judgment if there is an important and urgent reason for an immediate 
determination of such question . . . ." Del. Sup. Ct. R. 41(a)(ii). Because a final judgment has 
been entered, the issue is not appropriate for certification by this Court under Rule 41. See 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Blue Rock Shopping Ctr., Inc., 599 F. Supp. 684, 686-87 (D. Del. 
1984); cf. Rales v. Blasband, 626 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Del. 1993) (in granting certification, noting 
"[a] final judgment has also not been entered in this matter by the Delaware District Court"). 
Moreover, arguably, certification of a question of law is inappropriate in cases, such as this one, 
where such question of law is not likely to recur. See Fiat Motors of North America, Inc. v. City 
of Wilmington, 619 F. Supp. 29, 34 (D. Del. 1985) (citing Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Mem. 
Hosp., 701 F.2d 1266, 1268 (8th Cir. 1983)). 
End Footnotes [*62] 
d. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Award of Any Actual Damages 
Pathmark next argues there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's award of any 
compensatory damages to Mondzelewski, because there was insufficient evidence to support a 
jury finding that Mondzelewski's depression was caused by Pathmark's actions. Viewing the facts 
in the light most favorable to Mondzelewski, see, e.g., Starceski, 54 F.3d at 1095, the Court 
concludes there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Mondzelewski's 
mental breakdown, his mental and physical pain and suffering that accompanied his acute 
depression, and the associated medical costs were attributable to the adverse actions 
Mondzelewski was experiencing at work, rather than some other cause. Dr. Kaye, Dr. Young, 
and Pathmark's initial examining physician in this matter, Dr. Raskin (used during workers' 
compensation proceedings) agreed that Mondzelewski's acute depression was brought on by the 
events at work. 
As to any claim that Mondzelewski did not suffer injury, the jury received evidence that 
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Mondzelewski had past medical expenses of $ 5,630 for Dr. Kaye and $ 10,675 for his 
psychiatric [*63] counselor, Kathryn Poppitti. PX-29, 30. Additionally, Dr. Kaye testified to 
Mondzelewski's need for medication and treatment for the rest of Mondzelewski's life. C-53-58, 
78 (D.I. 129). Mondzelewski's economic expert testified that, based on Mondzelewski's 
estimated life expectancy of twenty-two years, the present value of an award to provide for 
Mondzelewski's future medical expenses was $ 74,618. F-8-13 (D.I. 146). Thus, the jury 
received evidence of special damages totaling approximately $ 91,000. 
Regarding emotional damages, H/V26"?'"there is 'no legal yardstick by which to measure 
accurately' reasonable compensation for pain and suffering." Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 
930 F. Supp. 194, 199 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 935, 
971 (M.D. Pa. 1983)), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 113 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 1997). A 
jury may not, however, base damages "on sheer speculation." Jackson & Coker, Inc. v. Lynam, 
840 F. Supp. 1040, 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd without op., 31 F.3d 1172 (3d Cir. 1994). The 
Third Circuit appellate court has held that HN2?m¥\f the only evidence [*64] of emotional 
distress is plaintiff's own testimony of depression and humiliation, and there is no evidence of 
physical suffering, the need for medical care, or the like, then there is no "reasonable 
probability, rather than a mere possibility, that damages due to emotional distress were in fact 
incurred as a result of" the wrongful act. Spence v. Board of Educ., 806 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 
1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, where a plaintiff has 
corroborated his or her own testimony with testimony of friends, family, and expert witnesses 
and has proffered evidence that he or she has needed or will need professional care, such 
evidence can support a compensatory damages award. Bolden v. SEPTA, 21 F.3d 29, 33 (3d Cir. 
1994); Rush, 930 F. Supp. at 199. In this case, Mondzelewski's extensive testimony regarding 
his emotional injuries was corroborated by testimony of his wife and co-workers as well as his 
physicians. The testimony indicated that Mondzelewski's depression was "acute", C-50 (D.I. 
129), and that Mondzelewski at times was suicidal. B-100 (D.I. 149), C-92 (D.I. 129), PX-7. 
There also was testimony [*65] from Mondzelewski and his doctors regarding the physical 
manifestation of his injury, including rapid weight loss, sleep disruption, and an ulcer. There was 
also testimony supporting past and future medical expenses attributable to Mondzelewski's 
injuries. Such evidence is sufficient to support a substantial award for pain and suffering. nl8 
Footnotes 
nl8 As to Pathmark's contention that the compensatory damages were nonetheless excessive, 
the Court addresses this argument in section III.C. infra. Regarding Pathmark's claim that the 
jury's compensatory damages award erroneously included compensation for Mondzelewski's 
inability to work since 1997 for reasons unrelated to his claims in this case, see section III.B.c 
infra. 
__ End Footnotes-
Pathmark also asserts the jury's award of distinct amounts of compensatory damages for each 
of the claims, $ 250,000 for the ADA discrimination claim, $ 400,000 for the ADA retaliation 
claim, and $ 200,000 for the workers' compensation retaliation claim, was "overlapping" and 
cannot be supported [*66] based on the evidence because there was no rational basis for such 
a division. Pathmark contends Mondzelewski offered alternative theories of liability but that 
there was only one indivisible injury, Mondzelewski's acute depressive episode. The Court agrees 
that much of the evidence supporting the ADA retaliation and ADA discrimination claims was 
overlapping. nl9 However, the Court discussed with the jury the issue of overlapping proof for 
the different claims and the jury was instructed that, if it found Pathmark both retaliated and 
discriminated against Mondzelewski, and that those actions caused the same damages, the jury 
should account for those damages only once in its total compensatory damages figure. n20 D.I. 
116, at 3 (Verdict Form). The jury was told that, because of the overlapping proof issue, the 
total award could be less than the sum of the compensatory damage awards for the three 
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claims, unless you decide that you can separate out the damages." 1-5 (D.I. 144). The Court 
presumes that the jury followed the instructions given and, apparently, the jury, following the 
instructions, was able to separate out or apportion damages among the various counts. n21 
Footnotes 
nl9 Because the Court has concluded that Mondzelewski's cannot recover on the workers' 
compensation retaliation claim and, accordingly, will vacate the corresponding damages awards, 
the Court's discussion of compensatory damages treats only the remaining ADA claims. [*67] 
n20 The relevant portion of the jury verdict sheet states as follows: 
4A. IF your answer to Question 1 was YES [finding liability for ADA discrimination], what 
amount of actual and compensatory damages has Mr. Mondzelewski shown were caused to Mr. 
Mondzelewski by Pathmark's discrimination? 
If any, write the dollar amount; if none, write 0.00. $ 
4B. IF your answer to Question 2 was YES [finding liability for ADA retaliation], what amount of 
actual and compensatory damages has Mr. Mondzelewski shown were caused to Mr. 
Mondzelewski by Pathmark's retaliation for asserting his rights under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act? 
If any, write the dollar amount; if none, write 0.00. $ 
4C. IF your answer to Question 3 was YES [finding liability for workers' compensation retaliation 
claim], what amount of actual and compensatory damages has Mr. Mondzelewski shown were 
caused to Mr. Mondzelewski by Pathmark's retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim? 
If any, write the dollar amount; if none, write 0.00. $ 
5. What is the total amount of actual and compensatory damages, if any, you award to Mr. 
Mondzelewski? 
If any, write the dollar amount; if none, write 0.00. $ 
NOTE: You should not arrive at the answer to Question 5 simply by adding the total of Questions 
4A, 4B, and 4C. If you have found that Pathmark both discriminated and retaliated against Mr. 
Mondzelewski and/or retaliated against Mr. Mondzelewski both because he asserted his rights 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act and because he asserted his rights under the workers' 
compensation statute and that those actions caused the same damages, you should only 
account for those damages once in you answer to Question 5. Any damages caused solely by 
discriminatory conduct, any damages caused solely by retaliatory conduct for Mr. Mondzelewski 
asserting his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and any damages caused solely by 
retaliatory conduct for Mr. Mondzelewski filing a workers' compensation claim should be added 
into this total as well. 
D.I. 116, at 2-3 (emphasis added). [*68] 
n21 Pathmark appears to be raising, for the first time, a contention that the jury instructions 
and interrogatories on compensatory damages were erroneous. Pathmark's brief states: "The 
jury was given no guidance in distinguishing from among these overlapping "harms," and their 
verdict reflects that fact. Allowing the jury to come up with three separate figures without any 
factual basis for doing so is akin to giving them a dartboard and three arrows to shoot while 
blindfolded." D.I. 153 at 22. To the extent that Pathmark is now arguing that the damages Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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interrogatories were erroneous, the Court notes that Pathmark made no objection to the jury 
verdict form or the method used by the Court in that form. Jury Prayer Conference, 7/19/99, at 
36-37. Even after the jury requested by note assistance in arriving at the damages award, 
Pathmark voiced no objection to the Court's additional instruction in response to that note. 1-6 
(D.I. 144), 10, 17-19. Having failed to object at trial to the jury instructions and verdict form on 
the grounds now pressed, Pathmark has waived this argument. See Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. 
E.I. Med. Sys., Inc., 181 F.3d 446, 463 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Encj Footnotes - [*69] 
Moreover, to the extent the jury may have double counted damages that were caused by both 
the ADA retaliation and ADA discrimination, as a practical matter, it would have no effect. The 
total compensatory damages awarded for the ADA retaliation and discrimination claims was $ 
650,000, of which the ADA retaliation claim award was $ 400,000. Due to the ADA statutory 
damages cap, the Court has already remitted this award to $ 300,000, less than half the sum of 
the combined awards and $ 100,000 less than the ADA retaliation award alone. Thus, as a 
practical matter, any possible double counting is negated by the effect of the damages cap. 
e. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Award of Punitive Damages in Any Amount 
Pathmark further argues that insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support an award of 
punitive damages in any amount. The Court need not address this argument for two reasons. 
First, the Court remitted all punitive damages on the ADA claims prior to the imposition of 
judgment after trial due to the $ 300,000 statutory damages cap of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 
See D.I. 120. Second, because any acts by Pathmark that could have been construed by the 
jury as [*70] retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim occurred before the 
enactment of the relied-upon statutory provision, 19 Del. C. § 2365, Mondzelewski is not 
entitled to any damages on that claim. See supra, section III.A.2 c. 
B. Motion for New Trial 
Pathmark argues that, if the Court decides it is not entitled to JMOL under Rule 50(b), it is 
nonetheless entitled to a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) for several reasons. First, 
Pathmark maintains the great weight of the evidence is contrary to the jury's finding of liability 
on the ADA discrimination claim and the ADA retaliation claim. n22 Second, Pathmark asserts it: 
is entitled to a new trial because the Court made the following errors in the jury charge that 
were sufficiently prejudicial to Pathmark to constitute reversible error mandating a new trial: (1) 
instructing the jury as to the meaning of the "major life activity of working" by quoting Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regulations that define the term, 
notwithstanding Pathmark's objection that the EEOC regulations are invalid as a result of the 
Supreme's Court's reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra; (2) [*71] overruling 
Pathmark's objections to the jury instruction concerning respondeat superior liability; and (3) 
not clarifying the difference between Mondzelewski's total and permanent disability status 
established in December 1997 and his claim of disability under the ADA. Finally, Pathmark 
contends the jury's damages awards was so excessive as to demonstrate that it was the result 
of passion or prejudice, requiring a new trial. n23 
Footnotes 
n22 Pathmark further contends the great weight of the evidence is contrary to the jury's finding 
of liability on the retaliation claim under the Delaware worker's compensation statute, and the 
finding of malice or reckless conduct by Pathmark sufficient to warrant punitive damages. 
Because Mondzelewski is not entitled to punitive damages for reasons stated supra, section 
III.A.2.e, the Court need not address these contentions. 
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n23 Pathmark further contends that it is entitled to relief from the punitive damages award 
because the Court abused its discretion by permitting Mondzelewski to re-open his case-in-chief 
after failing to offer any evidence of Pathmark's net worth, as required by law, and by permitting 
Mondzelewski to offer hearsay evidence of Pathmark's net worth. Because Mondzelewski is not 
entitled to punitive damages for the reasons stated supra, section III.A.2.e, the Court need not 
address this claim. 
End Footnotes [*72] 
1. Weight of the Evidence 
HN28TThe authority to grant a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will 
not be disturbed absent an abuse of such discretion. See Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 
F.3d 1002, 1017 (3d Cir. 1995). Pathmark must meet a high standard to prevail on a motion for 
a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. HN29T'[A] 
district court ought to grant a new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of 
the evidence only where a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to stand." 
Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1352 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). 
"When the district court grants a motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence, the 
court has: 
to some extent at least, substituted [its] judgment of the facts and the credibility of 
witnesses for that of the jury. Such an action effects a denigration of the jury system 
and to the extent that new trials are granted the judge takes over, if he does not 
usurp, the prime function of the jury as the trier of facts. . . . 
Id. (quoting Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 [*73] (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert, 
denied, 364 U.S. 835, 5 L. Ed. 2d 60, 81 S. Ct. 58 (I960)); see also Klein v. Hoi lings, 992 F.2d 
1285, 1290 (3d Cir. 1993). Therefore, a trial judge should exercise caution and grant a new trial 
because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence only where a jury's verdict results in a 
"miscarriage of justice," "cries out to be overturned," or "shocks [the] conscience." Williamson, 
926 F.2d at 1353 (citing EEOC v. Delaware Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 865 F.2d 1408, 1413 
(3d Cir. 1989)). 
For reasons similar to those set forth in the Court's discussion of the evidence as applied to 
Pathmark's motion for JMOL, the Court finds that the jury's verdict did not result in a 
miscarriage of justice, nor cry out to be overturned, nor did it shock the conscience. Id. The 
Court will not grant Pathmark's motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury's verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence. 
2. Asserted Errors in Jury Instructions 
Pathmark also asserts a new trial is warranted because the Court's jury charge was erroneous in 
several respects. ^"^^Erroneous jury instructions [*74] may serve as the basis for a new 
trial. See Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723, 730 (3d Cir. 1990). H/V3I+Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(a) n24 is the procedural authority under which a trial court may consider a motion 
for a new trial. See Finch, 941 F. Supp. at 1413. HN32t?"In evaluating a motion for a new trial 
on the basis of trial error, the Court's inquiry is twofold: (1) whether an error was in fact 
committed, and (2) whether that error was so prejudicial that denial of a new trial would be 
'inconsistent with substantial justice."' Id. at 1414 (quoting Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
709 F. Supp. 600, 601 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 61), aff'd, 922 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1990), cert, denied, 501 U.S. 1217, 115 L. Ed. 2d 997, 111 S. Ct. 2827 (1991)). 
Footnotes 
n24 This rule provides in pertinent part: 
HN33~£ 
(a) Grounds. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part 
of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the 
reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the 
courts of the United States . . . . 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). 
- End Footnotes- - [*75] 
a. Major Life Activity of Working 
Pathmark contends the Court erred in instructing the jury concerning the definition of disability 
and of the "major life activity of working" under the ADA. n25 First, Pathmark contends it was 
error for the Court to incorporate EEOC guidelines into its disability instructions. Second, 
Pathmark argues that Mondzelewski should not have been allowed to proceed on the theory that 
"working" is one of the "major life activities" under the ADA. 
Footnotes 
n25 The court instructed the jury on the definition of disability and the major life activity of 
working as follows: 
. . . A person is disabled if he has a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of that person. 
In this case, the parties agree that Mr. Mondzelewski's back injury is a physical 
impairment. However, a physical impairment standing alone is not necessarily a 
disability as defined by the ADA. Instead, it has to be an impairment which 
substantially limits a major life activity of that person. 
The only disability Mr. Mondzelewski is claiming to suffer from is in connection with 
the major life activity of working. Therefore, if Mr. Mondzelewski was substantially 
limited in the major life activity of working, he was disabled. 
In order to be disabled in the major life activity of working, an individual must be 
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range 
of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable 
training[,] skills[,] and ability. 
There is no requirement that Mr. Mondzelewski demonstrate he is totally disabled. To 
be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, Mr. Mondzelewski 
must show he is precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a 
particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing Mr. Mondzelewski's skills, but perhaps not his 
unique talents, are available, then he is not precluded from a substantial class of 
jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are available, he is not precluded 
from a broad range of jobs. In evaluating the evidence, your examination must be an 
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individualized one comparing Mr. Mondzelewski, with his physical impairment, to 
other workers who have comparable training, education, skills, abilities and age, but 
who do not have his physical impairment. 
H-24-25 (D.I. 143). 
End Footnotes [*76] 
On July 2, 1999, Pathmark's counsel wrote a letter to the Court objecting, based on the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Sutton, to the Court's proposed disability instructions, which 
were based on regulations and interpretive guidance promulgated by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In Sutton, the Supreme Court determined that, although the 
EEOC has the authority to promulgate regulations for employment-related provisions of the 
ADA, no federal agency had been given statutory authority to issue regulations implementing 
the generally-available provisions of the ADA, in particular, that "no agency has been delegated 
authority to interpret the term 'disability.'" 119 S. Ct. at 2145. Relying on this language in 
Sutton, Pathmark asked the Court to avoid reliance on EEOC regulations and confine its 
instructions on disability to the language found in the statute itself. n26 
Footnotes 
n26 In the July 2, 1996 letter, Pathmark further requested the Court to change the instruction 
regarding the major life activity of working "to reflect the Supreme Court's guidance, as 
expressed in Sutton, that 'if jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her 
unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs.'" This the Court 
did. H-25 (D.I. 143). The Court's jury instruction on "substantially limited in the major life 
activity of working" incorporated the following language from Sutton, which includes the 
language requested by Pathmark's attorney practically verbatim: 
To be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be 
precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of 
choice. If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique 
talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, 
if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad 
range of jobs. 
119 S. Ct. at 2151. 
End Footnotes [*77] 
Had the Court complied with Pathmark's request to limit its jury charge on the definition of 
disability to the statutory language itself, it would have left the jury to fend entirely for itself in 
trying to interpret a statute about which Pathmark has said, "Dante himself would no doubt be 
impressed with the circularity and impenetrability of the statute." D.I. 153 at 28. Therefore, 
prudence and a sense of duty demanded the Court provide the jury with some further 
explanation of the statutory language. 
The Court concludes its instructions to the jury on disability, including the major life activity of 
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working, were not in error. Contrary to Pathmark's suggestion, Sutton does not require or 
counsel eliminating all reliance on EEOC Regulations and Interpretive Guidance. In Sutton, the 
Court explicitly declined to rule on whether or not the EEOC's Regulations or Interpretive 
Guidelines were valid or due any sort of deference. 119 S. Ct. at 2145. Furthermore, the Sutton 
Court went on to use EEOC guidance in determining whether the plaintiffs in that case were 
"regarded as" disabled because the parties had agreed that the regulations applied. Id. at 
2150-52. Thus, [*78] the Court may see some role for the EEOC Regulations, even if they are 
not due the extreme deference once given them. Moreover, to this point, ^^ •cont ro l l ing 
caselaw on the ADA from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals incorporates the EEOC's Regulations 
and Interpretive Guidelines. See, e.g., Mondzelewski, 162 F.3d at 782-86. It follows it was not 
error for this Court to incorporate the EEOC Regulations and Interpretive Guidelines into its 
instructions on disability. 
Second, in its motion for a new trial, Pathmark now appears to argue that it was improper for 
the case to be tried to the jury on the theory that Mondzelewski was disabled because he was 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Pathmark's contention is based on 
some dicta in Sutton which suggests the Supreme Court may have some conceptual difficulty 
with "working" being included among "major life activities." See D.I. 153 at 29 (citing Sutton, 
119 S. Ct. at 2151). The cited dicta in Sutton does not alter controlling case law in this 
jurisdiction, and this case in particular, that working is included among the major life activities 
under the ADA'S definition [*79] of disability. See Mondzelewski, 162 F.3d at 782-86. 
Therefore, the Court did not err in instructing the jury that working was included among the 
major life activities. 
Moreover, at trial, the only major life activity in which Mondzelewski claimed he was 
substantially limited, to support his claim that he was an individual with a disability, was 
working. The trial was conducted based on an acceptance by both parties and the Court that the 
term "major life activities" included "working." Having not previously raised an objection or 
argument that working is not among the major life activities to the Court before or during trial, 
and Pathmark having not objected to the Court's final instructions on disability at the jury 
instruction conference, D.I. 137, at 15, Pathmark cannot now assign error to the Court's 
disability instructions on this basis. See Cooper Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 
180 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 1999); Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. 
b. Respondeat Superior 
Pathmark also contends the court committed reversible error in its instructions on respondeat 
superior liability relating to the definition of "manager." The Court [*80] instructed the jury as 
follows: 
Pathmark is responsible for the conduct of its managers, that is management 
personnel. A manager is an employee who, while not necessarily the top 
management, directors or officers of the company, is important to the company. In 
making your determination as to whether a particular individual is a manager, you 
should consider the type of authority Pathmark has given to the employee, the 
amount of discretion the employee has in what is done and how he or she actually 
accomplishes what is done. In determining whether a Pathmark employee is a 
manager, you should consider the function of the employee in the company, not his 
or her title. 
H-21 (D.I. 143). Pathmark objects to the instruction based on a concern that the second 
sentence, particularly the word "important," is vague. D.I. 137, at 10-12, 14. This language is 
derived from the Supreme Court's opinion in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 
119 S. Ct. 2118, 2128f 144 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1999) ("The examples in the Restatement of Torts 
suggest that an employee must be 'important,' but perhaps need not be the employer's 'top 
management, officers, or directors,' [*81] to be acting 'in a managerial capacity."' (citations Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Li rary, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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omitted)). Because the Court finds nothing vague about the word "important," the Court finds 
no error in its instruction. 
c. Pathmark's Request for Clarification to the Jury Regarding Mondzelewski's Period of 
Disability 
Next, Pathmark argues that the Court erred by failing to clarify to the jury that Mondzelewski's 
permanent back disability, which rendered him unable to work after December 1997, was not 
relevant to a determination regarding whether Mondzelewski was disabled within the meaning of 
the ADA during the relevant time period. Prior to the Court charging the jury, counsel for 
Pathmark expressly raised this concern and asked the Court to make a clarifying instruction. 
H-6-9 (D.I. 143). Before the Court made any definitive ruling as to whether the jury charge 
would be altered in light of Pathmark's request, Mondzelewski's counsel represented that in his 
closing he would "tell the jury there is no claim for disability beyond the point when 
[Mondzelewski] retired." H-9 (D.I. 143). Counsel for Pathmark agreed that this would be an 
acceptable solution to her concern. Id. During summation, however, Mondzelewski's [*82] 
counsel failed to make the clarification. Counsel for Pathmark did not raise any objections or 
request the Court to make such a clarification at the time. Having failed to preserve the 
objection by bringing it to the Court's attention at the conclusion of summation, Pathmark 
cannot now assign error to the Court's failure to give a clarifying instruction. See, e.g., Cooper 
Distribution Co., 180 F.3d at 549. 
3. Assertion that Jury was Swayed by Passion and Prejudice 
Finally, Pathmark asserts it is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the jury's verdict in this 
case was so excessive that it inherently demonstrates that the jury was swayed by passion or 
prejudice, citing Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 835 F.2d 597, 603 (5th Cir. 1988). HN351?A 
new trial is the proper remedy if it is shown that a jury verdict was the result of passion or 
prejudice. Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. E.I. Med. Sys., Inc., 181 F.3d 446, 464 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(citing Dunn v. HOVIC, 28 V.I. 467, 1 F.3d 1371, 1383 (3d Cir. 1993)(en banc)). However, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has "rejected the argument that 'the size of the award 
alone [*83] is enough to prove prejudice and passion.'" Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 
174 F.3d 95, 114 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1383), cert, denied 145 L. Ed. 2d 663, 
120 S. Ct. 786 (2000); see also Inter Med. Supplies, 181 F.3d at 464 (rejecting argument that $ 
100,600,000 punitive damage award that was remitted to $ 50,000,000 was so excessive as to 
indicate the jury's decision was the product of passion or prejudice). Because Pathmark's "only 
evidence of jury prejudice and passion is the amount of the [] damage award itself . . . 
[Pathmark's] argument cannot prevail." Hurley, 174 F.3d at 114. 
C. Motion for Remittitur or New Trial on Damages 
As a fallback position, Pathmark moves for remittitur of Mondzelewski's award in all categories 
of damages, or for a new trial on the issue of damages, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). HN36+ 
If a court concludes a jury verdict is "clearly unsupported" by the evidence and/or "excessive," it 
may deny a motion for a new trial on the condition that the plaintiff accept a remittitur of the 
jury's verdict. Starceski, 54 F.3d at 1101; Spence, 806 F.2d at 1201. [*84] Alternatively, the 
Court may grant a new trial on damages because the jury's award is so entirely disproportionate 
to the injury to the plaintiff that it "cries out to be overturned or shocks [the] conscience" of the 
Court. Williams, 926 F.2d at 1353. HN37TA trial court's decision to grant or withhold remittitur 
or order a new trial on damages lies within the discretion of that court and "cannot be disturbed 
absent a manifest abuse of [such] discretion." Starceski, 54 F.3d at 1100. 
Pathmark contends that both the Jury's verdict of $ 3.85 million and the judgment of $ 
1,000,000 entered by the Court are grossly excessive and disproportionate to Mondzelewski's 
injury and contrary to the great weight of the evidence presented. As already set forth supra, 
the judgment for Mondzelewski on the workers' compensation retaliation claim, and the 
corresponding $ 700,000 in combined compensatory and punitive damages for that claim, will 
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be vacated. Thus, Mondzelewski will receive only $ 300,000 compensatory damages for his ADA 
claims due to the statutory damages cap. Much of Pathmark's remittitur argument is addressed 
to the punitive damages award and, therefore, [*85] is moot. 
With respect to the compensatory damages, evidence was presented at trial regarding 
Mondzelewski's past and projected future medical expenses totaling approximately $ 91,000. 
There was also substantial testimony that Mondzelewski experienced extensive emotional and 
long-lasting psychiatric damages, accompanied by physical manifestations, and the jury 
apparently concluded that such damages were the result of Pathmark's conduct toward him. 
Based on this evidence, the Court concludes that a total award of $ 300,000 to Mondzelewski, 
including approximately $ 209,000 for pain and suffering, is "neither excessive as a matter of 
law nor 'clearly unsupported' by the record." Starceski, 54 F.3d at 1101 (citing Brunnemann v. 
Terra Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1992) ("A verdict is excessive as a matter of law if 
shown to exceed 'any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based upon 
the evidence before the jury.'" (quotation omitted)). Therefore, the Court will not grant further 
remittitur of the jury verdict or grant a new trial on damages on the ground that the verdict was 
excessive. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the [*86] reasons set forth, the Court will vacate the Judgment as to the jury's verdict of 
liability and damages on the workers' compensation retaliation claim. In all other respects, 
Pathmark's motion will be denied. Judgment will be entered for $ 300,000 compensatory 
damages on the ADA discrimination and retaliation claims. 
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MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Special Judge 
In this appeal, we are asked principally to decide whether the appellant, Rose Ann Wilkerson, 
should be allowed to pursue her claim for wrongful discharge against the appellee, Standard 
Knitting Mills, Inc. (SKM). 
Wilkerson contended in her complaint that SKM's termination of her employment was retaliatory 
and in contravention of the public policy doctrine announced in Clanton V. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 
S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984). As a secondary matter, she also claimed that her employee's conduct 
amounted to outrageous conduct. SKM defended its action by claiming that Wilkerson was an 
employee-at-will, without legal recourse for termination, and denied that it had engaged [*2] 
in outrageous conduct. 
The trial judge entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the employer, SKM. For 
the reasons set out below, we conclude that the summary judgment must be set aside and the 
case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the plaintiff's claim for retaliatory 
discharge. We are convinced from our review of the record, however, that there is no evidence 
to support a theory of outrageous conduct. The grant of summary judgment as to that claim is 
therefore sustained. See generally Medlin v. Allied Investment Co., 217 Tenn. 469, 398 S.W.2d 
270 (1966). 
Wilkerson concedes that she was an employee-at-will. According to her complaint she was hired 
on January 6, 1986, to fill the position of plant nurse. As such, she was in charge of providing 
on-site medical treatment to SKM employees, referring them to outside medical treatment when 
necessary, and running the plant infirmary. Wilkerson alleged that after she was hired and 
assumed her duties, she was instructed by her supervisors to avoid sending employees for 
outside medical treatment because "that resulted in increased workers' compensation claims." 
She was fired from her job on October 31, [*3] 1986, less than ten months after she was 
hired. She alleges that this termination was wrongful, because it was the "result of her refusal 
to assist her employer in its scheme to avoid and minimize workers' compensation claims." The 
complaint contains specific allegations concerning events leading up to Wilkerson's discharge 
and alleges that she was ultimately awarded unemployment compensation benefits following a 
determination that SKM had failed to establish work-related misconduct as a basis for 
termination. The complaint was later amended to include more specific allegations with regard 
to the retaliatory nature of Wilkerson's discharge, including assertions that SKM was engaged in 
a "scheme to deprive employees of their rightful workers' compensation benefits" and that SKM 
had "engaged in a pattern and practice of retaliating against employees who file workers' 
compensation claims and/or assist other employees in filing [them]." 
In response, SKM moved for summary judgment, alleging that Wilkerson was hired as an 
employee at will and was therefore "terminable" with or without cause. In discovery 
depositions, however, company officials took the position that Wilkerson had in fact [*4] been 
fired for good cause, testifying that she was "not a team player" and had failed to report 
regularly to her immediate supervisors. On the other hand, Wilkerson alleged that once she 
decided to ignore instructions not to send certain injured employees for outside medical 
treatment and instead began making what she considered to be medically necessary referrals, 
she was first warned that she was in trouble and then, a few days later, fired on the spot. 
There is no need to detail here the conflicting testimony given in various discovery depositions 
and affidavits filed in the case, except to note one telling statement from Wilkerson's 
supervisor, SKM's vice president for employee relations, Joseph Speegle. In an attempt to 
describe Wilkerson's deficiencies, Speegle complained that she had included medical diagnoses 
in the employee-patient files. This was a bad practice, he said, because making a diagnosis 
"encourages that person [the employee] to think in terms of workmen's compensation. . . ." Of 
course, had the nurse failed to give an adequate reason for referring a patient to outside 
medical assistance, she doubtless would have been subjected to even greater criticism for 
the [*5] unprofessional manner in which she carried out her duties. Digitized by th  Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The trial judge gave no reason for his decision to grant summary judgment but implicitly ruled 
that the case did not fall within the ambit of Clanton v. Cain-Sloan. We disagree. 
In that case, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized H/VI"?an exception to the general rule 
that in the absence of a contract specifying the terms or duration of employment, an employee 
may be terminated at will. In creating what has since become known as "the Cain-Sloan 
doctrine," the court followed the lead of several other jurisdictions and held that the discharge 
of an employee in retaliation for her pursuit of workers' compensation benefits is actionable in 
tort. 677 S.W.2d at 445. The court emphasized the clear public policy represented by the 
Tennessee workers' compensation statute to "provide a certain and expeditious remedy for 
injured employees" and to achieve "a careful balancing of the interests of employer and 
employee." Id. at 444. The court further noted that retaliatory discharges "have the effect of 
relieving the employer of its duty to compensate and the employee of his or her right to 
compensation," in violation of TCA § 50-6-114. [*6] Id. at 444-45. 
SKM argues on appeal that Wilkerson's claim is not actionable under Clanton v. Cain-Sloan 
because the holding in that case is applicable only to employees who are discharged in 
retaliation for filing their own compensation claims. SKM further argues that the rule should not 
be extended to cover the actions of third parties. We are convinced, however, that no extension 
of the rule is required in this case in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment. 
H/V2«yAs p a r t Qf t ^ e T e n n e s s e e workers' compensation statute, TCA § 50-6-114 provides that 
"[n]o contract or agreement, written or implied, or rule, regulation, or other device, shall in any 
manner operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by this 
chapter." (Emphasis added.) In Clanton v. Cain-Sloan, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that 
a retaliatory discharge was an unlawful "device" under the statute, given the legislature's 
commandment that § 50-6-114, like the rest of the workers' compensation statute, must be 
given "liberal and equitable construction 'to the end that the objects and purposes of this 
chapter may be realized and attained.*" 677 S.W.2d at 445, citing [*7] TCA § 50-6-116. It 
requires no stretch of these principles to hold that an employer's attempt to defeat the just 
compensation rights of its injured employees by ordering or encouraging medical personnel to 
obstruct the exercise of those rights is likewise a "device" to defeat the operation of the statute. 
In its recent opinion in Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1988), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court reiterated its ruling in Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co. that ^^^ ' ' there 
[can] be a claim for retaliatory discharge where a statutory policy is violated," id. at 555-56, 
and implicitly held that an employee can recover damages for retaliatory discharge by 
establishing that he or she was "required or requested to participate in, to continue to 
participate in or to remain silent about any illegal activities of the employer or its personnel." 
Id. at 553. While declining to "undertake] to define the limits of the tort of retaliatory 
discharge or attempt[] to list all of the public policy violations which might justify such an 
action," id. at 556, the court in Chism nevertheless noted with apparent approval a long list of 
cases involving "clearly defined public [*8] policies which warrant the Protection provided by 
this cause of action." Id. at 556. A review of those cases convinces us that if proven, 
Wilkerson's complaint would constitute a basis for recovery of damages under existing 
Tennessee law. 
The granting of summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim was clearly inappropriate 
here, because the material facts were obviously in dispute. The employer contested not only the 
legal basis for the employee's claim but also the factual basis to support it, i.e., the reason for 
the discharge. The affidavits filed by both sides, supporting and opposing the motion for 
summary judgment, not only indicate that there is a genuine issue as to material facts in the 
case, but they also fail to establish that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. Thus, under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03, summary judgment should not 
have been granted by the trial court. We therefore conclude that the judgment entered below 
must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings on this issue in the trial court. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Of course, the employee faces a difficult task at trial, where she must establish not only that 
there was [*9] a violation of public policy, as alleged in the complaint, but also that it was a 
"substantial factor" in her termination. Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., supra, 762 S.W.2d at 
556. In the industrial setting of Standard Knitting Mills, Wilkerson was a gatekeeper, sorting 
personal illnesses from job-related injuries and deciding daily which job-related injuries could 
be treated on-site and which required the expert attention of an outside physician. If she can 
show that SKM fired her for failure to keep the gate closed, in an effort to avoid its 
responsibilities under the workers* compensation statutes, she should be permitted to recover 
damages for wrongful discharge. If, on the other hand, it turns out that she was fired because 
she was an inadequate gatekeeper, using poor judgment in deciding whom to treat and whom 
to refer outside, or because she was simply uncooperative or even unlikeable, or for a dozen 
other reasons, good or bad but not in violation of public policy, then judgment ultimately must 
be rendered in the employer's favor. The only import of our ruling at this stage of the 
proceedings is that the employee should be given an opportunity to convince a trier of 
fact [*10] that the evidence supports her claim of wrongful discharge. 
Reversed and remanded. 
DISSENTBY: SANDERS 
DISSENT: DISSENTING OPINION 
Clifford E. Sanders, P J . (E.S.) 
I concur with the holding of the majority that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed 
as to the issue of outrageous conduct. However, I most respectfully dissent from the reversal of 
the trial court on the issue of retaliatory discharge. 
I must first observe that the majority opinion discusses the allegations contained in the 
complaint but I fail to find where it points to proof in the record which would bring the Plaintiff 
within the exception of the employment-at-will doctrine as recognized in this jurisdiction. I 
readily concede the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to withstand a Rule 12.02(6) 
TRCP motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, however, 
there is no proof to support a finding the Plaintiff comes within the exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine. 
The Defendant took discovery depositions of the Plaintiff in which it examined her extensively 
on each and every allegation of her complaint. It then filed a motion for summary judgment, 
alleging there was no genuine [*11] issue as to any material fact. It alleged the Plaintiff was 
an employee at will and Plaintiffs deposition testimony failed to establish a wrongful discharge 
and the evidence failed to establish the Plaintiff came within any recognized exception to the 
employment-at-will rule. It filed the depositions of the Plaintiff and those of Mr. Joe Speegle, 
Plaintiffs immediate superior, and Mr. Mel Cowan, Plaintiffs secondary superior, as supportive 
of its motion for summary judgment. It also filed an affidavit of its plant engineer. The court 
sustained the motion for summary judgment based upon the depositions and affidavits. 
It is undisputed the Plaintiff was an employee at will. As such, either party was at liberty to 
terminate the employment without liability for breach of contract whether it be for good cause, 
bad cause or no cause at all. Payne v. Railroad Company, 81 Tenn. 507 (1884); Whittaker v. 
Care-More Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. 1981). The Plaintiff is bound by this rule unless she can 
establish the circumstances in her case warrant an exception to the rule. Clanton v. Cain-Sloan 
Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., Inc., 762 S.W.2d T*121 
552 (Tenn. 1988). 
This case, having been disposed of on Summary Judgment Rule 56, TRCP, we must look to the 
pertinent provisions of that rule as they relate to the case at bar. Rule 56.03, as pertinent here, 
provides: "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, Digitized by t e How rd W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." In Woman v. Walden, 719 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn.App. 1986) this 
court, in addressing what a Plaintiff must do to withstand summary judgment under the rule, 
said: 
Under Rule 56.03, upon motion, summary judgment shall be entered against a party who failed 
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's 
case and on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. If the non-moving party fails 
to establish the existence of an essential element, there can be no genuine issue as to any 
material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other [*13] facts immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986). 
719 S.W.2d at 533. Also see, Stanley v. Joslin, 757 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn.App. 1987). The 
Plaintiff has totally failed to meet this criterion. 
In Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., Inc., 762 S.W.2d 552, the court, in addressing the issue of 
when exceptions would be made to the employment-at-will rule, speaking through Justice 
Harbison, said: 
It is obvious that the exception cannot be permitted to consume or eliminate the general rule. 
Corporate management, in cases such as this, must be allowed a great deal of discretion in the 
employing or discharging of corporate officers, where the latter are not employed for a definite 
term and have no formal contract of employment. Whittaker v. Care-More Inc., 621 S.W.2d 
395, 397 (Tenn.App. 1981). To be liable for retaliatory discharge in cases such as this, the 
employer must violate a clear public policy. Usually this policy will be evidenced by an 
unambiguous constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision. Further, the violation must be a 
substantial factor in the termination of an at-will employee, agent or officer. 
He enumerated [*14] several cases where an exception to the rule had been made, and then 
he said: "In each of these cases, however, very specific statutory violations were charged, and 
usually the employee's personal exposure to civil or criminal sanctions was emphasized." 
The record before us is devoid of any proof the Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. It is 
devoid of any proof the Defendant did anything or failed to do anything in violation of any 
statutory or regulatory obligation to her. The record is devoid of any proof the Defendant 
requested her to do or not to do anything which would expose her to civil or criminal sanctions. 
Since this matter is before us for review on a summary judgment, we must consider the proof in 
the record in the same manner as when a motion is one for a directed verdict; that is, view the 
proof in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See, Berry v. Whitworth, 576 
S.W.2d 351 (Tenn.App. 1978); Stone v. Hinds, 541 S.W.2d 598 (Tenn.App. 1976). Although 
summary judgment is usually inappropriate in a negligence case, the court should grant such a 
motion when the standard of Rule 56.03 is satisfied. Bowman v. Henard, 547 S.W.2d 1**151 
527 (Tenn. 1977). 
In the record before us we have for consideration the discovery depositions of the Plaintiff, 
consisting of approximately 300 pages. In those depositions she was interrogated at length on 
all of the material allegations of her complaint. The depositions were taken in November and 
December, 1987, and February, 1988. The motion for summary judgment was filed in March. 
Shortly before the case was heard in October the Plaintiff filed a 5-page affidavit which, in most 
respects, is in contradiction of her testimony, nor is it supported by her testimony. We have 
been cited to no cases in this jurisdiction, nor have we found any, which address this issue in 
summary judgment cases. However, it is a well-settled principle of law in this jurisdiction that 
self-contradictory statements by a witness without a plausible explanation cancel out the 
testimony of the witness. Tibbals Flooring Co. v. Stanfill, 219 Tenn. 498, 410 S.W.2d 892 
(1967); Donaho v. Large, 25 Tenn.App. 433, 158 S.W.2d 447 (1941); Todd v. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Rhoane-Anderson Company, 35Tenn.App. 687, 251 S.W.2d 132 (1952). 
The Sixth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals did address the issue before us in the case of 
[*16] Reid v. Sears Roebuck and Company, 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986). In Reid, after her 
deposition was taken the plaintiff filed an affidavit which was in conflict with her testimony. She 
argued on appeal the trial court was in error in granting summary judgment because it was 
contrary to her affidavit. In addressing the issue the court said: 
The district court properly refused to deny summary judgment on the basis of the affidavit. A 
party may not create a factual issue by filing an affidavit, after a motion for summary judgment 
has been made, which contradicts her earlier deposition testimony. Biechele v. Cedar Point, 
Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 1984). Even in response to a leading question in her 
deposition Ms. Batchelor replied that no promise was made at the interview to the effect that 
she didn't have to worry about being laid off. If such a statement had been made she was 
required to bring it out at the deposition and could not contradict her deposition testimony in a 
subsequent affidavit. In Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc. 747 F.2d at 215, we quoted from Perma 
Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir.1969): 
If a party who has [*17] been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact 
simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly 
diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact. 
The Plaintiff's testimony, for the most part, was vague, evasive or unresponsive to questions 
relating to the specific allegations in her complaint and did not support such allegations. The 
following quotes of her testimony are typical. She alleged she was fired in retaliation for her 
refusal to participate in the Defendant's scheme to cheat employees out of their right to proper 
medical treatment payable as worker's compensation benefits. In her deposition she described 
such a scheme in the following manner: 
Q. And you felt that whatever was done in those cases was a scheme to avoid Worker's 
Compensation? 
A. I felt that there was a scheme at Standard Knitting Mill to decrease and minimize Workman's 
Compensation claims. 
Q. Do you think it is possible that people could have a different point of view than you, Mrs. 
Wilkerson? 
A. No. 
Q. You don't? 
A. No, not in that case. 
Q. And so anybody that might disagree with you about [*18] Worker's Compensation 
responsibility would have some scheme to do something illegal? 
A. Mr. Rayson, OSHA says - and that's the Federal Government -- they set guidelines and rules 
and regulations down, and I say that when someone doesn't abide by those, then they're 
having a scheme of some kind to do something, yes. 
Plaintiff alleged certain areas of Defendant's plant exceeded OSHA's decibel limitations. Under 
OSHA regulations, employees working in areas exceeding limitations are to be monitored for 
hearing loss and sent out for further evaluation in the event loss is detected. However, the 
uncontroverted proof shows that no area of Defendant's plant exceeded OSHA's restrictions. The 
proof further shows that, pursuant to OSHA regulations, where decibel limitations are not 
exceeded, employers are not required to monitor their employees for hearing loss. Plaintiff sets 
forth no other guidelines, federal or otherwise, which the Defendant violated in an effort to 
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pursue its alleged scheme. 
Plaintiff alleged she was fired in retaliation for refusing to violate the Nurses Code of Ethics. The 
only specific mention of the Nurses Code in Plaintiff's deposition related to certain 
confidential [*19] letters Plaintiff thought should be kept in the meidical department. Her 
testimony was as follows: 
Q. Did you want to add some other forms? 
A. No, I asked — knowing that my code of ethics states that a nurse will safeguard the privacy 
of her clients from the public and I asked that any letters brought into the plant that stated 
"Strict confidential information, do not release," and I asked that those letters be kept in the 
Medical Department in a file, because I was responsible for the privacy of those people that got 
letters released from their doctor. 
Q. Who told you that you were responsible for that, Mrs. Wilkerson? 
A. Who told me that? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Well, I took an oath to do that. 
Q. But now you're working for Standard Knitting Mills and Standard Mills receives this letter, so 
who tells you that you are responsible to keep that letter? 
A. Well, I felt it was for the privacy of the employee and I was denied that also. 
Also, there is no proof in the record as to what a Nurses' Code of Ethics is. Although, in her 
amended complaint she sets out a list of some ten items which describe what nurses are 
supposed to do and is titled "Code for Nurses," there is nothing in [*20] the record to show 
this is in fact a "Code of Ethics," nor is there any proof that any one of the ten items under 
"Code for Nurses" was violated. 
Plaintiff alleged she was fired in retaliation for her refusal to commit a criminal act. She alleged 
obedience to her employer's instructions would have subjected her to criminal liability for 
conspiracy under T.C.A. § 39-1-601. However, the record is totally devoid of any proof in 
support of this allegation. There is no showing the Plaintiff would have been considered a 
partner in any conspiracy and thereby exposed to criminal liability under the statute mentioned 
above. Though Plaintiff cited in her brief the relevant provisions of the statute under which she 
allegedly could have been prosecuted, she failed to cite to any evidence in the transcript of 
deposition testimony which might have proved her allegation. See Rule 6(a)(4) and 6(b), Rules 
of the Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiff alleged she was fired in retaliation for refusing to violate 29 U.S.C.S., Art. 666(g) of 
OSHA, under which she would have been exposed to criminal liability for "knowingly making a 
false statement, representation or certification in any application, record, report, [*21] plan 
or other document filed or required to be maintained under [OSHA]. However, the record is 
devoid of any proof Plaintiff was ever instructed to make false statements, representations or 
certifications on any OSHA document. She testified in her deposition that Mr. Speegle criticized 
her for "putting my diagnosis down in the OSHA records" because "it might get the employees 
thinking about worker's compensation." However, she offers no proof she was ever asked to 
falsify a record. 
The evidence simply does not support any of Plaintiff's myriad allegations. There has been 
absolutely no evidentiary showing of a scheme devised by Standard Knitting Mills (SKM) to 
circumvent worker's compensation laws or any other law. Plaintiff not only failed to show SKM 
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how treatment or non-treatment related to an employer's scheme to avoid paying worker's 
compensation benefits. There is no showing any employee had a subsequent problem after an 
initial injury, nor a compensable claim. There is no showing any employee wanted to file a 
claim, did file a claim, or was terminated in retaliation for filing a worker's [*22] compensation 
claim. 
The Plaintiff was hired January 6, 1986, and terminated October 31. The proof shows that 
during this period she saw an average of 25 to 30 employees per day for treatment for injuries 
or illness. This would be an average of approximately 125 to 150 employees per week. Over the 
43-week period she would have seen between 5,000 and 6,000 employees for treatment. The 
record also indicates the medical records of these employees were made available to the 
Plaintiff after this suit was filed in order for her to copy the records on employees she alleged 
did not receive proper medical treatment or that she was criticized by management for sending 
out for treatment. From these records she testified about six employees she was criticized for 
sending out to see physicians. Of the six employees two did not have job-related injuries and 
one had defective hearing and complained to his foreman because she sent him out to a doctor 
when he didn't want to go. 
Plaintiff also testified about 19 other employees who she said should have been sent out for 
medical treatment but were not. Of these 19 one was not sent because she did not want to go. 
Three did not have job-related injuries. [*23] One ate some food from a vending machine 
with a foreign substance in it - she had no ill effects and had gone home before the Plaintiff 
learned of it. The remaining 11 the Plaintiff treated and on her own elected not to send them 
out for further treatment although she could have done so without consulting her superior. She 
testified the reason she did not send them out was because she was afraid she would be fired. 
The record fails to show that any of the employees about whom the Plaintiff testified ever 
required any further treatment or suffered any loss of work as a result of not receiving further 
treatment. Except, the Plaintiff did testify that one of the employees who had received a cut on 
the finger which Plaintiff had bandaged told her later she went to the emergency room over the 
weekend to have a suture put in her finger. 
Had this case been tried to a jury on the proof before us, in my view a directed verdict would be 
mandated. For this reason I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
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Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, the sole duty of the 
commission is to notify the appropriate federal agency of 
the complaint. 
'(2) Notwithstanding any other penalty provided in this 
|tle, if any employer, after receiving notice, fails or refuses to 
bey the rules or order of the commission relative to the 
rotection of the life, health, or safety of any employee, the 
strict' court of Utah is empowered, upon petition of the 
lommission to issue, ex parte and without bond, a temporary 
function restraining the further operation of the employer's 
siness. • 2001 
-1-408. Investigations through representatives. 
}f • (1) For the purpose of making any investigation necessary 
Jor the implementation of this title with regard to any employ-
ment or place of employment, the commission may appoint, in 
I writing, any competent person who is a resident of the state, 
l^an agent, whose duties shall be prescribed in the written 
p|fointment. 
r(2) In the discharge of the agent's duties, the agent shall 
ave: 
,« (a) every power of investigation granted in this title to 
* the commission; and 
(b) the same powers as a referee appointed by a district 
court with regard to taking evidence. 
(3) The commission may: 
r
 (a) conduct any number of the investigations contem-
poraneously through different agents; and 
;i(b), delegate to the agents the taking of evidence bear-
ing upon any investigation or hearing. 
>(4) The recommendations made by the agents shall be 
adyisory only and shall not preclude the taking of further 
gidence or further investigation if the commission so orders. 
1997 
-1-409. Partial invalidity — Saving clause. 
^fiould any section or provision of this title be decided by the 
| courts to be unconstitutional or invalid the same shall not 
Sect the validity of the title as a whole or any part of the title 
Other than the part so decided to be unconstitutional. 1997 
CHAPTER 2 ' 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT 
Part 1 
General Provisions 
Title. 
Definition of terms. 
Employers enumerated and defined — Regu-
larly employed — Statutory employers. 
"Employee," "worker," and "operative" de-
fined — Mining lessees and sublessees — 
Corporate officers and directors — Real 
estate agents and brokers — Prison in-
mates — Insurance producers — Certain 
domestic workers. 
Exclusive remedy against employer, and offi-
cer, agent, or employee of employer — 
Employee leasing arrangements. 
Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of 
persons other than employer, officer, agent, 
or employee of employer — Rights of em-
ployer or insurance carrier in cause of 
action — Maintenance of action — Notice 
of intention to proceed against third party 
— Right to maintain action not involving 
employee-employer relationship — Dis-
'' Section 
l 34A-2-101. 
| 34A-2-102, 
| 34A-2-103. 
h
 34A-2-104. 
* * * * • • • ' • 
| f ; " 1 ; r ' < - ' • > '•' 
• 34A-2-105. 
1 34A-2-106. 
Section 
34A-2-107. 
34A-2-108. 
34A-2-109. 
34A-2-110. 
34A-2-111. 
34A-2-112. 
• H n , 
bursement of proceeds of recovery — Ex-
clusive remedy. 
Appointment of workers' compensation advi-
sory council — Composition — Terms of 
members — Duties —:. Compensation. 
Void agreements between employers and em1 
ployees. 
Interstate and intrastate commerce. 
Workers' compensation insurance fraud — 
Elements — Penalties — Notice. < 
Managed health care — Health care cost 
containment. 
Administration of this chapter and Chapter 
3. 
Part 2 
Securing Workers' Compensation Benefits for 
Employees 
34A-2-201. Employers to secure workers' compensation 
benefits for employees — Methods. 
34A-2-201.5. Self-insured employer — Acceptable security 
— Procedures. 
34A-2-202. Assessment on self-insured employers in-
cluding counties, cities, towns, or school 
districts paying compensation direct. 
34A-2-202.5. Offset for occupational health and safety re-
lated donations. 
34A-2-203. Payment of premiums by state department, 
commission, board, or other agency. 
34A-2-204. Compliance with chapter — Notice to em-
ployees. 
34A-2-205. Notification of workers' compensation insure 
ance coverage to division — Cancellation 
requirements — Penalty for violation. 
34A-2-206. Furnishing information to division — Em-
ployers' annual report — Rights of division 
— Examination of employers under oath — 
Penalties. 
34A-2-207. Noncompliance — Civil action by employees. 
34A-2-208. Right to compensation when employer fails 
to comply. 
34A-2-209. Employer's penalty for violation — Notice of 
noncompliance — Proof required —Admis-
sible evidence — Criminal prosecution. 
34A-2-210. Power to bring suit for noncompliance. 
34A-2-211. Notice of noncompliance to employer — En-
forcement power of division — Penalty. 
34A-2-212. Docketing awards in district court — Enforc-
ing judgment. 
Part 3 
Protection of Life, Health, and Safety 
34A-2-301. Places of employment to be safe — Willful 
neglect — Penalty. 
34A-2-302. Employee's willful misconduct — Penalty. 
Part 4 
Compensation and Benefits 
34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to be 
paid. 
34A-2-402. Mental stress claims. 
34A-2-403. Dependents — Presumption. 
34A-2-404. Injuries to minors. 
34A-2-405. Employee injured outside state — Entitled to 
compensation — Limitation of time. 
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Section 
34A-2-406. Exemptions from chapter for employees tem-
porarily in state — Conditions — Evidence 
of insurance. 
34A-2-407. Reporting of industrial injuries — Regulation 
of health care providers. 
34A-2-408. Compensation — None for first three days 
. after injury unless disability extended. 
34A-2-409. Average weekly wage — Basis of computa-
tion. 
34A-2-410. Temporary disability — Amount of payments 
— State average weekly wage defined. 
34A-2-411. Temporary partial disability — Amount of 
payments. 
34A-2-412. Permanent partial disability — Scale of pay-
ments. 
34A-2-413. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments — Rehabilitation. 
34A-2-414. Benefits in case of death — Distribution of 
award to dependents — Death of depen-
dents — Remarriage of surviving spouse. 
34A-2-415. Increase of award to children and dependent 
spouse — Effect of death, marriage, major-
ity, or termination of dependency of chil-
dren — Death, divorce, or remarriage of 
spouse. 
34A-2-416. Additional benefits in special cases. 
34A-2-417. Claims and benefits — Time limits for filing 
— Burden of proof. 
34A-2-418. Awards — Medical, nursing, hospital, and 
burial expenses — Artificial means and 
appliances. 
34A-2-419. Agreements in addition to compensation and 
benefits. 
34A-2-420. Continuing jurisdiction of commission — No 
authority to change statutes of limitation 
— Authority to destroy records — Interest 
on award — Authority to approve final 
settlement claims. , 
34A-2-421. Lump-sum payments. 
34A-2-422. Compensation exempt from execution. 
34A-2-423. Survival of claim in case of death. 
Part 5 
Industrial Noise 
34A-2-501. Definitions. 
34A-2-502. Intensity tests. 
34A-2-503. Loss of hearing — Occupational hearing loss 
due to noise to be compensated. 
34A-2-504; Loss of hearing — Extent of employer's lia-
bility. 
34A-2-505. Loss of hearing — Compensation for perma-
nent partial disability. 
34A-2-506. Loss of hearing — Time for filing claim. 
34A-2-507. Measuring hearing loss. 
Part 6 
Medical Evaluations 
34A-2-601. Medical panel, director, or consultant — 
Findings and reports — Objections to re-
port — Hearing — Expenses. 
34A-2-602. Physical examinations. 
34A-2-603. Autopsy in death cases — Certified patholo-
gist — Attending physicians — Penalty for 
refusal to permit — Liability. 
34A-2-604. Employee leaving place of treatment. 
Part 7 
Funds 
Section 
34A-2-701. Premium assessment restricted account for 
safety. 
34A-2-702. Employers' Reinsurance Fund — Injury caus-
ing death — Burial expenses — Payments' 
to dependents. 
34A-2-703. Payments from Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. • ' 
34A-2-704. Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
Part 8 
Adjudication 
34A-2-801. Initiating adjudicative proceedings — Proce-
dure for review of administrative action. 
34A-2-802. Rules of evidence and procedure before com-
mission — Admissible evidence. 
34A-2-803. Violation of judgments, orders, decrees, or 
provisions of chapter — Grade of offense. 
Part 9 
Presumptions for Emergency Medical Services 
Providers 
34A-2-901. Workers' compensation presumption for 
emergency medical services providers. 
34A-2-902. Workers' compensation claims by emergency 
medical services providers — Time limits. 
34A-2-903. Failure to be tested — Time limit for death 
benefits. 
34A-2-904. Volunteer emergency medical services pro-
viders — Workers' compensation premi-
ums. 
34A-2-905. Rulemaking authority — Rebuttable pre-
sumption. 
PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
34A-2-101. Title. 
This chapter shall be known as the "Workers' Compensation 
Act . " 1997 
34A-2-102. Definition of terms. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Average weekly wages" means the average weekly 
wages as determined under Section 34A-2-409. 
(2) "Award" means a final order of the commission as to 
the amount of compensation due: 
(a) any injured employee; or 
(b) the dependents of any deceased employee. 
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and benefits 
provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act. 
(4) "Decision" means the ruling of an administrative 
law judge or, in accordance with Section 34A-2-801, the 
commissioner or Appeals Board and may include: 
(a) an award or denial of medical, disability, death, 
or other related benefits under this chapter or Chap-
ter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; or 
(b) another adjudicative ruling in accordance with 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act. 
(5) "Director" means the director of the division, unless 
the context requires otherwise. 
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(6) "Disability" means an administrative determina-
tion that may result in an entitlement to compensation as 
a consequence of becoming medically impaired as to 
function. Disability can be total or partial, temporary or 
permanent, industrial or nonindustrial. 
(7) "Division" means the Division of Industrial Acci-
dents. 
(8) "Impairment" is a purely medical condition reflect-
ing any anatomical or functional abnormality or loss. 
Impairment may be either temporary or permanent, in-
dustrial or nonindustrial. 
(9) "Order" means an action of the commission that 
determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immuni-
ties, or other interests of one or more specific persons, but 
not a class of persons. 
(10) (a) "Personal injury by accident arising out of and 
in the course of employment" includes any injury 
caused by the willful act of a third person directed 
against an employee because of the employee's em-
ployment. 
(b) "Personal injury by accident arising out of and 
in the course of employment" does not include a 
disease, except as the disease results from the injury. 
(11) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any employment 
or place of employment, means the freedom from danger 
to the life or health of employees reasonably permitted by 
the nature of the employment. 
(12) "Workers' Compensation Fund" means the non-
profit, quasi-public corporation created in Title 31A, 
Chapter 33, Workers' Compensation Fund. 2000 
34A-2-103. Employers enumerated and denned — Reg-
ularly employed — Statutory employers. 
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and school 
district in the state are considered employers under this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act 
prescribed in Sections 34A-2-105 anoj 34A-3-102, the state 
is considered to be a single employer and includes any 
office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, 
institution, hospital, college, university, or other instru-
mentality of the state.* 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person, 
including each public utility and each independent contractor, 
who regularly employs one or more workers or operatives in 
the same business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, 
is considered an employer under this chapter and Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. As used in this Subsection (2): 
(a) "Independent contractor" means any person en-
gaged in the performance of any work for another who, 
while so engaged, is: 
(i) independent of the employer in all that pertains 
to the execution of the work; 
(ii) not subject to the routine rule or control of the 
employer; 
(iii) engaged only in the performance of a definite 
job or piece of work; and 
(iv) subordinate to the employer only in effecting a 
result in accordance with the employer's design. 
(b) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual 
course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of 
the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or 
for only a portion of the year. 
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing arrange-
ment under Title 58, Chapter 59, Professional Employer 
Organization Registration Act, is considered the employer 
of leased employees and shall secure workers' compensa-
tion benefits for them by complying with Subsection 
34A-2-201(l) or (2) and commission rules. 
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite workers' com-
pensation secured in accordance with Subsection (3)(a) 
showing the leasing company as the named insured and 
each client company as an additional insured by means of 
individual endorsements. 
(c) Endorsements shall be filed with the division as 
directed by commission rule. 
(d) The division shall promptly inform the Division of 
Occupation and Professional Licensing within the Depart-
ment of Commerce if the division has reason to believe 
that an employee leasing company is not in compliance 
with Subsection 34A-2-20K1) or (2) and commission rules. 
(4) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee 
or more than one employee at least 40 hours per week is not 
considered an employer under this chapter and Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(5) (a) As used in this Subsection (5): 
(i) (A) "agricultural employer" means a person 
who employs agricultural labor as defined in 
Subsections 35A-4-206Q) and (2) and does not 
include employment as provided in Subsection 
35A-4-206(3); and 
(B) notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a)(i)(A), 
only for purposes of determining who is a mem-
ber of the employer's immediate family under 
Subsection (5)(a)(ii), if the agricultural employer 
is a corporation, partnership, or other business 
entity, "agricultural employer" means an officer, 
director, or partner of the business entity; 
(ii) "employer's immediate family" means: 
(A) an agricultural employer's: 
(I) spouse; 
(II) grandparent; 
(III) parent; 
(IV) sibling; 
(V).child; 
(VI) grandchild; 
(VII) nephew; or 
(VIII) niece; 
(B) a spouse of any person provided in Subsec-
tion (5)(a)(ii)(A)(II) through (VIII); or 
(C) an individual who is similar to those fisted 
in Subsections (5)(a)(ii)(A) or (B) as defined by 
rules of the commission; and 
(iii) "npnimmediate family" means a person who is 
not a member of the employer's immediate family. 
(b) For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, an agricultural employer is not 
considered an employer of a member of the employer's 
immediate family. 
(c) For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, an agricultural employer is not 
• considered an employer of a nonimmediate family em-
ployee if: 
(i) for the previous calendar year the agricultural 
employer's total annual payroll for all nonimmediate 
family employees was less than $8,000; or 
(ii) (A) for the previous calendar year the agricul-
tural empldyer's total annual payroll for all 
nonimmediate family employees was equal to or 
greater than $8,000 but less than $50,000; and 
(B) the agricultural employer maintains in-
surance that covers job-related injuries of the 
employer's nonimmediate family employees in at 
least the following amounts: 
(I) $300,000 liability insurance, as de-
fined in Section 31A-1-301; and 
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(II) $5,000 for health care benefits similar 
to benefits under health care insurance as 
defined in Section 31A-1-301. 
(d) For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, an agricultural employer is 
considered an employer of a nonimmediate family em-
ployee if: 
(i) for the previous calendar year the agricultural 
employer's total annual payroll for all nonimmediate 
family employees is equal to or greater than $50,000; 
or 
(ii) (A) for the previous year the agricultural em-
ployer's total payroll for nonimmediate family 
employees was equal to or exceeds $8,000 but is 
less than $50,000; and 
(B) the agricultural employer fails to maintain 
the insurance required under Subsection 
(5)(c)(ii). 
(6) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic ser-
vants who is not considered an employer under this chapter 
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, may come 
under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act, by complying with: 
(a) this, chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act; and 
(b) the rules of the commission. 
(7) (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work 
to be done wholly or in part for the employer by a 
contractor over whose work the employer retains super-
vision or control, and this work is a part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer, the contractor, all 
persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors 
under the contractor, and all persons employed by any of 
these subcontractors, are considered employees of the 
original employer for the purposes of this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improv-
ing, repairing, or remodelling a residence that the person 
owns or is in the process of acquiring as the person's 
personal residence may not be considered an employee or 
employer solely by operation of Subsection (7)(a). 
(c) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole 
proprietorship may not be considered an employee under 
Subsection (7)(a) if the employer who procures work to be 
done by the partnership or sole proprietorship obtains 
and relies on either: 
(i) a valid certification of the partnership's or sole 
proprietorship's compliance with Section 34A-2-201 
indicating that the partnership or sole proprietorship 
secured the payment of workers' compensation ben-
efits pursuant to Section 34A-2-201; or 
(ii) if a partnership or sole proprietorship with no 
employees other than a partner of the partnership or 
owner of the sole proprietorship, a workers' compen-
sation policy issued by an insurer pursuant to Sub-
section 31A-21-104(8) stating that: 
(A) the partnership or sole proprietorship is 
customarily engaged in an independently estab-
lished trade, occupation, profession, or business; 
and 
(B) the partner or owner personally waives 
the partner's or owner's entitlement to the ben-
efits of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occu-
pational Disease Act, in the operation of the 
partnership or sole proprietorship. 
. (d) A director or officer of a corporation may not be 
considered an employee under Subsection (7)(a) if the 
director or officer is excluded from coverage under Sub-
section 34A-2-104(4). 
(e) A contractor or subcontractor is not an employee of 
the employer under Subsection (7)(a), if the employer who 
procures work to be done by the contractor or subcontrac-
tor obtains and relies on either: 
(i) a valid certification of the contractor's or sub-
contractor's compliance with Section 34A-2-201; or 
(ii) if a partnership, corporation, or sole proprietor-
ship with no employees other than a partner of the 
partnership, officer of the corporation, or owner of the 
sole proprietorship, a workers' compensation policy 
issued by an insurer pursuant to Subsection 31A-21-
104(8) stating that: 
(A) the partnership, corporation, or sole pro-
prietorship is customarily engaged in an inde-
pendently established trade, occupation, profes-
sion, or business; and 
(B) the partner, corporate officer, or owner 
personally waives the partner's, corporate offic-
er's, or owner's entitlement to the benefits of this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Dis-
ease Act, in the operation of the partnership's, I 
corporation's, or sole proprietorship's enterprise 
under a contract of hire for services. 2005 ' 
34A-2-104. "Employee," "worker," and "operative" de-
fined — Mining lessees and sublessees — Cor-
porate officers and directors — Real estate 
agents and brokers — Prison inmates — In-
surance producers — Certain domestic work-
ers. 
(1) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-. 
tional Disease Act, "employee," "worker," and "operative" 
mean: " ^ 
(a) (i) each elective and appointive officer and any | 
other person: 
(A) in the service of: 
(I) the state; 
(II) a county, city, or town within the 
state; or 
(III) a school district within the state; 
(B) serving the state, or any county, city, town; 
or school district under: 
* (I) an election; 
(II) appointment; or 
(III) any contract of hire, express or im-
plied, written or oral; and 
(ii) including: 
(A) an officer or employee of the state institu* 
tions of learning; and -'a% 
(B) a member of the National Guard while^on 
state active duty; and j^ * 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as 
definea in Section 34A-2-103, who employs one or more 
workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or 
in or about the same establishment: 
(i) under any contract of hire: 
(A) express or implied; and 
(B) orad or written; 
(ii) including aliens and minors, whether legally 0 
illegally working for hire; and 
(iii) not including any person whose employment 
(A) is casual; and 
(B) not in the usual course of the trade, Kj 
ness, or occupation of the employee's employe 
(2) (a) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an e^P^I 
under this chapter and Chapter 3, any lessee in niine| 
of mining property and each employee and sublesse 
the lessee shall be: 
(i) covered for compensation by the lessor un 
this chapter and Chapter 3; 
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(ii) subject to this chapter and Chapter 3; and 
(iii) entitled to the benefits of this chapter and 
Chapter 3, to the same extent as if the lessee, 
employee, or sublessee were employees of the lessor 
drawing the.wages paid employees for substantially 
similar work. 
(b) The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores 
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance 
premium for that type of work. 
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to 
include any partner of the partnership or owner of the sole 
proprietorship as an employee of the partnership or sole 
proprietorship under this chapter and Chapter 3. 
(b) If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes an 
election under Subsection (3)(a), the partnership or sole 
proprietorship shall serve written notice upon its insur-
ance carrier naming the persons to be covered. 
(c) A partner of a partnership or owner of a sole 
proprietorship may not be considered an employee of the 
partner 's partnership or the owner's sole proprietorship 
under this chapter or Chapter 3 until the notice described 
in Subsection (3)(b) is given. 
(d) For premium ra te making, the insurance carrier 
shall assume the salary or wage of the partner or sole 
proprietor electing coverage under Subsection (3)(a) to be 
100% of the state's average weekly wage. 
(4) (a) A corporation may elect not to include any director 
or officer of the corporation as an employee under this 
chapter and Chapter 3. 
(b) If a corporation makes an election under Subsection 
(4)(a), the corporation shall serve written notice upon its 
insurance carrier naming the persons to be excluded from 
coverage. 
(c) A director or officer of a corporation is considered an 
employee under this chapter and Chapter 3 until the 
notice described in Subsection (4)(b) is given. 
(5) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, "employee," 
"worker,".and "operative" do not include: 
(a) a real estate sales agent or real estate broker, as 
defined in Section 61-2-2, who performs services in that 
capacity for a real estate broker if: 
(i) substantially all jof the real estate sales agent's 
or associated broker's income for services is from real 
estate commissions; and 
(ii) the services of the real estate sales agent or 
associated broker are performed under a written 
contract that: 
(A) the real estate agent is an independent 
contractor; and 
(B) the real estate sales agent or associated 
broker is not to be treated as an employee for 
federal income tax purposes; 
(b) an offender performing labor under Section 64-
13-16 or 64-13-19, except as required by federal s tatute or 
regulation; 
(c) an individual who for an insurance producer, as 
defined in Section 31A-1-301, solicits, negotiates, places 
or procures insurance if: 
(i) substantially all of the individual's income from 
those services is from insurance commissions; and 
(ii) the services of the individual are performed 
under a written contract tha t states that the individ-
ual: 
(A) is an independent contractor; 
(B) is not to be treated as an employee for 
federal income tax purposes; and 
(C) can derive income from more than one 
insurance company; or 
(d) notwithstanding Subsection 34A-2-103(4), an indi-
vidual who provides domestic work for a person if: 
(i) the person for whom the domestic work is being 
provided receives or is eligible to receive the domestic 
work under a s tate or federal program designed to 
pay the costs of domestic work to prevent the person 
from being placed in: 
(A) an institution; or 
(B) a more restrictive placement than where 
that person resides at the time the person re-
ceives the domestic work; 
(ii) the individual is paid by a person designated by 
the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with 
Section 3504, Internal Revenue Code, as a fiduciary, 
agent, or other person that has the control, receipt, 
custody, or disposal of, or pays the wages of the 
individual; and 
(iii) the domestic work is performed under a writ-
ten contract t h a t notifies the individual that the 
individual is not an employee under this chapter or 
Chapter 3. 
(6) An individual described in Subsection (5)(d) may be-
come an -employee under this chapter and Chapter 3 if the 
employer of the individual complies with: 
(a) this chapter and Chapter 3; and 
(b) commission rules. . 2003 
34A-2-105. Exclus ive remedy against employer, and 
officer, agent , or employee of employer — 
Employee l e a s i n g arrangements . 
(1) The right to recover compensation pursuant to this 
chapter for injuries sustained by an employee, whether result-
ing in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the 
employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any 
officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this chapter shall be in place of any 
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or 
otherwise, to the employee or to the employee's spouse, widow, 
children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal 
representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, 
on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way 
contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the em-
ployee in the course of or because of or arising out of the 
employee's employment, and no action at law may be main-
tained against an employer or against any officer, agent, or 
employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or 
death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall 
prevent an employee, or the employee's dependents, from 
filing a claim for compensation in those cases in accordance 
with Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) The exclusive remedy provisions of this section apply to 
both the client company and the employee leasing company in 
an employee leasing arrangement under Title 58, Chapter 59, 
Professional Employer Organization Registration Act. 
(3) (a) For purposes of this section: 
(i) "Temporary employee" means an individual who 
for temporary work assignment is: 
(A) an employee of a temporary staffing com-
pany; or 
(B) registered by or otherwise associated with 
a temporary staffing company. 
(ii) "Temporary staffing company" means a com-
pany that engages in the assignment of individuals as 
temporary full-time or part-time employees to fill 
assignments with a finite ending date to another 
independent entity, 
(b) If the temporary staffing company secures the pay-
ment of workers' compensation in accordance with Section 
34A-2-201 for all temporary employees of the temporary 
staffing company, the exclusive remedy provisions of this 
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section apply to both the temporary staffing company and 
the client company and its employees and provide the 
temporary staffing company the same protection that a 
client company and its employees has under this section 
for the acts of any of the temporary staffing company's 
temporary employees on assignment at the client com-
pany worksite. 2005 
34A-2-106. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts 
of persons other than employer, officer, agent, 
or employee of employer — Rights of em-
ployer or insurance carrier in cause of action 
— Maintenance of action — Notice of intend 
tion to proceed against third party — Right to 
maintain action not involving employee-em-
ployer relationship — Disbursement of pro-
ceeds of recovery — Exclusive remedy. 
(1) When any injury or death for which compensation is 
payable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person 
other than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of the 
employer: 
(a) the injured employee, or in case of death, the 
employee's dependents, may claim compensation; and 
(b) the injured employee or the employee's heirs or 
personal representative may have an action for damages 
against the third person. 
(2) (a) If compensation is claimed and the employer or 
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, 
the employer or insurance carrier: 
(i) shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party; and 
(ii) may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or 
the employee's heirs or the personal representative of 
the deceased. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), an employer or 
insurance carrier may not settle and release a cause of 
action of which it is a trustee under Subsection (2)(a) 
without the consent of the commission. 
(3) (a) Before proceeding against a third party, to give a 
person described in Subsections (3)(a)(i) and (ii) a reason-
able opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceed-
ing, the injured employee or, in case of death, the employ-
ee's heirs, shall give- written notice of the intention to 
bring an action against the third party to: 
(i) the carrier; and 
(ii) any other person obligated for the compensa-
tion payments, 
(b) The injured employee, or, in case of death, the 
employee's heirs, shall give written notice to the carrier 
and other person obligated for the compensation pay-
ments of any known attempt to attribute fault to the 
employer, officer, agent, or employee of the employer: 
(i) by way of settlement; or 
(ii) in a proceeding brought by the injured em-
ployee, or, in case of death, the employee's heirs. 
(4) For the purposes of this section' and notwithstanding 
Section 34A-2-103, the injured employee or the employee's 
heirs or personal representative may also maintain an action 
for damages against any of the following persons who do not 
occupy an employee-employer relationship with the injured or 
deceased employee at the time of the employee's injury or 
death: 
(a) a subcontractor; 
(b) a general contractor; 
(c) an independent contractor; 
(d) a property owner; Or 
(e) a lessee or assignee of a property owner. 
(5) If any recovery is obtained against a third person, it 
shall be disbursed in accordance with Subsections (5)(a) 
through- (c). 
(a) .The reasonable expense of the action, including 
attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged proportionately 
against the parties as their interests may appear. Any fee 
chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a credit upon 
any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the case of 
death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against 
the third party 
,(b) The person liable for compensation payments shall 
be reimbursed, less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a), for the 
payments made as follows: 
(i) without reduction based on fault attributed to 
the employer, officer,-agent, or employee of the em-
ployer in the action against the third party if the 
combined percentage of fault attributed to persons 
immune from suit is determined to be less than 40% 
prior to any reallocation of fault under Subsection 
78-27-39(2); or 
(ii) less the amount of payments made multiplied 
by the percentage of fault attributed to the employer, 
officer, agent, or employee of the employer in the 
action against the third party if the combined per-
centage of fault attributed to persons immune from 
suit is determined to be 40% or more prior to any 
reallocation of fault under Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee, 
or the employee's heirs in case of death, to be applied to 
reduce or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing 
against the person liable for compensation. 
(6) The apportionment of fault to the employer in a civil 
action against a third party is not an action at law and does 
not impose any liability on the employer. The apportionment 
of fault does not alter or diminish the exclusiveness of the 
remedy provided to employees, their heirs, or personal repre-
sentatives, or the immunity provided employers pursuant to 
Section 34A-2-105 or 34A-3-102 for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not. Any court in 
which a, civil action is pending shall issue a partial summary 
judgment to an employer with respect to the employer's 
immunity as provided in Section 34A-2-105 or 34A-3-102, even 
though the conduct of the employer may be considered in 
allocating fault to the employer in a third party action in the 
manner provided in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43. 1997 
34A-2-107. Appointment of workers' compensation ad-
visory council — Composition — Terms of 
members — Duties — Compensation. 
(1) The commissioner shall appoint a workers' compensa-
tion advisory council composed of: 
(a) the following voting members: 
(i) five employer representatives; and 
(ii) five employee representatives; and 
(b) the following nonvoting members: 
(i) a representative of the Workers' Compensation 
Fund; 
(ii) a representative of a private insurance carrier; 
(iii) a representative of health care providers; 
(iv) the Utah insurance commissioner or the insur-
ance commissioner's designee; and 
(v) the commissioner or the commissioner's desig-
nee. 
(2) Employers and employees shall consider nominating 
members of groups who historically may have been excluded 
from the council, such as women, minorities, and individuals 
with disabilities. 
(3) (a) Except as required by Subsection (3)(b), as terms of 
current council members expire, the commissioner shall 
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appoint each new member or reappointed member to a 
two-year term beginning July 1 and ending June 30. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection 
(3)(a), the commissioner shall, at the time of appointment 
or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure 
tha t the terms of council members are staggered so tha t 
approximately half of the council is appointed every two 
years. 
(4) (a) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any 
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unex-
pired term. 
(b) The commissioner shall terminate the term of any 
council member who ceases to be representative as desig-
nated by the member's original appointment. 
(5) The council shall confer at least quarterly for the 
purpose of advising the commission, the division, and the 
Legislature on: 
(a) the Utah workers' compensation and occupational 
disease laws; 
(b) the administration of the laws described in Subsec-
tion (5)(a); and 
(c) rules related to the laws described in Subsection 
(5Xa). 
(6) Regarding workers' compensation, rehabilitation, and 
reemployment of employees who are disabled because of an 
industrial injury or occupational disease the council shall: 
(a) offer advice on issues requested by: 
(i) the commission; 
(ii) the division; and 
(iii) the Legislature; and 
(b) make recommendations to: 
(i) the commission; and 
(ii) the division. 
(7) The commissioner or the commissioner's designee shall 
serve as the chair of the council and call the necessary 
meetings. 
(8) The commission shall provide staff support to the coun-
cil. 
(9) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees 
may not receive compensation or benefits for their 
services, but may receive per diem and expenses 
incurred in the performance of the member's official 
duties at the rates^established by the Division of 
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and 
expenses for their service, 
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members 
who do not receive salary, per diem, or expenses from 
their agency for their service may receive per diem 
and expenses incurred in the performance of their 
official duties from the council at the rates estab-
lished by the Division of Finance under Sections 
63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) State government officer and employee mem-
bers may decline to receive per diem and expenses for 
their service. 2001 
34A-2-108. Void agreements b e t w e e n employers and 
employees . 
(1) Except as provided in Section 34A-2-420, an agreement 
by an employee to waive the employee's rights to compensa-
tion under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, is not valid. 
(2) An agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the 
premium paid by his employer is not valid. 
(3) Any employer who deducts any portion of the premium 
from the wages or salary of any employee entitled to the 
benefits of this chapter or-Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act: 
(a) is guilty of a misdemeanor; and 
(b) shall be fined not more than $100 for each such 
offense. 1997 
34A-2-109. Interstate and intrastate commerce. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, apply to employers 
and their employees engaged in: 
(a) intrastate commerce; 
(b) interstate commerce; and 
(c) foreign commerce. 
(2) If a rule of liability or method of compensation is 
established by the Congress of the United States as to inter-
state or foreign commerce, this chapter and Chapter 3 apply 
only to the extent that : 
(a) this chapter and Chapter 3 has a mutual connection 
with intrastate work; and 
(b) the connection to intrastate work is clearly separa-
ble and distinguishable from interstate or foreign com-
merce. ' 1997 
34A-2-110. Workers' compensat ion insurance fraud — 
Elements — Penal t ies — Not ice . 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Corporation" has the same meaning as in Subsec-
tion 76-2-201(3). 
(b) "Intentionally" has the same meaning as in Subsec-
tion 76-2-103(1). 
(c) "Knowingly" has the same meaning as in Subsection 
76-2-103(2). 
(d) "Person" has the same meaning as in Subsection 
76-1-601(8). 
(e) "Recklessly" has the same meaning as in Subsection 
76-2-103(3). 
(2) (a) Any person is guilty of workers' compensation insur-
ance fraud if t h a t person intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly: 
(i) devises any scheme or artifice to obtain workers' 
compensation insurance coverage, disability compen-
sation, medical benefits, goods, professional services, 
fees for professional services, or anything of value 
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, promises, or material omis-
sions; and 
(ii) communicates or causes a communication with 
another in furtherance of the scheme or artifice, 
(b) Workers' compensation insurance fraud under Sub-
section (2)(a) is punishable in the manner prescribed by 
Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud. 
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of 
workers' compensation insurance fraud under the same con-
ditions as those set forth in Section 76-2-204. 
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under 
Subsection (2) shall be measured by the total value of all 
property, money, or other things obtained or sought to be 
obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (2), 
except as provided in Subsection 76-10-1801(l)(e). 
(5) Reliance on the par t of any person is not a necessary 
element of the offense described in Subsection (2). 
(6) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense 
described in Subsection (2) to permanently deprive any person 
of property, money, or anything of value is not a necessary 
element of this offense. 
(7) An insurer or self-insured employer giving written no-
tice in accordance with Subsection (10) that workers' compen-
sation insurance fraud is a crime is not a necessary element of 
the offense described in Subsection (2). 
(8) A scheme or artifice to obtain workers' compensation 
insurance coverage includes any scheme or artifice to make or 
cause to be made any false written or oral statement or 
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business reorganization, incorporation, or change in owner-
ship intended to obtain insurance coverage as mandated by 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, at 
rates that do not reflect the risk, industry, employer, or class 
codes actually covered by the policy. 
(9) A scheme or artifice to obtain disability compensation 
includes a scheme or artifice to collect or make a claim for 
temporary disability compensation as provided in Section 
34A-2-410 while working for gain. 
(10) (a) Each insurer or self-insured employer who, in 
connection with this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act, prints, reproduces, or furnishes a form 
to any person upon which that person applies for insur-
ance coverage, reports payroll, makes a claim by reason of 
accident, injury, death, disease, or other claimed loss, or 
otherwise reports or gives notice to the insurer or self-
insured employer, shall cause to be printed or displayed in 
comparative prominence with other content the state-
ment: "Any person who knowingly presents false or fraud-
ulent underwriting information, files or causes to be filed 
a false or fraudulent claim for disability compensation or 
medical benefits, or submits a false or fraudulent report 
or billing for health care fees or other professional ser-
vices is guilty of a crime and may be subject to fines and 
confinement in state prison." 
(b) Each insurer or self-insured employer who issues a 
check, warrant, or other financial instrument in payment 
of compensation issued under this chapter or Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall cause to be printed 
or displayed in comparative prominence above the area 
for endorsement a statement substantially similar to the 
following: "Workers' compensation insurance fraud is a 
crime punishable by Utah law." 
(c) (i) Subsections (10)(a) and (b) apply only to the 
legal obligations of an insurer or a self-insured em-
ployer. 
(ii) A person who violates Subsection (2) is guilty of 
workers' compensation insurance fraud, and the fail-
ure of an insurer or a self-insured employer to fully 
comply with Subsections (10)(a) and (b) may not be: 
(A) a defense to violating Subsection (2); or 
(B) grounds for"suppressing evidence. 
(11) In the absence of malice, a person, employer, insurer, or 
governmental entity that reports a suspected fraudulent act 
relating to a workers' compensation insurance policy or claim 
is not subject to any civil liability for libel, slander, or any 
other relevant cause of action. 
(12) In any action involving workers' compensation, this 
section supersedes Title 31A, Chapter 31, Insurance Fraud 
Act. 1998 
34A-2-111. Managed health care — Health care cost 
containment. 
(1) Self-insured employers and workers' compensation car-
riers may adopt a managed health care program to provide 
employees the benefits of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, beginning January 1, 1993. The 
plan may include one or more of the following: 
(a) (i) A preferred provider program may be developed 
so long as the program allows a selection by the 
employee of more than one physician in the health 
care specialty required for treating the specific prob-
lem of an industrial patient. If a preferred provider 
program is developed by an employer, insurance 
carrier, or self-insured entity, employees are required 
to use preferred provider physicians and medical care 
facilities. If a preferred provider program is not 
developed, an industrial claimant may have free 
choice of health care providers. Failure of an indus-
trial claimant to use a preferred health care facility 
as defined in Section 26-21-2 as part of a preferred 
provider program, or failure to initially receive treat-
ment from a preferred physician, may, if the claimant 
has been notified of the program, result in the claim-
ant being obligated for any charges in excess of the 
preferred provider allowances. 
(ii) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsec-
tion (l)(a)(i), a self-insured entity or other employer 
may: 
(A) have its own health care facility on or near 
its worksite or premises and continue to contract 
with other health care providers; or 
(B) operate a health care facility and require 
employees to first seek treatment at the provided 
health care or contracted facility. 
(hi) An employee of an employer using a preferred 
provider program or having its own health care 
facility may procure the services of any qualified 
practitioner: 
(A) for emergency treatment, if a physician 
employed in the program or at the facility is not 
available for any reason; 
(B) for conditions the employee in good faith 
believes are nonindustrial; or 
(C) when an employee living in a rural area 
would be unduly burdened by traveling to a. 
preferred provider. 
(b) (i) Other contracts with medical care providers or 
medical review organizations may be made for the 
following purposes: 
(A) insurance carriers or self-insured employ-
ers may form groups in contracting for managed 
health care services with medical providers; 
(B) peer review; 
(C) methods of utilization review; 
(D) use of case management; and 
(E) bill audit. . 
(ii) Insurance carriers may make any or all of the 
factors in Subsection (l)(b)(i) a condition of insuring 
entities in their insurance contract. 
(2) As used in Subsection (1), "physician" means any health 
care provider licensed under: 
(a) Title 58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric Physician Licensing 
Act; 
(b) Title 58, Chapter 24a, Physical Therapist Practice 
Act; 
(c) Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act; 
(d) Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical 
Practice Act; 
(e) Title 58, Chapter 69, Dentist and Dental Hygienist 
Practice Act; 
(f) Title 58, Chapter 70, Physician Assistant Practice 
Act; 
(g) Title 58, Chapter 71, Naturopathic Physician Prac-
tice Act; 
(h) Title 58., Chapter 72, Acupuncture Licensing Act; 
and 
(i) Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician Prac-
tice Act. 
(3) Each workers' compensation insurance carrier writing 
insurance in this state shall maintain a designated agent in 
this state registered with the division. 
(4) (a) In addition to managed health care plans, an insur-
ance carrier may require an employer to establish a work 
place safety program if the employer: 
(i) has an experience modification factor of 1.00 or 
higher, as determined by the National Council on 
Compensation Insurance; or 
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(ii) is determined by the carrier to have a three-
year loss ratio of 100% or higher, 
(b) A workplace safety program may include: 
(i) a written workplace accident and injury reduc-
tion program that promotes safe and healthful work-
ing conditions, which is based on clearly stated goals 
and objectives for meeting those goals; and 
(ii) a documented review of the workplace accident 
and injury reduction program each calendar year 
delineating how procedures set forth in the program 
are met. 
(5) A wri t ten workplace accident and injury reduction pro-
gram permitted under Subsection (4)(b)(i) should describe: 
(a) how managers, supervisors, and employees are re-
sponsible for implementing the program; 
(b) how continued participation of management will be 
established, measured, and maintained; 
(c) the methods used to identify, analyze, and control 
new or existing hazards, conditions, and operations; 
(d) how the program will be communicated to all em-
ployees so tha t the employees are informed of work-
related hazards and controls; 
(e) how workplace accidents will be investigated and 
corrective action implemented; and 
(f) how safe work practices and rules will be enforced. 
(6) The premiums charged to any employer who fails or 
refuses to establish a workplace safety program pursuant to 
Subsection (4)(b)(i) or (ii) may be increased by 5% over any 
existing current rates and premium modifications charged 
that employer. 1997 
34A-2-112. Administrat ion of this chapter and Chapter 
3 . 
(1) Administration of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, is vested in the commission to be 
administered through the division, the Division of Adjudica-
tion, and for administrative appeals through the commis-
sioner and the Appeals Board. 
(2) The commission: 
(a) has jurisdiction over every workplace in the state 
and may administer this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act; and any rule or order issued 
under these chapters, to ensure that every employee in 
this s ta te has a safe workplace in which employers have 
secured the payment of workers' compensation benefits 
for their employees in accordance with this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; 
(b) through the division under the supervision of the 
director, has the duty and full authority to take any 
administrative action authorized under this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and 
(c) through the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, 
and Appeals Board, provide for the adjudication and 
review of an administrative action, decision, or order of 
the commission in accordance with this title. 1997 
PART 2 
SECURING WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
FOR EMPLOYEES 
34A-2-201. Employers to secure workers ' compensa-
t ion benefits for employees — Methods. 
An employer shall secure the payment of workers' compen-
sation benefits for its employees by: 
(1) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this 
compensation with the Workers' Compensation Fund; 
(2) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this 
compensation with any stock corporation or mutual asso-
ciation authorized to transact the* business of workers' 
compensation insurance in this state; or 
(3) obtaining approval from the division in accordance 
with Section 34A-2-201.5 to pay direct compensation as a 
self-insured employer in the amount, in the manner, and 
when due as provided for in this chapter or Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. 2000 
34A-2-201.5. Self- insured employer — Acceptable secu-
rity — Procedures. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Acceptable security" means one or more of the 
following: 
(i) cash; 
(ii) a surety bond issued: 
(A) by a person acceptable to the division; and 
(B) in a form approved by the division; 
(hi) an irrevocable letter of credit issued: 
(A) by a depository institution acceptable to 
the division; and 
(B) in a form approved by the division; 
(iv) a United States Treasury Bill; 
(v) a deposit in a depository institution that: 
(A) has an office located in Utah; and 
(B) is insured by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation; or 
(vi) a certificate of deposit in a depository institu-
ti6n that: 
(A) has an office located in Utah; and 
(B) is insured by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation. 
(b) "Compensation" is as defined in Section 34A-2-102. 
(c) "Depository institution" is as defined in Section 
7-1-103.
 % 
(d) "Member of a public agency insurance mutual" 
means a political subdivision or public agency that is 
included within a public agency insurance mutual. 
(e) "Public agency insurance mutual" is as defined in 
Section 31A-M03. 
(f) "Self-insured employer" means one of the following 
that is authorized by the division to pay direct workers' 
compensation benefits under Subsection (2): 
(i) an employer; or 
(ii) a public agency insurance mutual. 
(2) (a) If approved by the division as a self-insured em-
ployer in accordance with this section: 
(i) an employer may directly pay compensation in 
the amount, in the manner, and when due as pro-
vided for in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occu-
pational Disease Act; and 
(ii) a public agency insurance mutual may directly 
pay compensation: 
(A) on behalf of the members of the public 
agency insurance mutual; and 
(B) in the amount, in the manner, and when 
due as provided in this chapter and Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) If an employer's or a public agency insurance mu-
tual's application to directly pay compensation as a self-
insured employer is approved by the division, the appli-
cation is considered acceptance: 
(i) of the conditions, liabilities, and responsibilities 
imposed by this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occu-
pational Disease Act, including the liability imposed 
pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-704Q4); 
(ii) by: 
(A) the employer; or • 
(B) (I) the public, agency insurance mutual; 
and 
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(IB the members of the public agency in-
surance mutual, 
(c) The division's denial under this Subsection (2) of an 
application to directly pay compensation as a self-insured 
employer becomes a final order of the commission 30 
calendar days from the date of the denial unless within 
that 30 days the employer or the public agency insurance 
mutual that filed the application files an application for a 
hearing in accordance with Part 8, Adjudication. 
(3) To qualify as a self-insured employer, an employer or a 
public agency insurance mutual shall: 
(a) submit a written application requesting to directly 
pay compensation as a self-insured employer; 
(b) annually provide the division proof of the employ-
er's or the public agency insurance mutual's ability to 
directly pay compensation in the amount, manner, and 
time provided by this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act; and 
(c) if requested by the division, deposit acceptable se-
curity in the amounts determined by the division to be 
sufficient to secure the employer's or the public agency 
insurance mutual's liabilities under this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(4) (a) Acceptable security deposited by a self-insured em-
ployer in accordance with Subsection (3)(c) shall be: 
(i) deposited on behalf of the division by the self-
insured employer with the state treasurer; and 
(ii) withdrawn only upon written order of the divi-
sion. 
(b) The self-insured employer has no right, title, inter-
est in, or control over acceptable security that is deposited 
in accordance with this section. 
(c) If the division determines that the amount of ac-
ceptable security deposited in accordance with this sec-
tion is in excess of that needed to secure payment of the 
self-insured employer's liability under this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, the division 
shall return the amount that is determined to be excess to 
• the self-insured employer. ' 
(5) (a) The division may af any time require a self-insured 
employer to: 
(i) increase or decrease the amount of acceptable 
security required to be deposited under Subsection 
(3)(c); or 
(ii) modify the type of acceptable security to be 
deposited under Subsection (3)(c). 
(b) (i) If the division requires a self-insured employer 
to take an action described in Subsection (5)(a), a 
perfected security interest is created in favor of the 
division in the assets of the self-insured employer to 
the extent necessary to pay any amount owed by the 
self-insured employer under this chapter and Chap-
ter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, that cannot be 
paid by acceptable security deposited in accordance 
with this section. 
(ii) The perfected security interest created in Sub-
section (5)(b)(i) ends when the self-insured employer 
complies with the division's request under Subsection 
(5)(a) to the satisfaction of the division. 
(6) (a) If an employer or a public agency insurance mutual 
is approved under Subsection (2) to directly pay compen-
sation as a self-insured employer, the division may revoke 
the employer's or the public agency insurance mutual's 
approval. 
(b) The division's revocation of the employer's or the 
public agency insurance mutual's approval under Subsec-
tion (6)(a) becomes a final order of the commission 30 
calendar days from the date of the revocation unless 
within that 30 days the employer or the public agency 
insurance mutual files an application for a hearing in 
accordance with Part 8, Adjudication. 
(7) If the division finds that a self-insured employer has 
failed to pay compensation that the self-insured employer was 
liable to pay under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act, the division may use the acceptable secu-
rity deposited and any interest earned on the acceptable 
security to pay: 
(a) the self-insured employer's liability under this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act 
and 
(b) any costs, including legal fees, associated with the 
administration of the compensation incurred by: 4 
(i) the division; 
(ii) a surety; ? 
(iii) an adjusting agency; or 
(iv) the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(8) (a) If the division determines that the acceptable secu-
rity deposited imder Subsection (3)(c) should be available 
for payment of the self-insured employer's liabilities un-
der Subsection (7), the division shall: 
(i) determine the method of claims administration, 
which majr include administration by: 
(A) a surety; 
(B) an adjusting agency; 
(C) the Uninsured Employers' Fund; or 
(D) any combination of Subsections (8)(a)(i)(A) 
through (C); and .Jt'. 
(ii) audit the self-insured employer's Habilities ujfe 
der this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(b) The following shall cooperate in the division's audit 
under Subsection (8)(a)(ii) and provide any relevant infor-
mation in its possession: 
(i) the self-insured employer; 
(ii) if the self-insured employer is a public agency; 
insurance mutual, a member of the public agency 
insurance mutual; 
(iii) any excess insurer; 
(iv) any adjusting agency; 
(v) a surety; 
(vi) an employee of a self-insured employer if the, 
employee makes a claim for compensation under this", 
chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act £ 
and 
(vii) an employee of a member of a public agency: 
insurance mutual that is approved as a self-insured 
employer under this section, if the employee makes a* 
claim for (compensation under this chapter or Chapter 
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. C 
(9) (a) Payment by a surety is a full release of the surety's 
liability under the bond to the extent of that payment, anr 
entitles the surety to full reimbursement by the princip* 
or the principal's estate including reimbursement of: 
(i) necessary attorney's fees; and 
(ii) other costs and expenses, 
(b) A payment, settlement, or administration of b 
efits made in good faith pursuant to this section byy 
surety, an adjusting agency, the Uninsured EmplQ-
Fund, or this division is valid and binding as betw 
(i) (A) the surety; 
(B) adjusting agency; 
(C) the Uninsured Employers' Fund; or 
(D) the division; 
(ii) the self-insured employer; and 
(iii) if the self-insured employer is a public agj 
insurance mutual, the members of the public £0 
insurance mutual. 
(10) (a) The division shall resolve any dispute concer 
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(i) the depositing, renewal, termination, exonera-
tion, or return of all or any portion of acceptable 
security deposited under this section; 
(ii) any liability arising out of the depositing or 
failure to deposit acceptable security; 
(iii) the adequacy of the acceptable security; or 
(iv) the reasonableness of administrative costs un-
der Subsection (7)(b), including legal fees, 
(b) The division's decision under Subsection (10)(a) 
becomes a final order of the commission 30 calendar days 
from the date of the decision, unless within that 30 days 
the employer or public agency insurance mutual files an 
application for hearing in accordance with Part 3, Adju-
dication. 2002 
34A-2-202. Assessment on self-insured employers in-
cluding counties, cities, towns, or school dis-
tricts paying compensation direct. 
(1) (a) (i) A self-insured employer, including a county, city, 
town, or school district, who by authority of the 
division under Sections 34A-2-201 and 34A-2-201.5 is 
authorized to pay compensation direct shall pay an-
nually, on or before March 31, an assessment in 
accordance with this section and rules made by the 
commission under this section. 
(ii) For purposes of this section, "self-insured em-
ployer" is as defined in Section 34A-2-201.5. 
(b) The assessment required by Subsection (l)(a) is: 
(i) to be collected by the State Tax Commission; 
(ii) paid by the State Tax Commission into the 
state treasury as provided in Subsection 59-9-101(2); 
and 
(iii) subject to the offset provided in Section 34A-
2-202.5. 
(c) The assessment under Subsection (l)(a) shall be 
based on a total calculated premium multiplied by the 
premium assessment rate established pursuant to Sub-
section 59-9-101(2). 
(d) The total calculated premium, for purposes of cal-
culating the assessment under Subsection (l)(a), shall be 
calculated by: 
(i) multiplying the total of the standard premium 
for each class code calculated in Subsection (l)(e) by 
the self-insured employer's experience modification 
factor; and 
(ii) multiplying the total under Subsection (l)(d)(i) 
by a safety factor determined under Subsection (l)(g). 
(e) A standard premium shall be calculated by: 
(i) multiplying the prospective loss cost for the 
year being considered, as filed with the insurance 
department pursuant to Section 31A-19a-406, for 
each applicable class code by 1.10 to determine the 
manual rate for each class code; and 
(ii) multiplying the manual rate for each class code 
under Subsection (l)(e)(i) by each $100 of the self-
insured employer's covered payroll for each class 
code. 
(f) (i) Each self-insured employer paying compensa-
tion direct shall annually obtain the experience mod-
ification factor required in Subsection (l)(d)(i) by 
using: 
(A) the rate service organization designated 
by the insurance commissioner in Section 31A-
19a-404; or 
(B) for a self-insured employer that is, a public 
agency insurance mutual, an actuary approved 
by the commission. 
(ii) If a self-insured employer's experience modifi-
cation factor under Subsection (l)(f)(i) is less than 
0.50, the self-insured employer shall use an experi-
ence modification factor of 0.50 in determining the 
total calculated premium. 
(g) To provide incentive for improved safety, the safety 
factor required in Subsection (l)(d)(ii) shall be determined 
based on the self-insured employer's experience modifica-
tion factor as follows: 
EXPERIENCE 
MODIFICATION SAFETY FACTOR 
FACTOR 
Less than or equal to 0.90 
Greater than 0.90 but less 
than or equal to 1.00 
Greater than 1.00 but less 
than or equal to 1.10 
Greater than 1.10 but less 
than or equal to 1.20 
Greater than 1.20 -
0.56 
0.78 
1.00 
1.22 
1.44 
(h) (i) A premium or premium assessment modifica-
tion other than a premium or premium assessment 
modification under this section may not be allowed. 
(ii) If a self-insured employer paying compensation 
direct fails to obtain an experience modification factor 
as required in Subsection (l)(f)(i) within the reason-
able time period established by rule by the State Tax 
Commission, the State Tax Commission shall use an 
experience modification factor of 2.00 and a safety 
factor of 2.00 to calculate the total calculated pre-
mium for purposes of determining the assessment. 
(iii) Prior to calculating the total calculated pre-
mium under Subsection (l)(h)(ii), the State Tax Com-
mission shall provide the self-insured employer with 
written notice that failure to obtain an experience 
modification factor within a reasonable time period, 
as established by rule by the State Tax Commission: 
(A) shall result in the State Tax Commission 
using an experience modification factor of 2.00 
and a safety factor of 2.00 in calculating the total 
calculated premium for purposes of determining 
the assessment; and 
(B) may result in the division revoking the 
self-insured employer's right to pay compensa-
tion direct. 
(i) The division may immediately revoke a self-insured 
employer's certificate issued under Sections 34A-2-201 
and 34A-2-201.5 that permits the self-insured employer to 
pay compensation direct if the State Tax Commission 
assigns an experience modification factor and a safety 
factor under Subsection (l)(h) because the self-insured 
employer failed to obtain ah experience modification fac-
tor. 
(2) Notwithstanding the annual payment requirement in 
Subsection (l)(a), a self-insured employer whose total assess-
ment obligation under Subsection (l)(a) for the preceding year 
was $10,000 or more shall pay the assessment in quarterly 
installments in the same manner provided in Section 59-9-104 
and subject to the same penalty provided in Section 59-9-104 
for not paying or underpaying an installment. , 
(3) (a) The State Tax Commission shall have access to all 
the records of the division for the purpose of auditing and 
collecting any amounts described in this section. 
(b) Time periods for the State Tax Commission to allow 
a refund or make an assessment shall be determined in 
accordance with Section 59-9-106. 
(4) (a) A review of appropriate use of job class assignment 
and calculation methodology may be conducted as di-
rected by the division at any reasonable time as a condi-
tion of the self-insured employer's certification of paying 
compensation direct. 
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(b) The State Tax Commission shall make any records 
necessary for the review available to the commission. 
(c) The commission shall make the results of any 
review available to the State Tax Commission. 2005 
34A-2-202.5. Offset for occupational health and safety 
related donations. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Occupational health and safety center" means an 
entity: 
(i) affiliated with an institution within the state 
system of higher education as defined in Section 
53B-1-102; and 
(ii) designated as an education and research center 
by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health. 
(b) "Qualified donation" means a donation that is: 
(i) cash; 
(ii) given directly to an occupational health and 
safety center; and 
(iii) given exclusively for the purpose of: 
(A) supporting graduate level education and 
• training in fields of: 
(I) safety and ergonomics; 
(II) industrial hygiene; 
(III) occupational health nursing; and 
(IV) occupational medicine; 
(B) providing continuing education programs 
for employers designed to promote workplace 
safety; and 
(C) paying reasonable administrative, person-
nel, equipment, and overhead costs of the occu-
pational health and safety center. 
(c) "Self-insured employer" is a self-insured employer 
as defined in Section 34A-2-201.5 that is required to pay 
the assessment imposed under Section 34A-2-202. 
(2) (a) A self-insured employer may offset against the as-
sessment imposed under Section 34A-2-202 an amount 
equal to the lesser of: 
(i) the total of qualified donations made by the 
self-insured employer in the calendar year for which 
the assessment is calculated; and 
(ii) .10% of the self-insured employer's total calcu-
lated premium calculated under Subsection 34A-2-
202(l)(d) for the calendar year for which the assess-
ment is calculated, 
(b) The offset provided under this Subsection (2) shall 
be allocated to the restricted account and funds described 
in Subsection 59-9-101(2)(c) in proportion to the rates 
provided in Subsection 59-9-101(2)(c). 
(3) An occupational health and safety center shall: 
(a) provide a self-insured employer a receipt for any 
qualified donation made by the self-insured employer to 
the occupational health and safety center; 
(b) expend monies received by a qualified donation: 
(i) for the purposes described in Subsection 
(l)(b)(iii); and 
(ii) in a manner that can be audited to ensure that 
the monies are expended for the purposes described 
in Subsection (l)(b)(iii); and 
(c) in conjunction with the report required by Section 
59-9-102.5, report to the Legislature through the Office of 
the Legislative Fiscal Analyst by no later t han July 1 of 
each year: 
(i) the qualified donations received by the occupa-
tional heal th and safety center in the previous calen-
dar year; and 
(ii) the expenditures during the previous calendar 
year of qualified donations received by the occupa-
tional heal th and safety center. 2005 
34A-2-203. Payment of premiums by state department 
commission, board, or other agency. 
Each department, commission, board, or other agency of the 
s ta te shall pay the insurance premium on its employees direct 
to the Workers' Compensation Fund. 2000 
34A-2-204. Compliance with chapter — Notice to em-
ployees. 
(1) Each employer providing insurance, or electing directly 
to pay compensation to the employer's injured workers, or the 
dependents of the employer's killed employees, in accordance 
with this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act, shall post in conspicuous places about the employer's 
place of business typewritten or printed notices stating, that: 
(a) the employer has complied with this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, and all the 
rules of the commission made under this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and 
(b) if such is the case, the employer has been autho-
rized by the division directly to compensate the employees 
or dependents. 
(2) The notice required in Subsection (1) when posted in 
accordance with Subsection (1), shall constitute sufficient 
notice to the employer's employees of the fact tha t the em-
ployer has complied with the law as to securing compensation 
to the employer's employees and their dependents. 1997 
34A-2-205. Notif ication of workers' compensat ion in-
surance coverage to d iv i s ion — Cancellation 
requirements — Penal ty for violation. 
(1) (a) Every insurance carrier writing workers' compensa-1 
tion insurance coverage in this state or for this state,3 
regardless of the state in which the policy is written, shall 
file notification of that coverage with the division or its 
designee within 30 days after the inception date of the | 
policy in the form prescribed by the division. 
(b) A-policy described in Subsection (l)(a) is in effecti 
from inception until canceled by filing with the division OF 
its designee a notification of cancellation in the form; 
prescribed by the division within ten days after the 
cancellation of a policy. 
(c) Failure to notify the division or its designee under 
Subsection (l)(b) will result in the continued liability of 
the carrier until the date that notice of cancellation is 
received by the division or its designee. 
(d) Filings shall be made within 30 days of: 
(i) the reinstatement of a policy; 
(ii) the changing or addition of a name or address | 
of the insured; or 
(iii) the merger of an insured with another entity. 
(e) All filings under this section shall include: 
(i) the name of the insured; 
(ii) the principal business address; 
(iii) any and all assumed name designations; 
(iv) the address of all locations within this state 
where business is conducted; and 
(v) all federal employer identification numbers 0 
federsd tax identification numbers. 
(2) Noncompliance with this section is grounds for rev~ 
tion of an insurance carrier's certificate of authority in ad 
tion to the grounds specified in Title 31 A, Insurance Code. 
(3) The division may assess an insurer up to $150, payabl 
to the Uninsured Employers' Fund, if the insurer fails 
comply with this section. 
(4) (a) The notification of workers' compensation insuranc 
coverage required to be filed under Subsection (1) is 
protected record under Section 63-2-304. 
. (b) The commission or any of its divisions may 
disclose the information described in Subsection (4) 
except as provided in: 
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(i) Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access 
and Management Act, for a protected record; or 
(ii) Subsection (4)(c), notwithstanding whether Ti-
tle 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and 
Management Act, permits disclosure. 
(c) The commission may disclose the information de-
scribed in Subsection (4)(a) if: 
(i) the information is disclosed on an individual 
case basis related to a single employer; 
(ii) the information facilitates the: 
(A) coverage of subcontractors by identifying 
the insurance carrier providing workers' compen-
sation coverage for an employer; 
(B) filing of a claim by an employee; or 
(C) payment of services rendered on an em-
ployee's claim by a medical practitioner; and 
(hi) promotes the purposes of this chapter or Chap-
ter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(d) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission shall 
make rules concerning when information may be dis-
closed under Subsection (4)(c). 2000 
34A-2-206. Furnishing information to division. — Em-
ployers' annual report — Rights of divis ion — 
Examinat ion of employers under oath — Pen-
.»• . ; a l t ies . 
(1) (a) Every employer shall furnish the division, upon 
request, all information required by it to carry out the 
purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act. 
(b) In the month of Ju ly of each year every employer 
shall prepare and mail to the division a statement con-
taining the following information: 
' (i) the number of persons employed during the 
• preceding year from July 1, to June 30, inclusive; 
(ii) the number of the persons employed at each 
kind of employment; , 
(hi) the scale of wages paid in each class of employ-
ment, showing the minimum and maximum wages 
paid; and > 
(iv) the aggregate amount of wages paid to all 
employees. 
• (2) (a) The information required under Subsection (1) shall 
be furnished in the form prescribed by the division, 
(b) Every employer shall: 
(i) answer fully and correctly all questions and 
give all the information sought by the division under 
Subsection (1); or . • 
(ii) if unable to comply with Subsection (2)(b)(i), 
give to the division, in writing, good and sufficient 
reasons for the failure. 
(3) (a) The division may require the information required 
to be furnished by this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
.Occupational Disease Act, to be made under oath and 
returned to the division within the period fixed by it or by 
law. 
(b) The division, or any person employed by the divi-
sion for t ha t purpose, shall have the right to examine, 
under oath, any employer, or the employer's agents or 
employees, for the purpose of ascertaining any informa-
tion tha t the employer is required by this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, to furnish to 
the division. 
(4) (a) The division may seek a penalty of not to exceed 
$500 for each offense to be, recovered in a civil action 
brought by the commission or the division on behalf of the 
commission against an employer who: 
(i) within a reasonable time to be fixed by the 
division and after the receipt of written notice signed 
by the director or the director's designee specifying 
the information demanded and served by certified 
mail, refuses to furnish to the division: 
(A) the annual statement required by this 
section; or ' •• 
(B) other information as may be required by 
the division under this section; or 
(ii) willfully furnishes a false or untrue statement. 
(b) All penalties collected under Subsection (4)(a) shall 
be paid into the Employers' Reinsurance Fund created in 
Section 34A-2-702. 1997 
34A-2-207. Noncompl iance — Civil ac t ion by employ-
ees. 
(1) (a) Employers who fail to comply with Section 34A-2-
201 are not entitled to the benefits of this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, during the 
period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a civil 
action to their employees for damages suffered by reason 
of personal injuries arising out of or in the course of 
employment caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or de-
fault of the employer or any of the employer's officers, 
agents, or employees, and also to the dependents or 
personal representatives of such employees when death 
results from such injuries. -
(b) In any action described in Subsection (l)(a), the 
defendant may not avail himself of any of the following 
defenses: 
(i) the fellow-servant rule; 
(ii) assumption of risk; or 
(hi) contributory negligence. 
(2) Proof of the injury shall constitute prima facie evidence 
of negligence on the part of the employer and the burden shall 
be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence result-
ing in the injury, -
(3) An employer who fails to comply with Section 34A-2-201 
is subject to Sections 34A-2-208 and 34A-2-212. 
(4) In any civil action permitted under this section against 
the employer, the employee shall be entitled to necessary costs 
and a reasonable attorney fee assessed against the employer. 
1998 
34A-2-208. Right to compensat ion w h e n employer fails 
t o comply. 
(1) Any employee, or the employee's dependents if death 
has ensued, may, in lieu of proceeding against the employee's 
employer by civil action in the courts as provided in Section 
34A-2-207, file an application with the Division of Adjudica-
tion for compensation in accordance with this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, when: 
(a) the employee's employer failed to comply with Sec-
tion 34A-2-201; 
(b) the employee has been injured by accident arising 
out of or in the course of the employee's employment, 
wherever the injury occurred; and 
(c) the injury described in Subsection (l)(b) was not 
purposely self-inflicted. 
(2) An application for compensation filed under Subsection 
(1) shall be treated by the commission, including for purposes 
of appeal to the commissioner or Appeals Board, as an appli-
cation for hearing under Section 34A-2-801. 
(3) (a) If an application for compensation is filed under 
Subsection (1), in accordance with Par t 8, Adjudication, 
the commission shall determine the award due to: 
(i) the injured employee; or 
(ii) the employee's dependents in case death has 
ensued, 
(b) The employer shall pay the award determined un-
der Subsection (3)(a) to the persons entitled to the com-
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pensation within ten days after receiving notice from the 
commission ofthe amount ofthe award determined under 
Subsection (3)(a). 1997 
34A-2-209. Employer's penalty for violation — Notice 
of noncompliance — Proof required —Admis-
sible evidence — Criminal prosecution. 
(1) (a) (i) Any employer who fails to comply, and every 
officer of a corporation or association that fails to 
comply, with Section 34A-2-201 is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(ii) Each day's failure to comply with Subsection 
(l)(a)(i) is a separate offense. 
(b) All funds, fines, or penalties collected or assessed 
under Subsection (l)(a) shall be deposited in the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund created by Section 34A-2-704 and 
used for the purposes of that fund. 
(c) If the division sends written notice of noncompli-
ance by certified mail to the last-known address of the 
employer, corporation, or officers of a corporation or asso-
ciation, and the employer, corporation, or officers do not 
within ten days provide to the division proof of compli-
ance, the notice and failure to provide proof constitutes 
prima facie evidence that the employer, corporation, or 
officers are in violation of this section. 
(2) (a) (i) If the division has reason to believe that an 
employer is conducting business without securing the 
payment of compensation in one of the three ways 
provided in Section 34A-2-201, the division may give 
the employer, or in the case of an employer corpora-
tion, the corporation.or the officers ofthe corporation, 
notice of noncompliance by certified mail to the last-
known address of the employer, corporation, or offic-
ers, and if the employer, corporation, or officers do 
not, within ten days, provide to the division proof of 
compliance, the employer and every officer of ah 
employer corporation is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor. 
(ii) Each day's failure to comply with Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) is a separate offense, 
(b) All funds, fines, or penalties collected or assessed 
under Subsection (2)(a) shall be deposited in the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund created by Section 34A-2-704 and 
used for the purposes of that fund. 
(3) All forms and records kept by the division or its designee 
pursuant to Section 34A-2-205 are admissible as evidence to 
establish noncompliance under this section. 
(4) The commission or division on behalf of the commission 
is authorized to prosecute or request the attorney general or 
district attorney to prosecute a criminal action in the name of 
the state to enforce the provisions of this chapter or Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. 1997 
34A-2-210. Power to bring suit for noncompliance. 
(1) (a) The commission or the division on behalf of the 
commission may maintain a suit in any court of the state 
to enjoin any employer, within this chapter or Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act, from further operation of 
the employer's business, when the employer fails to pro-
vide for the payment of benefits in one of the three ways 
provided in Section 34A-2-201. 
(b) Upon a showing of failure to provide for the pay-
ment of benefits, the court shall enjoin the further oper-
ation of the employer's business until the payment of 
these benefits has been secured by the employer as 
required by Section 34A-2-201. The court may enjoin the 
employer without requiring bond from the commission or 
division. 
(2) If the division has reason to believe that an employer is 
conducting a business without securing the payment of com-
pensation in one of the three ways provided in Section 34A-2-
201, the division may give the employer five days written 
notice by registered mail of the noncompliance and if the 
employer within the five days written notice does not remedy 
the default: 
(a) the commission or the division on behalf of the -. 
commission may file suit under Subsection (1); and 
(b) the court may, ex parte, issue without bond a 1 
temporary injunction restraining the further operation of * 
the employer's business. 1997 I 
34A-2-211. Notice of noncompliance to employer I 
Enforcement power of division — Penalty. 
(1) (a) In addition to the remedies specified in Section 
34A-2-210, if the division has reason to believe that an 1 
employer is conducting business without securing the 
payment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in 
Section 34A-2-201, the division may give that employer 
written notice of the noncompliance by certified mail to 
the last-known address of the employer. 
(b) If the employer does not remedy the default within 
15 days after delivery ofthe notice, the division may issue 
an order requiring the employer to appear before the 
division and show cause why the employer should not b6 
ordered to comply with Section 34A-2-201. 
(c) If it is found that the employer has failed to provide 
for the payment of benefits in one of the three ways 
provided in Section 34A-2-201, the division may require 
any employer to comply with Section 34A-2-201.
 u 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the division may 
impose a penalty against the employer under this Subsec-
tion (2): 
(i) subject to the notice and other requirements of 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act; 
and 
(ii) if the division believes that an employer of one 
or more employees is conducting business without ; 
securing the payment of benefits in one of the three f 
ways provided in Section 34A-2-201. 
(b) The penalty imposed under Subsection (2)(a) shall g 
be the greater of: 
(i) $1,000; or 
(ii) three times the amount of the premium the 
employer would have paid for workers' compensation 
insurance based on the rate filing of the Workers' 
Compensation Fund, during the period of noncompli-
ance. 
. (c) For purposes of Subsection (2)(b)(ii), the premium is 
calculated by applying rates and rate multipliers to the 
payroll basis under Subsection (2)(d), using the highest 
rated employee class code applicable to the employer's 
operations. 
(d) The payroll basis for the purpose of calculating the 
premium penalty shall be 150% ofthe state's average 
weekly wage multiplied by the highest number of workers 
employed by the employer during the period of the em-
ployer's noncompliance multiplied by the number of 
weeks of the employer's noncompliance up to a maximum 
of 156 weeks. 
(3) The penalty imposed under Subsection (2) shall be 
deposited in the Uninsured Employers' Fund created by Sec-
tion 34A-2-704 and used for the purposes of that fund. 
(4) (a) An employer who disputes the determination, impo-
sition, or amount of a penalty imposed under Slubsection m 
(2) shall request a hearing before an administrative law m 
judge within 30 days of the date of issuance of the M 
administrative action imposing the penalty or the adrnin- M 
istrative action becomes a final order of the commission. § 
(b) The employer's request for a hearing under Subsec- • 
tion (4)(a) shall specify the facts and grounds that are the 1 
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basis of the employer's objection to the determination, 
imposition, or amount of the penalty. 
(c) An administrative law judge's decision under this 
Subsection (4) may be reviewed pursuant to Part 8, 
Adjudication. 
(5) (a) After a penalty has been issued and becomes a final 
order of the commission the division on behalf of the 
commission may file an abstract for any uncollected 
penalty in the district court. 
(b) The abstract filed under Subsection (5)(a) shall 
state: 
(i) the amount of the uncollected penalty; 
(ii) reasonable attorneys' fees; 
(iii) costs of collection; and 
(iv) court costs. 
(c) The filed abstract shall have the effect of a judgment 
of that court. 
(6) Any administrative action issued by the division under 
this section shall: 
(a) be in writing; 
(b) be sent by certified mail to the last-known address 
of the employer; 
(c) s tate the findings and administrative action of the 
division; and 
(d) specify its effective date, which may be immediate 
or may be at a later date. 
(7) The final order of the commission under this section, 
upon application by the division on behalf of the commission 
made on or after the effective date of the order to a court of 
general jurisdiction in any county in this state, may be 
enforced by an order to comply entered ex parte and without 
notice by the court. 2000 
34A-2-212. Docket ing awards in district court — En-
forcing judgment . 
(1) (a) An abstract of any final order providing an award 
may be filed under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, in the office of the clerk of the 
district court of any county in the state. 
(b) The abstract shall be docketed in the judgment 
docket of the district court where the abstract is filed. The 
time of the receipt of the abstract shall be noted on the 
abstract by the clerk of the district court and entered in 
the docket. 
(c) When filed and docketed under Subsections (l)(a) 
and (b), the order shall constitute a Hen from the time of 
the docketing upon the real property of the employer 
situated in the county, for a period of eight years from the 
date of the order unless the award provided in the final 
order is satisfied during the eight-year period. 
(d) Execution may be issued on the hen within the 
same t ime and in the same manner and with the same 
effect as if said award were a judgment of the district 
court. 
(2) (a) If the employer. was uninsured at the time of the 
injury, the county attorney for the county in which the 
applicant or the employer resides, depending on the 
district in which the filial order is docketed, shall enforce 
the judgment when requested by the commission or 
division on behalf of the commission. 
(b) In an action to enforce an order docketed under 
Subsection (1), reasonable attorney's fees and court costs 
shall be allowed in addition to the award. 1997 
PART 3 
PROTECTION OF LIFE, HEALTH, AND SAFETY 
34A-2-301. Places of employment to b e safe — Willful 
neglect — Penalty. 
:(1) An employer may not: 
(a) construct, occupy, or maintain any place of employ-
ment tha t is not safe; 
(b) require or knowingly permit any employee to be in 
any employment or place of employment that is not safe; 
(c) fail to provide and use safety devices and safe-
guards; 
(d) remove, disable, or bypass safety devices and safe-
guards; 
(e) fail to obey orders of the commission; 
(f) fail to obey rules of the commission; 
(g) faii to adopt and use methods and processes reason-
ably adequate to render the employment and place of 
employment safe; or 
(h) fail or neglect to do every other thing reasonably 
necessary to protect the life, health, and safety of the 
employer's employees. 
(2) Compensation as provided in this chapter shall be 
increased 15%, except in case of injury resulting in death, 
when injury is caused by the willful failure of an employer to 
comply with: 
(a) the law; 
(b) a rule of the commission; 
(c) any lawful order of the commission; or 
(d) the employer's own written workplace safety pro-
gram. 2003 
34A-2-302. Employee's willful misconduct — Penalty. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "controlled substance" is as defined in Section 58-
37-2; 
(b) "local government employee" is as defined in Section 
34-41-101; 
(c) "local governmental entity" is as defined in Section 
34-41-101; 
(d) "state institution of higher education" is as defined 
in Section 34-41-101; and 
(e) "valid prescription" is a prescription, as defined in 
Section 58-37-2, that: 
(i) is prescribed for a controlled substance for use 
by the employee for whom it was prescribed; and 
(ii) has not been altered or forged. 
(2) An employee may not: 
(a) remove, displace, damage, destroy, or carry away 
any safety device or safeguard provided for use in any 
employment or place of employment; 
(b) interfere in any way with the use of a safety device 
or safeguard described in Subsection (2)(a) by any other 
person; 
(c) interfere with the use of any method or process 
adopted for the protection of any employee in the employ-
er's employment or place of employment; or 
(d) fail or neglect to follow and obey orders and to do 
every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, 
health, and safety of employees. 
(3) Except in case of injury resulting in death: 
(a) compensation provided for by this chapter shall be 
reduced 15% when injury is caused by the willful failure of 
the employee: 
(i) to use safety devices when provided by the 
employer; or 
(ii) to obey any order or reasonable rule adopted by 
the employer for the safety of the employee; and 
(b) except when the employer permitted, encouraged, 
or had actual knowledge of the conduct described in 
Subsection (3)(b)(i) through (iii), disability compensation 
may not be awarded under this chapter or Title 34A, 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, to an em-
ployee when the major contributing cause of the employ-
ee's injury is the employee's: 
(i) use of a controlled substance that the employee 
did not obtain under a valid prescription; 
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(ii) intentional abuse of a controlled substance that 
the employee obtained under a valid prescription if 
the employee uses the controlled substance intention-
ally: 
(A) in excess of prescribed therapeutic 
amounts; or 
V (B) in an otherwise abusive manner; or 
(hi) intoxication from alcohol with a blood or 
breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater 
as shown by a chemical test. 
(4) (a) For purposes of Subsection (3), as . shown by a 
chemical test that conforms to scientifically accepted 
analytical methods and procedures and includes verifica-
tion or confirmation of any positive test result by gas 
chromatography, gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy, 
or other comparably reliable analytical method, before the 
result of the test may be used as a basis for the presump-
tion, it is presumed that the major contributing cause of 
the employee's injury is the employee's conduct described 
in Subsections (3)(b)(i) through (hi) if at the time of the 
injury: 
(i) the employee has in the employee's system: 
(A) any amount of a controlled substance or its 
metabolites if the employee did not obtain the 
controlled substance under a valid prescription; 
or 
(B) a controlled substance the employee ob-
tained under a valid prescription or the metabo-
lites of the controlled substance if the amount in 
the employee's system is consistent with the 
employee using the controlled substance inten-
tionally: 
(I) in excess of prescribed therapeutic 
amounts; or 
(II) in an otherwise abusive manner; 
(ii) the employee has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater, 
(b) The presumption created under Subsection (4)(a) 
may be rebutted by evidence showing that: 
(i) the chemical test creating the presumption is 
inaccurate because the employer failed to comply 
with: 
(A) Sections 34-38-4 through 34-38-6; or 
. (B) if the employer is a local governmental 
entity or state institution of higher education, 
Section 34-41-104 and Subsection 34-41-103(5); 
(ii) the employee did not engage in the conduct 
described in Subsections (3)(b)(i) through (hi); 
(hi) the test results do not exclude the possibility of 
passive inhalation of marijuana because the concen-
tration of total urinary cannabinoids is less than 50 
nanograms/ml as determined by a test conducted in 
accordance with: 
(A) Sections 34-38-4 through 34-38-6; or 
(B) if the employer is a local governmental 
entity or state institution of higher education, 
Section 34-41-104 and Subsection 34-41-103(5); 
(iv) a competent medical opinion from a physician 
verifies that the amount in the employee's system of 
the following does not support a finding that the 
conduct described in Subsections (3)(b)(i) through (iii) 
was the major contributing cause of the employee's 
injury: 
(A) any amount of a controlled substance or its 
metabolites if the employee did not obtain the 
controlled substance under a valid prescription; 
or 
(B) a controlled substance the employee ob-
tained under a valid prescription or the metabo-
lites of the controlled substance if the amount in 
the employee's • system is consistent with the 
employee using the controlled substance inten-
tionally: 
(I) in excess of prescribed therapeutic 
amounts; or 
(II) in an otherwise abusive maimer; 
(C) alcohol; or 
(D) a combination of Subsections (4)(b)(iii)(A) 
through (C); or 
(v) the conduct described in Subsections (3)(b)(i) 
through (iii) was not the major contributing cause of 
the employee's injury, 
(c) (i) Except as provided in Subsections (4)(c)(ii) and 
(iii), if a chemical test that creates the presumption 
under Subsection (4)(a) is taken at the request of the 
employer, the employer shall comply with: 
(A) Title 34, Chapter 38, Drug and Alcohol 
Testing; or 
(B) if the employee is a local governmental 
employee or an employee of a state institution of 
higher education, Title 34, Chapter 41, Local 
Governmental Entity Drug-Free Workplace Pol-
icies. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34-38r13, the results 
of a test taken under Title 34, Chapter 38, may be 
disclosed to the extent necessary to establish or rebut 
the presumption created under Subsection (4)(a). 
(iii) Notwithstanding Section 34-41-103, the re-
sults of a test taken under Title 34, Chapter 41, may 
be disclosed to the extent necessary to establish or 
rebut the presumption created under Subsection 
(4)(a). 
(5) If any provision of this section, or the application of any 
provision of this section to any person or circumstance, is held 
invalid, the remainder of this section shall be gjven effect 
without the invalid provision or application. 2000 
PART 4 
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to 
be paid. 
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is 
killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines; and 
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral ex-
penses. 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of 
medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and 
funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance car-
rier; and 
(b) not on the employee. 
(3) Payment of benefits provided by this chapter or Chapter 
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall commence within 30 
calendar days after any final award by the commission. 1999 
34A-2-402. Mental stress claims. 
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional injuries related to men-
tal stress arising out of and in the course of employment shall 
be compensable under this chapter only when there is a 
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sufficient legal and medical causal connection between the 
employee's injury and employment. 
(2) (a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary 
mental stress from a sudden stimulus arising predomi-
nantly and directly from employment. 
(b) The extraordinary and sudden nature of the alleged 
mental stress is judged according to an objective standard 
in comparison with contemporary national employment 
and nonemployment life. 
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, 
mental, or emotional injury was medically caused by the 
mentalstress that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or 
emotional injury. 
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including disci-
plinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs, demo-
tions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not form 
the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this 
chapter. 
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor 
practices otherwise actionable at law may not form the basis of 
compensable mental stress claims under this chapter. 
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable industrial 
accident involving mental stress bears the burden of proof to 
establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of 
the evidence. • 1997 
34A-2-403. Dependents — Presumption. 
(1) The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly 
dependent for support upon a deceased employee: 
(a) a child under 18 years of age, or over if the child is 
physically or mentally incapacitated and dependent upon 
the parent, with whom the child is living at the time of the 
death of the parent, or who is legally bound for the child's 
support; and 
(b) for purposes of payments to be made under Subsec-
tion 34A-2-702(5)(a)(i), a surviving spouse with whom the 
deceased employee lived at the time of the employee's 
death. 
(2) (a) In a case not provided for in Subsection (1), the 
question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be 
determined in accordance with tlfie facts in each particu-
lar case existing at the time of the injury or death of an 
employee, except for purposes of dependency reviews 
under Subsection 34A-2-702(5)(a)(iv). 
(b) A person may not be considered as a dependent 
unless that person is: 
(i) a member of the family of the deceased em-
ployee; 
(ii) the spouse of the deceased employee; 
(hi) a lineal descendant or ancestor of the deceased 
employee; or 
(iv) brother or sister of the deceased employee. 
(3) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act: 
(a) "brother or sister" includes a half brother or sister; 
and 
(b) "child" includes: 
(i) a posthumous child; or 
(ii) a child legally adopted prior to the injury. 1997 
34A-2-404. Injuries to minors. 
(1) A minor is considered sui juris for the purposes of this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, and 
no other person shall have any cause of action or right to 
compensation for an injury to the minor employee. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), in the event of the 
award of a lump sum of compensation to a minor employee, 
the sum shall be paid only to the minor's legally appointed 
guardian. 1997 
34A-2-405. Employee injured outside state — Entitled 
to compensation — Limitation of time. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if an employee who 
has been hired or is regularly employed in this state receives 
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment outside of this state, the employee, or the employ-
ee's dependents in case of the employee's death, shall be 
entitled to compensation according to the law of this state. 
(2) This section applies only to those injuries received by 
the employee within six months after leaving this state, unless 
prior to the expiration of the six-month period the employer 
has filed with tb,e division notice that the employer has elected 
to extend such coverage a greater period of time. ' 1997 
34A-2-406. Exemptions from chapter for employees 
temporarily in state — Conditions — Evi-
dence of insurance. 
(1) Any employee who has been hired in another state and 
the employee's employer are exempt from this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, while the em-
ployee is temporarily within this state doing work for the 
employee's employer if: 
(a) the employer has furnished workers' compensation 
insurance coverage under the workers' compensation or 
similar laws of the other state; 
(b) the coverage covers the employee's employment 
while in this state; and 
(c) (i) the extraterritorial provisions of this chapter 
and Chapter 3 are recognized in the other state and 
employers and employees who are covered in this 
.state are likewise exempted from the application of 
the workers' compensation or similar laws of the 
other state; or 
(ii) the Workers'Compensation Fund: 
(A) is an admitted insurance carrier in the 
other state; or 
(B) has agreements with a carrier and is able 
to furnish workers' compensation insurance or 
similar coverage to Utah employers and their 
subsidiaries or affiliates doing business in the 
other state. 
(2) The benefits under the workers' compensation or similar 
laws of the other state are the exclusive remedy against an 
employer for any injury, whether resulting in death or not, 
received by an employee while working for the employer in 
this state. 
(3) A certificate from an authorized officer of the industrial 
commission or similar department of the other state certifying 
that the employer is insured in the other state and has 
provided extraterritorial coverage insuring the employer's 
• employees while working in this state is prima facie evidence 
that the employer carries compensation insurance. 2000 
34A-2-407. Reporting of industrial injuries — Regula-
tion of health care providers. 
(1) As used in this section, "physician" is as defined in 
Section 34A-2-111. 
(2) (a) Any employee sustaining an injury arising out of 
and in the course of employment shall provide notification 
to the employee's employer promptly of the injury. 
(b) If the employee is unable to provide the notification 
required by Subsection (2)(a), the following may provide 
notification of the injury to the employee's employer: 
(i) the employee's next-of-kin; or 
(ii) the employee's attorney. 
(c) An employee claiming benefits under this chapter, 
or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall com-
ply with rules adopted by the commission regarding 
disclosure of medical records of the employee medically 
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relevant to the industrial accident or occupational disease 
claim. 
(3) (a) An employee is barred for any claim of benefits 
arising from an injury if the employee fails to notify 
within the time period described in Subsection (3)(b): 
(i) the employee's employer in accordance with 
Subsection (2); or 
(ii) the division, 
(b) The notice required by Subsection (3)(a) shall be 
made within: 
(i) 180 days of the day on which the injury occurs; 
or 
(ii) in the case of an occupational hearing loss, the 
time period specified in Section 34A-2-506. 
(4) The following constitute notification of injury required 
by Subsection (2): 
(a) an employer's or physician's injury report filed with: 
(i) the division; 
(ii) the employer; or 
(hi) the employer's insurance carrier; or 
(b) the payment of any medical or disability benefits by: 
(i) the employer; or 
(ii) the employer's insurance carrier. 
(5) (a) In the form prescribed by the division, each em-
ployer shall file a report with the division of any: 
(i) work-related fatality; or 
(ii) work-related injury resulting in: 
(A) medical treatment; 
(B) loss of consciousness; 
(C) loss of work; 
(D) restriction of work; or 
(E) transfer to another job. 
(b) The employer shall file the report required by 
Subsection (5)(a) within seven days after: 
(i) the occurrence of a fatality or injury; 
(ii) the employer's first knowledge of the fatality or 
injury; or } 
(iii) the employee's" notification of the fatality or 
injury. 
(c) (i) An employer shall file a subsequent report with 
the division of any previously reported injury that 
later results in death. 
(ii) The subsequent report required by this Subsec-
tion (5)(c) shall be filed with the division within seven 
days following: 
(A) the death; or 
(B) the employer's first knowledge or notifica-
tion of the death. 
(d) A report is not required to be filed under this 
Subsection (5) for minor injuries, such as cuts or scratches 
that require first-aid treatment only, unless: 
(i) a treating physician files a report with the 
division in accordance with Subsection (9); or 
(ii) a treating physician is required to file a report 
with the division in accordance with Subsection (9). 
(6) An employer required to file a report under Subsection 
(5) shall provide the employee with: 
(a) a copy of the report submitted to the division; and 
(b) a statement, as prepared by the division, of the 
employee's rights and responsibilities related to the in-
dustrial injury. 
(7) Each employer shall maintain a record in a manner 
prescribed by the division of all: 
(a) work-related fatalities; or 
(b) work-related injuries resulting in: 
(i) medical treatment; 
(ii) loss of consciousness; 
(iii) loss of work; 
(iv) restriction of work; or 
(v) transfer to another job. 
(8) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (8)(b), an employer 
who refuses or neglects to make reports, to maintain 
records, or to file reports with the division as required by 
this section is: 
(i) guilty of a class C misdemeanor;' and 
(ii) subject to a civil assessment: 
(A) imposed by the division, subject to the 
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Adminis-
trative Procedures Act; and 
(B) that may not exceed $500. 
(b) An employer is not subject to the civil assessment or 
guilty of a class C misdemeanor under this Subsection (8) 
if: 
(i) the employer submits a report later than re-
quired by this section; and 
(ii) the division finds that the employer has shown 
good cause for submitting a report later than re-
quired by this section. 
(c) A civil assessment collected under this Subsection 
(8) shall be deposited into the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
created in Section 34A-2-704. 
(9) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (9)(c), a physician 
attending an injured employee shall comply with rules 
established by the commission regarding: 
(i) fees for physician's services; 
(ii) disclosure of medical records of the employee 
medically relevant to the employee's industrial acci-
dent, or occupational disease claim; and 
(iii) reports to the division regarding: 
(A) the condition and treatment of an injured 
employee; or 
(B) amy other matter concerning industrial 
cases that the physician is treating. 
(b) A physician who is associated with, employed by, or 
bills through a hospital is subject to Subsection (9)(a). 
(c) A hospital is not subject to the requirements of 
Subsection (9)(a). 
(d) The commission's schedule of fees may reasonably 
differentiate remuneration to be paid to providers of 
health services based on: 
(i) the severity of the employee's condition; 
(ii) the nature of the treatment necessary; and 
(iii) the facilities or equipment specially required 
to deliver that treatment. 
(e) This Subsection (9) does not modify contracts with 
providers of health services relating to the pricing of 
goods and services existing on May 1, 1995. 
(f) In accordance With Title 63, Chapter 46b, Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, a physician may file with the 
Division of Adjudication an application for hearing to 
appeal a decision or final order to the extent a decision or 
final order concerns the fees charged by the physician in 
accordance with this section. 
(10) A copy of the initial report filed under Subsection 
(9)(a)(iii) shall be furnished to: 
(a) the division; 
(b) the employee; and 
(c) (i) the employer; or 
(ii) the employer's insurance carrier. 
(11) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (ll)(b), a physi-
cian, excluding any hospital, who fails to comply with 
Subsection (9)(a)(iii) is guilty of a class C misdemeanor for 
each offense. 
(b) A physician is not guilty of a class C misdemeanor 
under this Subsection (11), if: 
(i) the physician files a late report; and 
(ii) the division finds that there is good cause for 
submitting a late report. 
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(12) (a) Subject to appellate review under Section 34A-1-
303, the commission has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and 
determine whether the t reatment or services rendered to 
an employee by a physician are: 
(i) reasonably related to industrial injuries or oc-
cupational diseases; and 
(ii) compensable pursuant to this chapter or Chap-
ter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (12)(a), Subsec-
tion 34A-2-21K7), or Section 34A-2-212, a person may not 
maintain a cause of action in any forum within this state 
other than the commission for collection or payment of a 
physician's .billing for t reatment or services that are 
compensable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 2004 
34A-2-408. Compensation — None for first three days 
after injury unless disability extended. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (1) (b) and (2), 
compensation may not be allowed for the first three days 
after the injury is received.. 
(b) The disbursements authorized in this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, for medical, 
nurse and hospital services, and for medicines and fu-
neral expenses are payable for the first three days after 
the injury is received. 
(2) If the period of total temporary disability lasts more 
than 14 days, compensation shall also be payable for the first 
three days after the injury is received. 1997 
34A-2-409. Average weekly wage — Basis of computa-
tion. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter or Chapter 
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, the average weekly wage of 
the injured employee at the time of the injury is the basis upon 
which to compute the weekly compensation rate and shall be 
determined as follows: 
(a) if at the time of the injury the wages are fixed by the 
year, the average weekly wage shall be that yearly wage 
divided by 52; 
(b) if at the time of the injury the wages are fixed by the 
month, the average weekly* wage shall be that monthly 
wage divided by 4 Vz\ 
(c) if at the time of the injury the wages are fixed by the 
week, that amount shall be the average weekly wage; 
(d) if at the time of the injury the wages are fixed by the 
day, the weekly wage shall be determined by multiplying 
the daily wage by the greater of; 
(i) the number of days and fraction of days in the 
week during which the employee under a contract of 
hire was working at the time of the accident, or would 
have worked if the accident had not intervened; or 
(ii) three days; 
(e) if at the time of the injury the wages are fixed by the 
hour, the average weekly wage shall be determined by 
multiplying the hourly rate by the greater of: 
(i) the number of hours the employee would have 
worked for the week if the accident had not inter-
vened; or 
(ii) 20 hours; 
(f) if at the time of the injury the hourly wage has not 
been fixed or cannot be ascertained, the average weekly 
wage for the purpose of calculating compensation shall be 
the usual wage for similar services where those services 
are rendered by paid employees; 
(g) (i) if at the time of the injury the wages are fixed by 
the output of the employee, the average weekly wage 
shall be the wage most favorable to the employee 
computed by dividing by 13 the wages, not including 
overtime or premium pay, of the employee earned 
through that employer in the first, second, third, or 
fourth period of 13 consecutive calendar weeks in the 
52 weeks immediately preceding the injury; or 
(ii) if the employee has been employed by that 
employer less than 13 calendar weeks immediately 
preceding the injury, the employee's average weekly 
wage shall be computed as under Subsection (l)(g)(i), 
presuming the wages, not including overtime or pre-
mium pay, to be the amount the employee would have 
earned had the employee been so employed for the 
full 13 calendar weeks immediately preceding the 
injury and had worked, when work was available to 
other employees, in a similar occupation. 
(2) If none of the methods in Subsection (1) will fairly 
determine the average weekly wage in a particular case, the 
commission shall use such other method as will, based on the 
facts presented, fairly determine the employee's average 
weekly wage. 
(3) When the average weekly wage of the injured employee 
at the time of the injury is determined in accordance with this 
section, it shall be taken as the basis upon which to compute 
the weekly compensation rate. After the weekly compensation 
is computed, it shall be rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(4) If it is established that the injured employee was of such 
age and experience when injured that under natural condi-
tions the employee's wages would be expected to increase, tha t 
fact may be considered in arriving at the employee's average 
weekly wage. 1997 
34A-2-410. Temporary disability — Amount of pay-
m e n t s — State average week ly wage defined. 
(1) (a) In case of temporary disability, so long as the dis-
ability is total, the employee shall receive 66-%% of that 
employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury 
but: 
(i) not more than a maximum of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per 
week; and 
(ii) not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus 
$5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent 
child under the age of 18 years, up ,to a maximum of 
four dependent children, not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, 
but not to exceed 100% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week. 
(b) In no case shall the compensation benefits exceed 
312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury over a period of 12 years 
from the date of the injury. 
(2) In the event a fight duty medical release is obtained 
prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of recovery, and 
when no light duty employment is available to the employee 
from the employer, temporary disability benefits shall con-
tinue to be paid. 
(3) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to in this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall 
be determined by the commission as follows: 
(a) On or before June 1 of each year, the total wages 
reported on contribution reports to the Unemployment 
Insurance Division for the preceding calendar year shall 
be divided by the average monthly number of insured 
workers determined by dividing the total insured workers 
reported for the preceding year by 12. 
(b) The average annual wage obtained under Subsec-
tion (3)(a) shall be divided by 52. 
(c) The average weekly wage determined under Sub-
section (3)(b) is rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(4) The state average weekly wage determined under Sub-
section (3) shall be used as the basis for computing the 
maximum compensation rate for: 
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(a) injuries or disabilities arising from occupational 
disease that occurred during the twelve-month period 
commencing July 1 following the June 1 deterniination; 
and 
(b) any death resulting from the injuries or disabilities 
arising from occupational disease. 2005 
34A-2-411. Temporary partial disability — Amount of 
payments. 
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability for 
work, the employee shall receive weekly compensation ec[ual 
to: 
(a) 66 2/3% of the difference between the employee's 
average weekly wages before the accident and the weekly 
wages the employee is able to earn after the accident, but 
not more than 100% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of injury; plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each depen-
dent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of 
four such dependent children, but only up to a total 
weekly compensation that does not exceed 100% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of injury. 
(2) The commission may order an award for temporary 
partial disability for work at any time prior to 12 years after 
the date of the injury to an employee: 
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury 
is not finally healed and fixed 12 years after the date of 
injury; and 
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 
34A-2-417. 
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 
weeks nor continue more than 12 years after the date of the 
injury. Payments shall terminate when the disability ends or 
the injured employee dies. 1999 
34A-2-412. Permanent partial disability — Scale of 
payments. 
(1) An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as 
a result of an industrial accident and who files an application 
for hearing under Section 34A-2-4JL7 may receive a permanent 
partial disability award from the commission. 
(2) Weekly payments may not in any case^continue after the 
disability ends, or the death of the injured person. 
(3) (a) In the case of the injuries described in Subsections 
(4) through (6), the compensation shall be 66 %% of that 
employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, 
but not more than a maximum of 66 %% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week 
and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for 
a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four 
. dependent children, but not to exceed 66 %% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week, 
(b) The compensation determined under Subsection 
(3)(a) shall be: 
(i) paid in routine pay periods not to exceed four 
weeks for the number of weeks provided for in this 
section; and 
(ii) in addition to the compensation provided for 
temporary total disability and temporary partial dis-
ability. 
(4) For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
(a) Upper extremity 
(i) Arm 
(A) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputa-
tion) 218 
(B) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid 
insertion 187 
(C) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow 
joint, at elbow joint, or below elbow joint proxi-
mal to insertion of biceps tendon . 178 
(D) Forearm below elbow joint distal to inser-
tion of biceps tendon 168 
(ii) Hand 
(A) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal 
amputation 168 
(B) All fingers except thumb at metacarpopha-
langeal joints ... 101 
(hi) Thumb 
(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with re-
section of carpometacarpal bone 67 
(B) At interphalangeal joint 50 
(iv) Index finger 
(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with re-
section of metacarpal bone 42 
(B) At proximal interphalangeal joint. . . . 34 
(C) At distal interphalangeal joint 18 
(v) Middle finger 
(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with re-
section of metacarpal bone 34 
(B) At proximal interphalangeal joint. . . . 27 
(C) At distal interphalangeal joint . . . 15 
(vi) Ring finger 
(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with re-
section of metacarpal bone 17 
(B) At proximal interphalangeal joint. . . . 13 
(C) At distal interphalangeal joint. . 8 
(vii) Little finger 
(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with re-
section of metacarpal bone 8 
(B) At proximal interphalangeal joint 6 
(C) At distal interphalangeal joint 4 
(b) Lower extremity 
(i) Leg 
(A) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis) 156 
(B) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less 
below tuberosity of ischium 125 
(C) Leg above knee with functional stump, at 
knee joint or Gritti-Stokes amputation or below 
knee with short stump (three inches or less below 
intercondylar notch) 112 
(D) Leg below knee with functional stump 88 
(ii) Foot 
(A) Foot at ankle 88 
(B) Foot partial amputation (Qiopart's) .. 66 
(C) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 44 
(iii) Toes 
(A) Great toe 
(I) With resection of metatarsal bone 26 
(II) At metatarsophalangeal jo in t . . . 16 
(III) At interphalangeal joint 12 
(B) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th) 
(I) With resection of metatarsal bone 4 
(II) At metatarsophalangeal joint 3 
(III) At proximal interphalangeal joint 2 
(IV) At distal interphalangeal joint.. . 1 
(C) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints 26 
(iv) Miscellaneous 
(A) One eye by enucleation 120 
(B) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(C) Total loss of binaural hearing 109 
(5) Permanent iand complete loss of use shall be deemed 
equivalent to loss of the member. Partial loss or partial loss of 
use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of 
the member. This Subsection (5) does not apply to the items 
listed in Subsection (4)(b)(iv). 
(6) (a) For any permanent impairment caused by an indus-
trial accident, that is not otherwise provided for in the 
schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial 
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disability compensation shall be awarded by the commis-
sion based on the medical evidence. 
(b) Compensation for any impairment described in 
Subsection (6)(a) shall, as closely as possible, be propor-
tionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in 
this section. 
(c) Permanent partial disabihty compensation may 
not: 
(i) exceed 312 weeks, which shall be considered the 
period of compensation for permanent total loss of 
bodily function; and
 ; 
(ii) be paid for any permanent impairment that 
existed prior to an industrial accident. 
(7) The amounts specified in this section are all subject to 
the limitations as to the maximum weekly amount payable as 
specified in this section, and in no event shall more than a 
maximum of 66-%% of the state average weekly wage a t the 
time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be 
required to be paid. 1997 
34A-2-413. Permanent total disabil i ty — Amount of 
payments — Rehabil i tat ion. 
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from 
an industrial accident or occupational disease, the em-
ployee shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section. 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disabil-
ity compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to 
show by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impair-
ment or combination of impairments as a result of the 
industrial accident or occupational disease tha t gives 
rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; 
and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease 
was the direct cause of the employee's permanent 
total disabihty. 
,. . (c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, 
the commission shall conclude that : 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has aruimpairment or combina-
tion,of impairments that limit the employee's ability 
to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused im-
pairment or combination of impairments prevent the 
employee from performing the essential functions of 
the work activities for which the employee has been 
qualified until the time of the industrial accident or 
occupational disease that is the basis for the employ-
ee's permanent total disabihty claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work rea-
sonably available, taking into consideration the em-
ployee's: 
(A) age; 
(B) education; 
(C) past work experience; 
(D) medical capacity; and 
(E) residual functional capacity. 
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability 
benefits other than those provided under this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant: 
(i) may be presented to the commission; 
(ii) is not binding; and 
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement un-
der this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. . 
(2) For permanent total disabihty compensation during the 
initial 312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-%% of 
the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
limited as follows: 
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury; 
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the 
sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus 
$5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four dependent minor children, but not 
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a) 
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee a t 
the time of the injury; and 
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly 
compensation ra te under Subsection (2)(b) shall be 36% of 
the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
(3) This Subsection (3) applies to claims resulting from an 
accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment-on or before June 30, 1994. 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for 
the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disability com-
pensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in 
effect on the date of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be 
required to pay compensation for any combination of 
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and 
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Par t 5, Indus-
tr ial Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation 
payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable 
permanent total disabihty compensation rate under Sub-
section (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be 
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from 
the employee's employer, its insurance carrier, or the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at 
the applicable permanent total disability compensation 
rate , the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all 
remaining permanent total disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall com-
mence immediately after the employer or its insurance 
carrier has satisfied its liability under this Subsection (3) 
or Section 34A-2-703. 
(4) This Subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an 
accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994. 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for 
permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be 
required to pay compensation for any combination of 
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and 
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Pa r t 5, Indus-
trial Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation 
payable over the initial 312 weeks at the apphcable 
permanent total disabihty compensation ra te under Sub-
section (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be 
recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier by 
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future 
liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Sub-
section (2), the compensation payable by the employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after 
an employee has received compensation from the employer or 
the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of dis-
abilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the 
apphcable total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, 
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to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of 
the Social Security retirement benefits received by the em-
ployee during the same period. 
•" (6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total 
disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the 
parties, until: 
(i) tan administrative law judge reviews a sum-
mary of reemployment activities undertaken pursu-
ant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemploy-
ment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits 
to the administrative law judge: 
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by «a 
qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably de-
signed to return the employee to gainful employ-
ment; or 
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance 
carrier will not submit a plan; and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to 
the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipu-
lated, to: 
(A) consider evidence regarding rehabilita-
tion; and 
(B) review any reemployment plan submitted 
by the employer or its insurance earner under 
Subsection (6)(a)(ii). 
(b) Before commencing the procedure required by Sub-
section (6)(a), the administrative law judge shall order: 
. (i) the initiation of permanent total disability com-
pensation payments to provide for the employee's 
subsistence; and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or 
medical benefits due the employee. 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), an order for pay-
ment of benefits described in Subsection (6)(b) is consid-
ered a final order for purposes of Section 34A-2-212. 
(d) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given 
credit for any disability payments made under Subsection 
(6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liabil-
ity under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(e) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be 
ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the employer 
or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the 
plan is subject to Subsections (6)(e)(i) through (iii). 
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, 
medical and disability compensation benefits, job 
placement services, or incentives calculated to facili-
tate reemployment funded by the employer or its 
insurance carrier. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable 
disability compensation to provide for the employee's 
subsistence during the rehabilitation process. 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall 
diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The em-
ployer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently 
pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the 
administrative law judge on the administrative law 
judge's own motion to make a final decision of perma-
nent total disability. 
(f) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that 
successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administra-
tive law judge shall order that the employee be paid 
weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. 
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the 
employee became permanently totally disabled, as deter-
mined by a final order of the commission based on the 
facts and evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning 
regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide 
locate for a permanently totally disabled employee' 
sonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a 
earning at least minimum wage provided that emplo 
merit may not be required to the extent that it wo?" 
disqualify the employee from Social Security disabut 
benefits. 
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placeme 
and employment process and accept the reasonable nxe 
ically appropriate, part-time work. 
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an emplf* 
ee's gross income from the work provided under Subs^ 
tion (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance cafrd 
may reduce the employee's permanent total disabiL 
compensation by 50% of the employee's income in efce 
of $500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the* 
ployer or its insurance carrier, a permanently tot~ 
disabled employee may obtain medically appropr 
part-time work subject to the offset provisions cont; 
in Subsection (7)(d). 
(f) (i) Thes commission shall establish rules regard 
the part-time work and offset. 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under t 
Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication^ 
(g) The eraployer or its insurance carrier shall have; 
burden of proof to show that medically appropriate% 
time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in 
job that would require the employee to undert 
work exceeding the employee's medical capacity ^ 
residual functional capacity or for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier 
reduce permanent total disability benefits a s 3 
vided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medic 
appropriate, part-time employment has been offe* 
but the employee has failed to fully cooperate^ 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the^ 
ployee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has so 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for perma 
partial disability. 
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, 
employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless -
employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemp 
ment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupatio 
Disease Act. The aolministrative law judge shall dis~ 
without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if 
administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to 
cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states spe 
findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice, 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the 
of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both e j 
or any combination of two such body members consti 
total and permanent disability, to be compensated ac~ 
ing to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability puirsu" 
Subsection (10)(a) is final. 
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may p&g 
cally reexamine a permanent total disability claim, e 
those based on Subsection (10), for which the rasur 
self-insured employer had or has payment response 
to determine whether the worker remains perman 
totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more^ 
once every three years after an award is final, unles 
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cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to 
allow more frequent reexaminations. 
(c) The reexamination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical 
evaluations; 
(hi) employee submission to reasonable rehabilita-
tion evaluations and retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax 
Returns; 
(v) employee certification of compliance with Sec-
tion 34A-2-110; and 
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or 
questionnaires approved by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for 
the cost of a reexamination with appropriate employee 
reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel 
allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert 
witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the 
employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at 
the time of reexamination. 
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reason-
able reexamination of a permanent total disability find-
ing, an administrative law judge may order the suspen-
sion of the employee's permanent total disability benefits 
until the employee cooperates with the reexamination. 
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total 
disability finding reveal evidence that reasonably 
raises the issue of an employee's continued entitle-
ment to permanent total disability compensation 
benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may 
petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing 
on tha t issue. The petition shall be accompanied by 
documentation supporting the insurer's or self-in-
sured employer's belief that the employee is no longer 
permanently totally disabled. 
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (ll)(f)(i) dem-
onstrates good cause, as determined by the Division 
of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall 
adjudicate the issue a t a hearing. 
(hi) Evidence of an employee's participation in 
medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the 
sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent 
. total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the 
employee's participation in medically appropriate, 
part-time work under Subsection (7) may be consid-
ered in the reexamination or hearing with other 
evidence relating to the employee's status and condi-
tion. 
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the admin-
istrative law judge may award reasonable attorneys fees 
to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the 
employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the 
permanent total disability finding, except if the employee 
does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. 
The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its 
insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total 
disability compensation benefits due. 
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication 
if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured 
employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall con-
tinue to pay the permanent total disability compensation 
benefits due the employee. 
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
remainder of this section shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 2005 
34A-2-414. Benefits in case of death — Distribution of 
award to dependents — Death of dependents 
— Remarriage of surviving spouse. 
(1) (a) The benefits in case of death shall be paid to one or 
more of the dependents of the decedent for the benefit of 
all the dependents, as may be determined by an admin-
istrative law judge. 
(b) The administrative law judge may apportion the 
benefits among the dependents in the manner tha t the 
administrative law judge considers just and equitable. 
(c) Payment to a dependent subsequent in right may be 
made, if the administrative law judge considers it proper, 
and shall operate to discharge all other claims. 
(2) The dependents, or persons to whom benefits are paid, 
shall apply the same to the use of the several beneficiaries 
thereof in compliance with the finding and direction of the 
administrative law judge. 
(3) In all cases of death when: 
(a) the dependents are a surviving spouse and one or 
more minor children, it shall be sufficient for the surviv-
ing spouse to make application to the Division of Adjudi-
cation on behalf of tha t individual and the minor children; 
and 
(b) all of the dependents are minors, the application 
shall be made by the guardian or next friend of the minor 
dependents. 
(4) The administrative law judge may, for the purpose of 
protecting the rights and interests of any minor dependents 
the administrative law judge considers incapable of doing so, 
provide a method of safeguarding any payments due the minor 
dependents. 
(5) Should any dependent of a deceased employee die dur-
ing the period covered by weekly payments authorized by this 
section, the right of the deceased dependent to compensation 
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act, shall cease. 
(6) (a) If a surviving spouse, who is a dependent of a 
deceased employee and who is receiving the benefits of 
this chapter or Chapter 3 remarries, tha t individual's sole 
right after the remarriage to further payments of compen-
sation shall be the right to receive in a lump sum the 
lesser of: 
(i) the balance of the weekly compensation pay-
ments unpaid from the time of remarriage to the end 
of six years or 312 weeks from the date of the injury 
from which death resulted; or 
(ii) an amount equal to 52 weeks of compensation 
a t the weekly compensation rate the surviving spouse 
was receiving at the time of such remarriage, 
(b) (i) If there are other dependents remaining at the 
t ime of remarriage, benefits payable under this chap-
ter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, 
shall be paid to such person as an administrative law 
judge may determine, for the use and benefit of the 
other dependents. 
(ii) The weekly benefits to be paid under Subsec-
tion (6)(b)(i) shall be paid at intervals of not less than 
four weeks. 1997 
34A-2-415. Increase of award to children and depen-
dent spouse — Effect of death, marriage, ma-
jority, or termination of dependency of chil-
dren — Death, divorce, or remarriage of 
spouse. 
If an award is made to, or increased because of a dependent 
spouse or dependent minor child or children, as provided in 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, the 
award or increase in amount of the award shall cease at: 
(1) the death, marriage, at tainment of the age of 18 
years, or termination of dependency of the minor child or „ 
children; or 
(2) upon the death, divorce, or remarriage of the spouse 
of the employee, subject to the provisions in Section 
34A-2-414 relative to the remarriage of a spouse. 1998 
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34A-2-416.. Additional benefits in special cases. 
(1) An administrative law judge may extend indefinitely 
benefits received by a wholly dependent person under this 
chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if at the 
termination of the benefits: 
(a) the wholly dependent person is still in a dependent 
condition; and 
(b) under all reasonable circumstances the wholly de-
pendent person should be entitled to additional benefits. 
(2) If benefits are extended under Subsection (1): 
(a) the liability of the employer or insurance carrier 
involved may not be extended; and 
(b) the additional benefits allowed shall be paid out of 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund created in Subsection 
34A-2-702Q). 1997 
34A-2-417. Claims and benefits — Time limits for filing 
— Burden of proof. 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonperma-
nent total disability cases an employee's medical benefit 
entitlement ceases if for a period of three consecutive years the 
employee does not: 
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the 
industrial accident; and 
(b) submit the medical expenses incurred to the em-
ployee's employer or insurance carrier for payment. 
(2) (a) A claim described in Subsection (2)(b) is barred, 
unless the employee: 
(i) files an application for hearing with the Divi-
sion of Adjudication no later than six years from the 
date of the accident; and 
(ii) by no later than 12 years from the date of the 
accident, is able to meet the employee's burden of 
proving that the employee is due the compensation 
claimed under this chapter. 
(b) Subsection (2)(a) applies to a claim for compensa-
tion for: 
(i) temporary total disability benefits; 
(ii) temporary partial disability benefits; 
(iii) permanent partial disability benefits; or 
(iv) permanent total disability benefits. 
(c) The commission may enter an order awarding or 
denying an employee's claim for compensation under this 
chapter within a reasonable time period beyond 12 years 
from the date of the accident, if: 
(i) the employee complies with Subsection (2)(a); 
and 
(ii) 12 years from the date of the accident: 
(A) (I) the employee is fully cooperating in a 
commission approved reemployment plan; 
and 
(II) the results of that commission ap-
proved reemployment plan are not known; or 
(B) the employee is actively adjudicating is-
sues of compensability before the commission. 
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an applica-
tion for hearing is filed within one year of the date of death of 
the employee. 
(4) (a) (i) Subject to Subsections (2)(c) and (4)(b), after an 
employee files an application for hearing within six 
years from the date of the accident, the Division of 
Adjudication may enter an order to show cause why 
the employee's claim should not be dismissed because 
the employee has failed to meet the employee's bur-
den of proof to establish an entitlement to compensa-
tion claimed in the application for hearing. 
(ii) The order described in Subsection (4)(a)(i) may 
be entered on the motion of the: 
(A) Division of Adjudication; 
(B) employee's employer; or 
(C) employer's insurance carrier. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a), the Division of Adjudica-
tion may dismiss a claim: 
(i) without prejudice; or 
(ii) with prejudice only if: 
(A) the Division of Adjudication adjudicates 
the merits of the employee's entitlement to the 
compensation claimed in the application for 
hearing; or 
(B) the employee fails to comply with Subsec-
tion (2)(a)(ii). 
(c) If a claim is dismissed without prejudice under 
Subsection (4)(b), the employee is subject to the time 
limits under Subsection (2)(a) to claim compensation 
under this chapter. 
(5) A claim for compensation under this chapter is subject 
to a claim or lien for recovery under Section 26-19-5. 2004 
34A-2-418. Awards — Medical, nursing, hospital, and 
burial expenses — Artificial means and appli-
ances. 
(1) In addition to the compensation provided in this chapter 
or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, the employer or 
the insurance carrier shall pay reasonable sums for medical, 
nurse, and hospital services, for medicines, and for artificial 
means, appliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the 
injured employee. 
(2) If death results from the injury, the employer or the 
insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses in ordinary 
cases as established by rule. 
(3) If a compensable accident results in the breaking of or 
loss of an employee's artificial means or appliance including 
eyeglasses, the employer or insurance carrier shall provide a 
replacement of the artificial means or appliance. 
(4) An administrative law judge may require the employer 
or insurance carrier to maintain the artificial means or 
appliances or provide the employee with a replacement of any 
artificial means or appliance for the reason of breakage, wear 
and tear, deterioration, or obsolescence. 
(5) An administrative law judge may, in unusual cases, 
order, as the administrative law judge considers just and 
proper, the payment of additional sums: 
(a) for burial expenses; or 
(b) to provide for artificial means or appliances. 1997 
34A-2-419. A.greements in addition to compensation 
and benefits. 
(1) (a) Subject to the approval of the division, any employer 
securing the payment of workers' compensation benefits 
for its employees under Section 34A-2-201 may enter into 
or continue any agreement with the employer's employees 
to provide compensation or other benefits in addition to 
the compensation and other benefits provided by this 
chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) An agreement may not be approved if it requires 
contributions from the employees, unless it confers ben-
efits in addition to those provided under this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, at least com-
mensurate with the contributions. 
(c) An agreement for additional benefits may be termi-
nated by the division if: 
(i) it appears that the agreement is not fairly 
administered; 
(ii) its operation discloses defects threatening its 
solvency; or 
(iii) for any substantial reason it fails to accom-
plish the purposes of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(d) If the agreement is terminated, the division shall 
determine the proper distribution of any remaining as-
sets. 
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(e) The termination under Subsection (l)(c) becomes a 
final order of the commission effective 30 days from the 
date the division terminates the agreement, unless within 
the 30 days either the employer or employee files an 
application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication 
in accordance with Part 8, Adjudication. The application 
for hearing may contest: 
(i) the recommendation to terminate the agree-
ment; 
(ii) the distribution of remaining assets after ter-
mination; or 
(iii) both the recommendation to terminate and the 
distribution of remaining assets. 
(2) (a) Any employer who makes a deduction from the 
wages or salary of any employee to pay for the statutory 
benefits of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(b) Subject to the supervision of the division, nothing in 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, 
may be construed as preventing the employer and the 
employer's employees from entering into mutual con-
tracts and agreements respecting hospital benefits and 
accommodations, medical and surgical services, nursing, 
and medicines to be furnished to the employees as pro-
vided in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, if no direct or indirect profit is made by any 
employer as a result of the contract or agreement. 
(3) The purpose and intent of this section is that, where 
hospitals are maintained and medical and surgical services 
and medicines furnished by the employer from payments by, 
or assessments on, the employer's employees, the payments or 
assessments may not be more or greater than necessary to 
make these benefits self-supporting for the care and treatment 
of the employer's employees. Money received or retained by 
the employer from the employees for the purpose of these 
benefits shall be paid and applied to these services. Any 
hospitals so maintained in whole or in part by payments or 
assessment of employees are subject to the inspection and 
supervision of the division as to services and treatment 
rendered to the employees. . 1997 
) 
34A-2-420. Continuing jurisdiction of commission — 
No authority to change statutes of limitation 
— Authority to destroy records — Interest on 
award — Authority to approve final settle-
ment claims. -
(1) (a) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over 
each case shall be continuing. 
(b) After notice and hearing, the Division of Adjudica-
tion, commissioner, or Appeals Board in accordance with 
Part 8, Adjudication, may from time to time modify or 
change a former finding or order of the commission. 
(c) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in 
any respect the statutes of limitations contained in other 
sections of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(d) The commission may not in any respect change the 
statutes of limitation referred to in Subsection (l)(c). 
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and 
inactive for ten years, other than cases of total permanent 
disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 
34A-2-417, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commis-
sion. 
(3) Awards made by a final order of the commission shall 
include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date 
when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due 
and payable. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and Section 34A-2-108, 
an administrative law judge shall review and may approve the 
agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final: 
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disabil-
ity, or death benefit entitlements under this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; or 
(b) commutation and settlement of reasonable future 
medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements under 
this chapter or Chapter 3 by means of a lump sum 
payment, structured settlement, or other appropriate 
payout. 1997 
34A-2-421. Lump-sum payments. 
An administrative law judge, under special circumstances 
and when the same is deemed advisable, may commute 
periodic benefits to one or more lump-sum payments. 1997 
34A-2-422. Compensation exempt from execution. 
Compensation before payment shall be exempt from all 
claims of creditors, and from attachment or execution, and 
shall be paid only to employees or their dependents, except as 
provided in Sections 26-19-5 and 34A-2-417. 2004 
34A-2-423. Survival of claim in case of death. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Estate" is as defined in Section 75-1-201. 
(b) "Personal representative" is as defined in Section 
75-1-201. 
(2) The personal representative of the estate of an employee 
may adjudicate an employee's claim for compensation under 
this chapter if in accordance with this chapter, the employee 
files a claim: 
(a) before the employee dies; and 
(b) for compensation for an industrial accident or occu-
pational disease for which compensation is payable under 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(3) If the commission finds that the employee is entitled to 
compensation under this chapter for the claim described in 
Subsection (2)(a), the commission shall order that compensa-
tion be paid for the period: 
(a) beginning on the day on which the employee is 
entitled to receive compensation under this chapter; and 
(b) ending on the day on which the employee dies. 
(4) (a) Compensation awarded under Subsection (3) shall 
be paid to: 
(i) if the employee has one or more dependents on 
the day on which the employee dies, to the depen-
dents of the employee; or 
(ii) if the employee has no dependents on the day 
on which the employee dies, to the estate of the 
employee. 
(b) The commission may apportion any compensation 
paid to dependents under this Subsection (4) in the 
manner that the commission considers just and equitable. 
(5) If an employee that files a claim under this chapter dies 
from the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the 
basis of the employee's claim, the compensation awarded 
under this section shall be in addition to death benefits 
awarded in accordance with Section 34A-2-414. 2003 
1
 PART 5 
INDUSTRIAL NOISE 
34A-2-501. Definitions. 
(1) "Harmful industrial noise" means: 
(a) sound that results in acoustic trauma such as 
sudden instantaneous temporary noise or impulsive or 
impact noise exceeding 140 dB peak sound pressure 
levels; or 
(b) the sound emanating from equipment and ma-
chines during employment exceeding the following per-
missible sound levels, dBAslow response, and correspond-
ing durations per day, in hours: 
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Sound Level 
90 
92 
95 
97 
100 
102 
105 
110 
115 
Duration 
8 
6 
4 
3 
2 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0.25 c 
(2) "Loss of hearing" means binaural hearing loss measured 
in decibels with frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 
cycles per second (Hertz). If the average decibel loss at 500, 
1,000,2,000, and 3,000 cycles per second (Hertz) is 25 decibels 
or less, usually no hearing impairment exists. 1997 
34A-2-502. Intensity tests. 
(1) The commission may conduct tests to determine the 
intensity of noise at places of employment. 
(2) An administrative law judge may consider tests con-
ducted by the commission, and any other tests taken by 
authorities in the field of sound engineering, as evidence of 
harmful industrial noise. 1997 
34A-2-503. Loss of hearing — Occupational hearing 
loss due to noise to be compensated. 
(1) Permanent hearing loss caused by exposure to harmful 
industrial noise or by direct head injury shall be compensated 
according to the terms and conditions of this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) A claim for compensation for hearing loss for harmful 
industrial noise may not be paid under this chapter or 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, unless it can be 
demonstrated by a professionally controlled sound test that 
the employee has been exposed to harmful industrial noise as 
denned in Section 34A-2-501 while employed by the employer 
against whom the claim)is made. 1997 
34A-2-504. Loss of hearing — Extent of employer's 
liability. 
(1) An employer is liable only for the hearing loss of an 
employee that arises out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment for that employer. 
(2) If previous occupational hearing loss or nonoccupational 
hearing impairment is established by competent evidence, the 
employer may not be liable for the prior hearing loss so 
established, whether or not compensation has previously been 
paid or awarded. The employer is liable only for the difference 
between the percentage of hearing loss presently established 
and that percentage of prior hearing loss established by 
preemployment audiogram or other competent evidence. 
(3) The date for compensation for occupational hearing loss 
shall be determined by the date of direct head injury or the 
last date when harmful industrial noise contributed substan-
tially in causing the hearing loss. 1997 
34A-2-505. Loss of hearing — Compensation for per-
manent partial disability. 
(1) Compensation for permanent partial disability for bin-
aural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the 
percentage of binaural hearing loss by 109 weeks of compen-
sation benefits as provided in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) When an employee files one or more claims for hearing 
loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist 
shall be deducted from any subsequent award by the commis-
sion. 
(3) In no event shall compensation benefits be paid for total 
or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 109 weeks of com-
pensation benefits. 1997 
34A-2-506. Loss of hearing — Time for filing claim. 
An employee's occupational hearing loss shall be reported to 
the employer pursuant to Section 34A-2-407 within 180 days 
of the date the employee: 
(1) first suffered altered hearing; and 
(2) knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have known, that the hearing loss was caused by 
employment. 1997 
34A-2-507. Measuring hearing loss. 
(1) The degree of hearing loss shall be established, no 
sooner than six weeks after termination of exposure to the 
harmful industrial noise, by audiometric determination of 
hearing threshold level performed by medical or paramedical 
professionals recognized by the commission, as measured from 
0 decibels on an audiometer calibrated to ANSI-S3.6-1969, 
American National Standard "Specifications for Audiometers" 
(1969). 
(2) (a) In any evaluation of occupational hearing loss, only 
hearing levels at frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 
3,000 cycles per second (Hertz) shall be considered. The 
individual measurements for each ear shall be added 
together and then shall be divided by four to determine 
the average decibel loss in each ear. 
(b) lb determine the percentage of hearing loss in each 
ear, the average decibel loss for each decibel of loss 
exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by 1.5% up to the 
maximum of 100% which is reached at 91.7 decibels. 
(3) Binaural hearing loss or the percentage of binaural 
hearing loss is determined by: 
(a) multiplying the percentage of hearing loss in the 
better ear by five; 
(b) adding the amount under Subsection (3)(a) with the 
percentage of hearing loss in the poorer ear; and 
(c) dividing the number calculated under Subsection 
(3)(b)bysix. 1997 
PART6 
MEDICAL EVALUATIONS 
34A-2-601. Medical panel, director, or consultant — 
Findings and reports — Objections to report 
— Hearing — Expenses. 
(1) (a) The Division of Adjudication may refer the medical 
aspects of a case described in this Subsection (l)(a) to a 
medical panel appointed by an administrative law judge 
(i) upon the filing of a claim for compensatior 
arising out of and in the course of employment for: 
• (A) disability by accident; or 
(B) death by accident; and 
(ii) if the employer or the employer's insurano 
carrier denies liability. 
(b) An administrative law judge may appoint a medics 
panel appointed by an administrative law judge upon th 
filing of a claim for compensation based upon disability c 
death due to an occupational disease. 
(c) A medical panel appointed under this section sha 
consist of one or more physicians specializing in tr 
treatment of the disease or condition involved in tl 
claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an imparti 
medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a contr 
verted case, the division may employ a medical director 
one or more medical, consultants:
 N 
(i) on a full-time or part-time basis; and 
(ii) for the purpose of: 
(A) evaluating the medical evidence; and 
(B) advising an administrative law judge w: 
respect to the administrative law judge's u 
mate fact-finding responsibility. 
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(e) If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or 
one or more medical consultants, the medical director or 
one or more medical consultants shall be allowed to 
function in the same manner and under the same proce-
dures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) A medical panel, medical director, or medical con-
sultant may do the following to the extent the medical 
panel, medical director, or medical consultant determines 
that it is necessary or desirable: 
(i) conduct a study; 
(ii) take an x-ray; 
(iii) perform a test; or 
(iv) if authorized by an administrative law judge, 
conduct a post-mortem examination. 
(b) A medical panel, medical director, or medical con-
sultant shall make: 
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law 
judge in a form prescribed by the Division of Adjudi-
cation; and 
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law 
judge may require. 
(c) In an occupational disease case, in addition to the 
requirements of Subsection (2)(b), a medical panel, med-
ical director, or medical consultant shall certify to the 
administrative law judge: 
(i) the extent, if any, of the disability of the claim-
ant from performing work for remuneration or profit; 
(ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or 
death, in the opinion of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultant results from the occu-
pational disease; and 
(iii) (A) whether any other causes have aggra-
vated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way 
contributed to the disability or death; and 
(B) if another cause has contributed to the 
disability or death, the extent in percentage to 
which the other cause has contributed to the 
disability or death. 
(d) (i) The administrative law judge shall promptly 
distribute full copies of a report submitted to the 
administrative law judge under this Subsection (2) by 
certified mail with return receipt requested to: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; and 
(C) the employer's insurance carrier. 
(ii) Within 15 days after the report described in 
Subsection (2)(d)(i) is deposited in the United States 
post office, the following may file with the adminis-
trative law judge written objections to the report: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; or 
(C) the employer's insurance carrier. 
(iii) If no written objections are filed within the 
period described in Subsection (2)(d)(ii), the report is 
considered admitted in evidence. 
(e) (i) The administrative law judge may base the 
administrative law judge's finding and decision on 
the report of: 
(A) a medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) one or more medical consultants. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e)(i), an ad-
ministrative law judge is not bound by a report 
described in Subsection (2)(e)(i) if other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary 
finding. 
(f) (i) If an objection to a report is filed under Subsec-
tion (2)(d), the administrative law judge may set the 
case for hearing to determine the facts and issues 
involved. 
(ii) At a hearing held pursuant to this Subsection 
(2)(f), any party may request the administrative law 
judge to have any of the following present at the 
hearing for examination and cross-examination: 
(A) the chair of the medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) the one or more medical consultants, 
(iii) For good cause shown, the administrative law 
judge may order the following to be present at the 
hearing for examination and cross-examination: 
(A) a member of a medical panel, with or 
without the chair of the medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) a medical consultant. 
(g) (i) The written report of a medical panel, medical 
director, or one or more medical consultants may be 
received as an exhibit at the hearing described in 
Subsection (2)(f). 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(g)(i), a report 
received as an exhibit under Subsection (2)(g)(i) may 
not be considered as evidence in the case except as far 
as the report is sustained by the testimony admitted. 
(h) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a 
medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant 
before July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund established in Section 34A-
2-702: 
(i) expenses of the study and report of the medical 
panel, medical director, or medical consultant; and 
(ii) the expenses of the medical panel's, medical 
director's, or medical consultant's appearance before 
the administrative law judge, 
(i) (i) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a 
medical panel, medical director, or medical consul-
tant on or after July 1, 1997, the commission shall 
pay out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund estab-
lished in Section 34A-2-704 the expenses of: 
(A) the study and report of the medical panel, 
medical director, or medical consultant; and 
(B) the medical panel's, medical director's, or 
medical consultant's appearance before the ad-
ministrative law judge. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34A-2-704, the ex-
penses described in Subsection (2)(i)(i) shall be paid 
from the Uninsured Employers' Fund whether or not 
the employment relationship during which the indus-
trial accident or occupational disease occurred is 
localized in Utah as described in Subsection 34A-2-
704(20). 2002 
34A-2-602. Physical examinations. 
(1) The division or an administrative law judge may require 
an employee claiming the right to receive compensation under 
this chapter to submit to a medical examination at any time, 
and from time to time, at a place reasonably convenient for the 
employee, and as may be provided by the rules of the commis-
sion. 
(2) If an employee refuses to submit to an examination 
under Subsection (1), or obstructs the examination, the em-
ployee's right to have the employee's claim for compensation 
considered, if the employee's claim is pending before an 
administrative law judge, commissioner, or Appeals Board, or 
to receive any payments for compensation theretofore granted 
by a final order of the commission, shall be suspended during 
the period of the refusal or obstruction. 1997 
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34A-2-603. Autopsy in death cases — Certified pathol-
ogist — Attending physicians — Penalty for 
refusal to permit — Liability. 
(1) (a) On the filing of a claim for compensation for death 
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, when, in the opinion of the commissioner or 
the commissioner's designee it is necessary to accurately 
and scientifically ascertain the cause of death, an autopsy 
may be ordered by the commissioner or the commission-
er's designee. 
(b) The commissioner or the commissioner's designee 
shall: 
(i) designate the certified pathologist to make the 
autopsy; and 
(ii) determine who shall pay the charge of the 
certified pathologist making the autopsy. 
(2) Any person interested may designate a duly licensed 
physician to attend the autopsy ordered under Subsection (1). 
(3) The findings of the certified pathologist performing the 
autopsy shall be filed with the commission. 
(4) All proceedings for compensation shall be suspended 
upon refusal of a claimant or claimants to permit such autopsy 
when ordered under Subsection (1). 
(5) When an autopsy has been performed pursuant to an 
order of the commissioner or the commissioner's designee no 
cause of action shall he against any person, firm, or corpora-
tion for participating in or requesting the autopsy. 1997 
34A-2-604. Employee leaving place of treatment. 
(1) An injured employee who desires to leave the locality in 
which the employee has been employed during the treatment 
of the employee's injury, or to leave this state, shall: 
(a) report to the employee's attending physician for 
examination; 
(b) notify the division in writing of the intention to 
leave; and 
(c) accompany the notice with a certificate from the 
attending physician setting forth: 
(i) the exact nature of the injury; 
(ii) the condition of the employee; and 
(hi) a statement of the probable length of time 
. disability will continue. 
(2) An employee may leave the locality in which the em-
ployee was employed only after: 
(a) complying with Subsection (1); and 
(b) receiving the written consent of the division. 
(3) If an employee does not comply with this section, com-
pensation may not be allowed during the absence. 1997 
PART 7 
FUNDS 
34A-2-701. Premium assessment restricted account for 
safety. 
(1) There is created in the General Fund a restricted 
account known as the Workplace Safety Account. 
(2) An amount equal to 0.25% of the premium income 
remitted to the state treasurer pursuant to Subsection 59-9-
101(2)(c) shall be deposited in the Workplace Safety Account in 
the General Fund for use by the commission to promote Utah 
workplace safety. 
(3) Monies shall be appropriated by the Legislature from 
the restricted account to the commission for use by the 
commission to: 
(a) improve safety consultation services available to 
Utah employers; or 
(b) provide for electronic or print media advertising 
campaigns designed to promote workplace safety. 
(4) From monies appropriated by the Legislature from the 
restricted account to the commission for use by the commis-
sion, the commission may fund other safety programs or 
initiatives recommended to it by its state workers' compensa-
tion advisory council created under Section 34A-2-107. 
(5) The commission shall annually report to the governor, 
the Legislature, and its state council regarding: 
(a) the use of the monies appropriated under Subsec-
tion (3) or (4); and 
(b) the use of the monies on the safety of Utah's 
workplaces. 
(6) The monies deposited in the restricted account: 
(a) shall be: 
(i) used only for the activities described in Subsec-
tion (3) or (4); and 
(ii) expended according to processes that can be 
verified by audit; and 
(b) may not be used for: 
(i) administrative costs unrelated to the restricted 
account; or 
(ii) any activity of the commission other than the 
activities of the commission described in Subsection 
(3) or (4). 1997 
34A-2-702. Employers' Reinsurance Fund — Injury 
causing death — Burial expenses — Payments 
to dependents. 
(1) (a) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
for the purpose of making payments for industrial acci-
dents or occupational diseases occurring on or before June 
30,1994. The payments shall be made in accordance with 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall have no liability 
for industrial accidents or occupational diseases occurring 
on or after July 1, 1994. 
(b) The Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall succeed to 
all monies previously held in the "Special Fund," the 
"Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund." 
(c) The commissioner shall appoint ah administrator of 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
(d) The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and the administrator 
shall make provisions for and direct its distribution. 
(e) Reasonable costs of administering the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund or other fees may be paid from the 
fund. 
(2) The state treasurer shall: 
(a) receive workers' compensation premium assess-
ments from the State Tax Commission; and 
(b) invest the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to ensure 
maximum investment return for both long and short term 
investments in accordance with Section 51-7-12.5. 
(3) The administrator may employ, retain, or appoint coun-
sel to represent the Employers' Reinsurance Fund m proceed-
ings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund. 
If requested by the commission, the attorney genensd shall aid 
in representation of the fund. 
(4) The liability of the state, its departments, agencies, 
mstramentalities, elected or appointed officials, or other duly 
authorized agents, with respect to payment of any compensa-
tion benefits, expenses, fees, medical expenses, or disburse-
ment properly chargeable against the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund, is limited to the cash or assets in the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, and they are not otherwise, in any way, 
liable for the operation, debts, or obligations of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund. 
(5) If injury causes death within a period of 312 weeks from 
the date of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier 
shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided in 
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Section 34A-2-418, and further benefits in the amounts and to 
the persons in accordance with Subsections (5)(a) through (c). 
(a), (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the 
time of the death, the payment by the employer or its 
insurance carrier shall be 66 %% of the decedent's 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but not 
more than a maximum of 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
not less than a minimum of $45 per week, plus $5 for 
a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent 
minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but 
not exceeding the average weekly wage of the em-
ployee at the time of the injury, and not exceeding 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week. 
(ii) Compensation shall continue during depen-
dency for the remainder of the period between the 
date of the death and the expiration of 312 weeks 
after the date of the injury. 
(hi) The payment by the employer or its insurance 
carrier to wholly dependent persons during depen-
dency following the expiration of the first 312-week 
period described in Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be an 
amount equal to the weekly benefits paid to those 
wholly dependent persons during that initial 312-
week period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal 
Social Security death benefits paid to those wholly 
dependent persons. 
(iv) The issue of dependency shall be subject to 
review by an administrative law judge at the end of 
the initial 312-week period and annually after the 
initial 312-week period. If in any review it is deter-
mined that, under the facts and circumstances exist-
ing at that time, the applicant is no longer a wholly 
dependent person, the applicant may be considered a 
partly dependent or nondependent person and shall 
be paid such benefits as the administrative law judge 
may determine under Subsection (5)(b)(iii). 
(v) For purposes of any dependency determination, 
a surviving spouse of a deceased employee shall be 
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a 
312-week period from the date of death of the em-
ployee. This presumption shall not apply after the 
initial 312-week period and, in detennining the then 
existing annual income of the surviving spouse, the 
administrative law judge shall exclude 50% of any 
federal Social Security death benefits received by that 
surviving spouse, 
(b) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time 
of the death, the payment shall be 66 %% of the 
decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per 
week. 
(ii) Compensation shall continue during depen-
dency for the remainder of the period between the 
date of death and the expiration of 312 weeks after 
the date of injury as the administrative law judge in 
each case may determine. Compensation may not 
amount to more than a maximum of $30,000. 
(iii) The benefits provided for in this subsection 
shall be in keeping with the circumstances and con-
ditions of dependency existing at the date of injury, 
and any amount awarded by the administrative law 
judge under this subsection shall be consistent with 
the general provisions of this chapter and Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(iv) Benefits to persons determined to be partly 
dependent under Subsection (5)(a)(v) shall be deter-
mined by the administrative law judge in keeping 
with the circumstances and conditions of dependency 
existing at the time of the dependency review and 
may be paid in an amount not exceeding the maxi-
mum weekly rate that partly dependent persons 
would receive if wholly dependent. 
(v) Payments under this section shall be paid to 
such persons during their dependency by the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier. 
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and also 
partly dependent persons at the time of death, the admin-
istrative law judge may apportion the benefits as the 
administrative law judge considers just and equitable; 
provided, that the total benefits awarded to all parties 
concerned do not exceed the maximum provided for by 
law. 
(6) The Employers' Reinsurance Fund: 
(a) shall be: 
(i) used only in accordance with Subsection (1) for: 
(A) the purpose of making payments for indus-
trial accidents or occupational diseases occurring 
on or before June 30, 1994, in accordance with 
this section and Section 34A-2-703; and 
(B) payment of: 
(I) reasonable costs of administering the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund; or 
(II) fees required to be paid by the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund; 
(ii) expended according to processes that can be 
verified by audit; and 
(b) may not be used for: 
(i) administrative costs unrelated to the fund; or 
(ii) any activity of the commission other than an 
activity described in Subsection (6)(a). 1997 
34A-2-703. Payments from Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
If an employee, who has at least a 10% whole person 
permanent impairment from any cause or origin, subse-
quently incurs an additional impairment by an accident 
arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment 
during the period of July 1, 1988, to June 30, 1994, inclusive, 
and if the additional impairment results in permanent total 
disability, the employer or its insurance carrier and the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for the payment of 
benefits as follows: 
(1) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for 
the first $20,000 of medical benefits and the initial 156 
weeks of permanent total disability compensation as 
provided in this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(2) Reasonable medical benefits in excess of the first 
$20,000 shall be paid in the first instance by the employer 
or its insurance carrier. Then, as provided in Subsection 
(5), the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse the 
employer or its insurance carrier for 50% of those ex-
penses. 
(3) After the initial 156-week period under Subsection 
(1), permanent total disability compensation payable to 
an employee under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, becomes the liability of and 
shall be paid by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
(4) If it is determined that the employee is perma-
nently and totally disabled, the employer or its insurance 
carrier shall be given credit for all prior payments of 
temporary total, temporary partial, and permanent par-
tial disability compensation made as a result of the 
industrial accident. Any overpayment by the employer or 
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its insurance carrier shall be reimbursed by the Employ-
ers' Reinsurance Fund under Subsection (5). 
(5) (a) Upon receipt of a duly verified petition, the 
Employers' Reinsurance. Fund shall reimburse the 
employer or its insurance carrier for the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund's share of medical benefits and 
compensation paid to or on behalf of an employee. A 
request for Employers' Reinsurance Fund reimburse-
ments shall be accompanied by satisfactory evidence 
of payment of the medical or disability compensation 
for which the reimbursement is requested. Each 
request is subject to review as to reasonableness by 
the administrator. The administrator may determine 
the manner of'reimbursement. 
(b) A decision of the administrator under Subsec-
tion (5) (a) may be appealed in accordance with Part 
8, Adjudication. 
(6) If, at the time an employee is determined to be 
permanently and totally disabled, the employee has other 
actionable workers' compensation claims, the employer or 
insurance carrier that is liable for the last industrial 
accident resulting in permanent total disability shall be 
liable for the benefits payable by the employer as provided 
in this section and Section 34A-2-413. The employee's 
entitlement to benefits for prior actionable claims shall 
then be determined separately on the facts of those 
claims. Any previous permanent partial disability arising 
out of those claims shall then be considered to be impair-
ments that may give rise to Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
liability under this section. 1997 
34A-2-704. Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(1) (a) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
The Uninsured Employers' Fund has the purpose of 
assisting in the payment of workers' compensation ben-
efits to any person entitled to the benefits, if: 
(i) that person's employer: 
(A) is individually, jointly, or severally liable to 
pay the benefits,; and 
(B) (I) becomes or is insolvent; 
(II) appoints or has appointed a receiver; 
or 
(III) otherwise does not have sufficient 
funds, insurance, sureties, or other security 
to cover workers' compensation liabilities; 
and 
(ii) the employment relationship between that per-
son and the person's employer is localized within the 
state as provided in Subsection (20). 
(b) The Uninsured Employers' Fund succeeds to all 
monies previously held in the Default Indemnity Fund. 
(c) If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund is liable for all obligations of the 
employer as set forth in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, with the exception of penalties 
on those obligations. 
(2) (a) Monies for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be 
deposited into the Uninsured Employers' Fund in accor-
dance with this chapter and Subsection 59-9-101(2). 
(b) The commissioner shall appoint an administrator of 
the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(c) (i) The state treasurer is the custodian of the Un-
insured Employers' Fund. 
(ii) The administrator shall make provisions for 
and direct distribution from the Uninsured Employ-
ers' Fund. 
(3.) Reasonable costs of administering the Uninsured Em-
ployers' Fund or other fees required to be paid by the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund may be paid from the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund. 
(4) The state treasurer shall: 
(a) receive workers' compensation premium assess-
ments from the State Tax Commission; and 
(b) invest the Uninsured Employers' Fund to ensure 
maximum investment return for both long and short term 
investments in accordance with Section 51-7-12.5. 
(5) (a) The administrator may employ, retain, or appoint 
counsel to represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in 
all proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on 
behalf of the; Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(b) If requested by the commission, the following shall 
aid in the representation of the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund: 
(i) the attorney general; or 
(ii) the city, attorney, or county attorney of the 
locality in which: 
(A) any investigation, hearing, or trial under 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, is pending; 
(B) the employee resides; or 
(C) an employer: 
(I) resides; or 
(II) is doing business. 
(6) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits 
paid or payable to or on behalf of an employee or the employ-
ee's dependents from the Uninsured Employers' Fund, the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund, by subrogation, has all the 
rights, powers, and benefits of the employee or the employee's 
dependents against the employer failing to make the compen-
sation payments. 
(7) (a) The receiver, trustee, liquidator* or statutory succes-
sor of an employer meeting a condition listed in (Subsec-
tion (l)(a)(i)(B) is bound by settlements of covered claims 
by the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(b) The court with jurisdiction shall grant all payments 
made under this section a priority equal to that to which 
the claimant would have been entitled in the absence of 
this section against the assets of the employer meeting a 
condition listed in Subsection.(l)(a)(i)(B). 
(c) The expenses of the Uninsured Employers' Fund in 
handling claims shall be accorded the same priority as the 
liquidator's expenses. 
(8) (a) The administrator shall periodically file the infor-
mation described in Subsection (8)(b) with the receiver, 
trustee, or liquidator of: 
(i) an employer that meets a condition listed in 
Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B); 
(ii) a public agency insurance mutual, as defined in 
Section 31A-1-103, that meets a condition listed in 
Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B); or . 
(hi) an insolvent insurance carrier. 
(b) The information required to be filed under Subsec-
tion (8)(a) is: 
(i) statements of the covered claims paid by the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund; and 
(ii) estimates of anticipated claims against the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(c) The filings under this Subsection (8) shall preserve 
the rights of the Uninsured Employers' Fund for claims 
against the assets of the employer that meets a condition 
listed in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B). 
(9) When smy injury or death for which compensation is 
payable from the Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused 
by the wrongful act or neglect of another person not in the 
same employment, the Uninsured Employers' Fundi has the 
same rights as allowed under Section 34A-2-106. 
(10) The Uninsured Employers' Fund, subject to approval of 
the administrator, shall discharge its obligations by: 
(a) adjusting its own claims; or 
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(b) contracting with an adjusting company, risk man-
agement company, insurance company, or other company 
that has expertise and capabilities in adjusting and 
paying workers' compensation claims. 
(11) (a) For the purpose of mamtaining the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund, an administrative law judge, upon 
rendering a decision with respect to any claim for work-
ers' compensation benefits in which an employer that 
meets a condition listed in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B) was duly 
joined as a party, shall: 
(i) order the employer that meets a condition listed 
in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B) to reimburse the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund for all benefits paid to or on behalf 
of an injured employee by the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund along with interest, costs, and attorneys' fees; 
and 
(ii) impose a penalty against the employer that 
meets a condition listed in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B) of 
15% of the value of the total award in connection with 
the claim that shall be paid into the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund. 
(b) Awards may be docketed as other awards under this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(12) The liability of the state, the commission, and the state 
treasurer, with respect to payment of any compensation ben-
efits, expenses, fees, or disbursement properly chargeable 
against the Uninsured Employers' Fund, is limited to the 
assets in the Uninsured Employers' Fund, and they are not 
otherwise in any way liable for the making of any payment. 
(13) The commission may make reasonable rules for the 
processing and payment of claims for compensation from the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
(14) (a) (i) If it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Em-
ployers' Fund to pay benefits under this section to an 
employee described in Subsection (14)(a)(ii), the Un-
insured Employers' fund may assess all other self-
insured employers amounts necessary to pay: 
(A) the obligations of the Uninsured Employ-
ers' Fund subsequent to a condition listed in 
Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B) occurring; 
(B) /the expenses of handling covered claims 
subsequent to a condition listed in Subsection 
(l)(a)(i)(B) occurring; 
(C) the cost of examinations under Subsection 
(15); and 
(D) other expenses authorized by this section, 
(ii) This Subsection (14) applies to benefits paid to 
an employee of: 
(A) a self-insured employer, as defined in Sec-
tion 34A-2-201.5, that meets a condition listed in 
Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B); or 
(B) if the self-insured employer that meets a 
condition described in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B) is a 
public agency insurance mutual, a member of the 
public agency insurance mutual. 
(b) The assessments of each self-insured employer 
shall be in the proportion that the manual premium of the 
self-insured employer for the preceding calendar year 
bears to the manual premium of all self-insured employ-
ers for the preceding calendar year. 
(c) Each self-insured employer shall be notified of the 
self-insured employer's assessment not later than 30 days 
before the day on which the assessment is due. 
(d) (i) A self-insured employer may not be assessed in 
any year an amount greater than 2% of that self-
insured employer's manual premium for the preced-
ing calendar year. 
(ii) If the maximum assessment does not provide 
in any one year an amount sufficient to make all 
necessary payments from the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund for one or more self-insured employers that 
meet a condition listed in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B), the 
unpaid portion shall be paid as soon as funds become 
available. 
(e) All self-insured employers are liable under this 
section for a period not to exceed three years after the day 
on which the Uninsured Employers' Fund first pays 
benefits to an employee described in Subsection (14)(a)(ii) 
for the self-insured employer that meets a condition listed 
in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B). 
(f) This Subsection (14) does not apply to claims made 
against a self-insured employer that meets a condition 
listed in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B) if the condition listed in 
Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B) occurred prior to July 1, 1986. 
(15) (a) The following shall notify the division of any infor-
mation indicating that any of the following may be insol-
vent or in a financial condition hazardous to its employees 
or the public: 
(i) a self-insured employer; or 
(ii) if the self-insured employer is a public agency 
insurance mutual, a member of the public agency 
insurance mutual. 
(b) Upon receipt of the notification described in Subsec-
tion (15)(a) and with good cause appearing, the division 
may order an examination of: 
(i) that self-insured employer; or 
(ii) if the self-insured employer is a public agency 
insurance mutual, a member of the public agency 
mutual. 
(c) The cost of the examination ordered under Subsec-
tion (15)(b) shall'be assessed against all self-insured 
employers as provided in Subsection (14). 
(d) The results of the examination ordered under Sub-
section (15)(b) shall be kept confidential. 
(16) (a) In any claim against an employer by the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund, or by or on behalf of the employee to 
whom or to whose dependents compensation and other 
benefits are paid or payable from the Uninsured Employ-
ers' Fund, the burden of proof is on the employer or other 
party in interest objecting to the claim. 
(b) The claim described in Subsection (16)(a) is pre-
sumed to be valid up to the full amount of workers' 
compensation benefits claimed by the employee or the 
employee's dependents. 
(c) This Subsection (16) applies whether the claim is 
filed in court or in an adjudicative proceeding under the 
authority of the commission. 
(17) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole 
proprietorship may not recover compensation or other benefits 
from the Uninsured Employers' Fund if: 
(a) the person is not included as an employee under 
Subsection 34A-2-104(3); or 
(b) the person is included as an employee under Sub-
section 34A-2-104(3), but: 
(i) the person's employer fails to insure or other-
wise provide adequate payment of direct compensa-
tion; and 
(ii) the failure described in Subsection (17)(b)(i) is 
attributable to an act or omission over which the 
person had or shared control or responsibility. 
(18) A director or officer of a corporation may not recover 
compensation or other benefits from the Uninsured Employ-
ers' Fund if the director or officer is excluded from coverage 
under Subsection 34A-2-104(4). 
(19) The Uninsured Employers' Fund: 
(a) shall be: 
(i) used in accordance with this section only for: 
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(A) the purpose of assisting in the payment of 
workers' compensation benefits in accordance 
with Subsection (1); and 
(B) in accordance with Subsection (3), pay-
ment of: 
(I) reasonable costs of administering the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund; or 
(II) fees required to be paid by the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund; and 
(ii) expended according to processes that can be 
verified jby audit; and 
(b) may not be used for: 
(i) administrative. costs unrelated to the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund; or 
(ii) any activity of the commission other than an 
activity described in Subsection (19)(a). 
(20) (a) For purposes of Subsection (1), an employment 
relationship is localized in the state if: 
(i) (A) the employer who is liable for the benefits 
has a business premise in the state; and 
(B) (I) the contract for hire is entered into in 
the state; or 
(II) the employee regularly performs work 
duties in the state for the employer who is 
liable for the benefits; or 
(ii) the employee is: 
(A) a resident of the state; and 
(B) regularly performs work duties in the 
state for the employer who is liable for the 
benefits! 
(b) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission shall by 
rule define what constitutes regularly performing work 
duties in the state. 2004 
PART 8 
ADJUDICATION 
) 
34A-2-801. Initiating adjudicative proceedings — Pro-
cedure for review of administrative action. 
(1) (a) To contest an action of the employee's employer or 
its insurance carrier concerning a compensable industrial 
accident or occupational disease alleged by the employee, 
any of the following shall file an application for hearing 
with the Division of Adjudication: 
(i) the employee; or 
(ii) a representative of the employee, the qualifica-
tions of whom are defined in rule by the commission. 
(b) lb appeal the imposition of a penalty or other 
administrative act imposed by the division on the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier for failure to comply with 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, 
any of the following shall file an application for hearing 
with the Division of Adjudication: 
(i) the employer; 
(ii) the insurance carrier; or 
(in) a representative of either the employer or the 
insurance carrier, the qualifications of whom are 
defined in rule by the commission. 
(c) A physician, as defined in Section 34A-2-111, may 
file an application for hearing in accordance with Section 
34A-2-407. 
(d) An attorney may file an application for hearing in 
accordance with Section 34A-1-309. 
(2) Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an 
administrative law judge in accordance with Subsection (3), 
the decision of an administrative law judge on an application 
for hearing filed under Subsection (1) is a final order of the 
commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued. 
(3) (a) A party in interest may appeal the decision of an 
administrative law judge by filing a motion for review 
with the Division of Adjudication within 30 days of the 
date the decision is issued. 
(b) Unless a party in interest to the appeal requests 
under Subsection (3)(c) that the appeal be heard by the 
Appeals Board, the commissioner shall hear the review. 
(c) A party in interest may request that an appeal be 
heard by the Appeals Board by filing the request with the 
Division of Adjudication: 
(i) as part of the motion for review; or 
(ii) if requested by a party in interest who did not 
file a motion for review, within 20 days of the date the 
motion for review is filed with the Division of Adju-
dication, 
(d) A case appealed to the Appeals Board shall be 
decided by the majority vote of the Appeals Board. 
(4) All records on appeals shall be maintained by the 
Division of Adjudication. Those records shall include an ap-
peal docket showing the receipt and disposition of the appeals 
on review. 
(5) Upon appeal, the commissioner or Appeals Board shall 
make its' decision in accordance with Section 34A-1-303. 
(6) The commissioner or Appeals Board shall promptly 
notify the parties to any proceedings before it of its decision, 
including its findings and conclusions. 
(7) The decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board is 
- final unless withiin 30 days after the date the decision is issued 
further appeal is initiated under the provisions of this section 
or Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(8) (a) Within 30 days after the date the decision of the 
commissioner or Appeals Board is issued, any aggrieved 
party may secure judicial review by commencing an 
action in the court of appeals against the commissioner or 
Appeals Board for the review of the decision of the 
commissioner or Appeals Board. 
(b) In an action filed under Subsection (8)(a): 
(i) any other party to the proceeding before the 
commissioner or Appeals Board shall be made a 
party; and 
(ii) the commission shall be made a party. 
(c) A party claiming to be aggrieved may seek judicial 
review only if the party has exhausted the party's reme-
dies before the commission as provided by this section. 
(d) At the request of the court of appeals, the commis-
sion shall certify and file with the court all documents and 
papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the 
matter together with the decision of the commissioner or 
Appeals Board. 2003 
34A-2-802. Rules of evidence and procedure before 
commission — Admissible evidence. 
(1) The commission, the commissioner, an administrative 
law judge, or the Appeals Board, is not bound by the usual 
common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical 
or formal rules or procedure, other than as provided in this 
section or as adopted by the commission pursuant to this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The 
commission may make its investigation in such manner as in 
its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial 
rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the 
chapter. 
(2) The commission may receive as evidence and use as 
proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and 
relevant including, but not limited to the following: 
(a) depositions and sworn testimony presented in open 
hearings; 
(b) reports of attending or examining physicians, or of 
pathologists; 
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(c) reports of investigators appointed by the commis-
sion; 
(d) reports of employers, including copies of time 
sheets, book accounts, or other records; or 
(e) hospi ta l records i n the case of an injured or diseased 
employee. 1997 
34A-2-803. Violation of judgments, orders, decrees, or 
provisions of chapter — Grade of offense. 
(1) An employer, employee, or other person is guilty of a 
misdemeanor if that employer, employee, or other person 
violates this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act, including: 
(a) doing any act prohibited by this chapter or Chapter 
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; 
(b) failing or refusing to perform any duty lawfully 
imposed under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act; 
(c) failing, neglecting, or refusing to obey any lawful 
order given or made by the commission, or any judgment 
or decree made by any court in connection with the 
provisions of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act. 
(2) Every day during which any person fails to observe and 
comply with any order of the commission, or to perform any 
duty imposed by this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, shall constitute a separate and distinct offense. 
1997 
PART 9 
PRESUMPTIONS FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL ; 
SERVICES PROVIDERS 
34A-2-901. Workers' compensation presumption for 
emergency medical services providers. 
(1) An emergency medical services provider who claims to 
have contracted a disease, as defined by Section 78-29-101, as 
a result of a significant exposure in the performance of his 
duties as an emergency medical services provider, is presumed 
to have contracted the disease by accident during the course of 
his duties as an emergency medical services provider if: 
(a) his employment or service as an emergency medical 
services provider in this state commenced prior to July 1, 
1988, and he tests positive for a disease during the tenure 
of his employment or service, or within three months after 
termination of his employment or service; or 
(b) the individual's employment or service as an emer-
gency medical services provider in this state commenced 
on or after July 1, 1988, and he tests negative for any 
disease at the time his employment or service com-
menced, and again three months later, and he subse-
quently tests positive during the tenure of his employ-
ment or service, or within three months after termination 
of his employment or service. 
, (2) Each emergency medical services agency shall inform 
the emergency medical services providers that it employs or 
utilizes of the provisions and benefits of this section at 
commencement of and termination of employment or service. 
2005 
34A-2-902. Workers' compensation claims by emer-
gency medical services providers — Time lim-
its. 
(1) For all purposes of establishing a workers' compensation 
claim, the "date of accident" is presumed to be the date on 
which an emergency medical services provider first tests 
positive for a disease, as defined in Section 78-29-101. How-
ever, for purposes of establishing the rate of workers' compen-
sation benefits under Subsection 34A-2-702(5), if a positive 
test for a disease occurs within three months after termination 
of employment, the last date of employment is presumed to be 
the "date of accident." 
(2) The time limits prescribed by Section 34A-2-417 do not 
apply to an employee whose disability is due to a disease, so 
long as the employee who claims to have suffered a significant 
exposure in the service of his employer gives .notice, as 
required by Section 34A-3-108, of the "date of accident." 
(3) Any claim for workers' compensation benefits or medical 
expenses shall be filed with the Division of Adjudication of the 
Labor Commission within one year after the date on which the 
employee first becomes disabled or requires medical t reatment 
for a disease, or within one year after the termination of 
employment as an emergency medical services provider, 
whichever occurs later. 2005 
34A-2-903. Failure to be tested — Time limit for death 
benefits. 
(1) An emergency medical services provider who refuses or 
fails to be tested in accordance with Section 34A-2-901 is not 
entitled to any of the presumptions provided by this part. 
(2) Death benefits payable under Section 34A-2-702 are 
payable only if it can be established by competent evidence 
tha t death was a consequence of or result of the disease and, 
notwithstanding Subsection 34A-2-702(5), tha t death oc-
curred within six years from the date the employee first 
became disabled or required medical t reatment for the disease 
tha t caused his death. 2005 
34A-2-904. Volunteer emergency medical services pro-
viders — Workers' compensation premiums. 
(1) For purposes of receiving workers' compensation ben-
efits, any person performing the services of an emergency 
medical services provider is considered an employee of the 
entity for whom it provides those services. 
(2) (a) With regard to emergency medical services provid-
ers who perform those services for minimal or no compen-
sation on a volunteer basis, and who are primarily em-
ployed other than as emergency medical services 
providers, the amount of workers' compensation benefits 
shall be based on that primary employment. Any excess 
premiums necessary for workers' compensation shall be 
paid by the entity that utilized that individual as an 
emergency medical services provider. 
(b) With regard to emergency medical services provid-
ers who perform those services for minimal or no compen-
sation or on a volunteer basis, and who have no other 
employment, the amount of workers' compensation ben-
efits shall be the minimum benefit. Any premium neces-
sary for workers' compensation shall be paid by the entity 
that utilizes that individual as an emergency medical 
services provider. 
(3) Workers' compensation benefits are the exclusive rem-
edy for all injuries and occupational diseases, as provided by 
Title 34A, Chapters 2 and 3. However, emergency medical 
services providers described in Subsection (2) are not pre-
cluded from utilizing insurance benefits provided by a primary 
employer, or any other insurance benefits, in addition to 
workers' compensation benefits. 2005 
34A-2-905. Rulemaking authority — Rebuttable pre-
sumption. 
(1) The Labor Commission has authority to establish rules 
necessary for the purposes of this part. 
(2) The presumption provided by this par t is a rebuttable 
presumption. 2005 
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